In what follows, I offer reasons we should be skeptical of the efficacy of U.S. intelligence services. I primarily rely on AJ Rossmiller's recent memoir, "Still Broken," but I also provide other readings to suggest such disenchantment should not rest only in recent events. Rather, looking at some history of U.S. Intelligence, combined with contemporary failures, suggests we should not expect to alter this view soon.

This post is based primarily on recent books by Rossmiller and Tim Weiner, and on a New York Times report on "On Point II," a recent US Army history of the Iraq war. See the end of the post for links and a complete source list.

Jump to:
Introduction
The disillusionment of AJ Rossmiller
Precedent
Conclusion
Notes and sources

Introduction

Not long after I finished AJ Rossmiller's "Still Broken: A Recruit's Inside Account of Intelligence Failures, from Baghdad to the Pentagon," it occurred to me that I hadn't read a memoir in ages, if ever. Nor have I read anything about memories that could answer the question: what now?

I'm familiar with some research on memory --- that it doesn't always remember things well [1], that its accuracy is suspect [2], and that it's quite good at convincing us otherwise [3].

Rossmiller accounts the nearly two years he spent working for the United States' Defense Intelligence Agency as an analyst, including a six-month tour in Baghdad. By his telling, the intelligence community appeared wholly incapable of delivering accurate assessments to military and political leaders.

Such intelligence is clearly important - flaws in the system speak to the US's ability to conduct warfare.

But throughout the book, sources are at a premium. Apart from snippets of e-mails (his and others'), and the occasional news article in a footnote, Rossmiller's memory is the narrative's pillar.

In other words, I was questioning Rossmiller's stories of a stifling bureaucracy in national intelligence. Were they accurate? Were things as bad as Rossmiller remembered?

Or was he simply disgruntled?

I think things were just as bad. They may even have been worse --- even if it turns out Rossmiller's memory slips up here and there.

In what follows, I offer reasons we should be skeptical of the efficacy of U.S. intelligence services. I primarily rely on Rossmiller's memoir, but I also provide other readings to suggest such disenchantment should not rest only in recent events. Rather, looking at some history of U.S. intelligence, combined with contemporary failures, suggests we should not expect to alter this view soon.

The disillusionment of AJ Rossmiller

Jump to:
Introduction
The disillusionment of AJ Rossmiller
Precedent
Conclusion
Notes and sources

Rossmiller's reasons for joining DIA --- at least the ones he mentions --- are admirable. He was a student at Middlebury College on Sept. 11. After the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, the thought of his peers fighting and dying in the Middle East, while he spent his days in the comfort of academia, continually haunted him.

Rossmiller joined DIA immediately after graduating. He soon he volunteered to go to Baghdad.

His Iraq mission seemed to be ridden with errors from the beginning. "The first sign of trouble came during the transition from the outgoing personnel to our group, their replacement," Rossmiller writes. For the life of us, we couldn't figure out what the hell they had been doing" (30).

Later: "The people who had organized our deployment at DIA had apparently failed to communicate with [Combined Intelligence Operations Center, "the hub for U.S. intelligence in Iraq"] leadership, and upon our arrival nobody knew what to do with us" (31).

Rossmiller's eventual job took intelligence gathered in the field and organize it in a way useful to troops, one he says he performed well. (His performance reviews, included in an appendix, seem to confirm this, but never having read one before who am I to say?)

Yet the intelligence was frequently lost, misinterpreted, and jumbled as it moved up the chain of command. When troops "acted upon" his work, Rossmiller usually knew little of the result apart from reports of X suspects captured or Y soldiers killed.

Rossmiller returned to Washington unhappy, but still motivated by the hope that, if nothing else, his work was helping more than hurting.

But he found a Pentagon short on desks and computers for his team. Not all the computers they could access had proper security clearance. The administrator responsible for such things moved at a snail's pace.

Rossmiller also learned about staying "on message."

As Rossmiller's intelligence reports moved up the chain of command, they were met by editors with different viewpoints --- as one could expect.

But these editors often changed content in ways that transformed Rossmiller's conclusions. They would do so without the input, much less the consent, of Rossmiller and his colleagues.

Perhaps worst of all, Rossmiller's papers were edited to stay "on message" with the good news flowing from the Bush' administration's mouths.

In editing, "Happy became glad, likely became probable, and so on and so forth, with specific words as well as general assessments" (167). A superior once told Rossmiller, "you can't criticize the Iraqi constitution. State [Department] put a lot of work into that!" (169).

He and his fellow analysts created a "Wall of Optimism" on which they taped up drafts, red-inked full of "message" by superiors --- a wall that, apparently, those superiors were all but oblivious to.

Of course, the administration's optimism was fueled by intelligence that "predicted" such success. Meanwhile, in the bowels of the Pentagon, analysts' original assessments proved correct time and again.

Was Rossmiller as correct in his analysis as often as he says he was? I have no idea. But I found less error in his self-grading than in the fact that he saved his most damning tales for last, without telling the reader to wait for it. I nearly stopped reading after he returned from Baghdad. But I'm glad I didn't.

Precedent

Jump to:
Introduction
The disillusionment of AJ Rossmiller
Precedent
Conclusion
Notes and sources

So why should I feel secure in the thought that Rossmiller's account is, in the main, indicative of intelligence culture "on the ground"?

Because history appears to be on my side.

First, as The New York Times (among others) recently reported, we have the Army's own admissions of failure in its initial post-invasion operations in Iraq.

In "On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign," Army historians write of the Bush administration's near-absence of a plan for running Iraq once Saddam Hussein had been removed. Where strategies was in place, they were often scrapped from on high, including by Gen. Tommy Franks. Hence, the number of soldiers that ended up "on the ground" was too few and their training irrelevant to the task at hand.

Given these missteps, it seems likely that even if intelligence existed to warn commanders of impending error, it stood little chance of earning attention. Chances became even slimmer with Bush fresh from his infamous "Mission Accomplished" speech -- let's not forget the need to stay "on message."

Second, and perhaps more importantly, why should I have expected anything different? For it appears the U.S. has a long history of intelligence mistakes, misjudgments, and implosions spanning all levels of the chain of command.

I base this claim on Tim Weiner's 2007 book "Legacy of Ashes." The book is lengthy, yet names, places, and events come at you rapidly. I confess to fatigue and some skimming by the time Nixon rolled around. But as an introduction to the agency, there's no questioning that the picture is ugly.

Weiner draws on a history of the agency from its World War II days as the Office of Strategic Services to its gradual development. He relies extensively on internal histories and memos, to a more than satisfying degree for my eyes.

Politics is less the foe of intelligence here than is incompetence and inexperience.

It's not just the infamous screw-ups, like the Bay of Pigs. I clearly remember instead the number of times Weiner tells of CIA commanders in the 1950s sending agents to their deaths by dropping them into the waiting cross hairs of the Soviet bloc. The agency was regularly infiltrated by opposing intelligence services well into the Vietnam era.

The cost of these failures in lives, careers, and the untold billions of dollars presidents threw to the agency is overwhelming.

(To the claim that these missteps are but growing pains for a budding intel force, I point back to the Iraq War's intelligence disasters and ask, for heaven's sake, when we can expect the agency to begin teething?)

Certainly, inter- and intra-agency conflict and political pressure were no less rampant than they are in Rossmiller's account. These tug-of-wars undoubtedly had an effect on the agency's efficacy.

For example: In 1967 , when Lyndon Johnson, having ordered the CIA to spy on Americans, was told such a mission was illegal, Johnson is reported to have said "I'm quite aware of that." The mission hence proceeded.

Yet Johnson also moved to call for war in Vietnam following the Gulf of Tonkin attack when, had the CIA had a chance to look at the data, he might have learned the translation of communist communications intercepts were incorrect, and no attack had actually taken place.

Conclusion: And what else?

Jump to:
Introduction
The disillusionment of AJ Rossmiller
Precedent
Conclusion
Notes and sources

Have the leadership of the United States been so pugnacious, so trusting, so paranoid, or so insulated so as to keep the CIA in business all these years? To believe in the quality of intelligence they've received from defense agencies?

If they have, then given the trust-busting quality of these narratives, why should they continue to do so?

A fault of both Rossmiller and Weimer's books are they do not provide a clear response to these questions in the form of counterarguments.

In other words, what have these agencies done correctly? What are their success stories, and do they go beyond presidential proclamations of the need for such programs for the safety of Americans? Did I skim over them?

To read Weiner's book is to come away with the impression that the CIA has botched nearly every effort asked of it. To read Rossmiller's book, one might think that few, if any, accurate bits of intelligence make their way to our leaders. If no successes exist, it would have been nice for both of them to, at least, discuss the point.

Endnotes

Jump to:
Introduction
The disillusionment of AJ Rossmiller
Precedent
Conclusion
Notes and sources

[1] See Wang and Aarnodt.

[2] See Hastorf and Cantrill.

[3] See Elliot and Devine, Festinger, Festinger and Carlsmith, and Tavris and Aronson; also, for a criticism of cognitive dissonance research, see Rosenberg.

Complete bibliography

Elliot, Andrew J., and Patricia G. Devine. "On the Motivational nature of Cognitive Dissonance: Dissonance as Psychological Discomfort." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67.3 (1994): 382-394.

Festinger, Leon. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford University Press, 1957.

Festinger, Leon, and James M. Carlsmith. "Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 58 (1959): 203-210.

Gordon, Michael R. "Occupation Plan for Iraq Faulted in Army History." The New York Times 29 Jun 2008. 18 Jul 2008 <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/29/washington/29army.html>.

Hastorf, A.H., and Hadley Cantril. "They Saw a Game: A Case Study." Journal of Abnormal Psychology 49.1 (1954): 129-34.

Rosenberg, Milton J. "When Dissonance Fails: On Eliminating Evaluation Apprehension from Attitude Measurement." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1.1 (1965): 28-42.

Rossmiller, A. J. Still Broken: A Recruit's Inside Account of Intelligence Failures, from Baghdad to the Pentagon. Presidio Press, 2008.

Tavris, Carol, and Elliot Aronson. Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts. Harcourt, 2007.

Wang, Sam, and Sandra Aamodt. "Your Brain Lies to You." The New York Times 27 Jun 2008. 27 Jun 2008 <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/opinion/27aamodt.html>.

Weiner, Tim. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. Doubleday, 2007.

Journalist Tim Weiner discusses future President George H.W. Bush's appointment to Director of Central Intelligence under Gerald Ford.

Recommend this post at Progressive Bloggers

HBS rating: Interesting, but not a must

who should read:

• History lovers looking for another angle at what happened in the last 60 years
• Those who can stand 400 pages or so of one man’s very opinionated opinion (he does claim it’s based on fact)
• The complexity of keeping a democracy democratic

On a recent visit to San Francisco I found myself responsible for my own entertainment.  Being deeply in jet-leg zone after a long 10 hour flight, and a very early wakeup call (colleague from the UK was kind enough to phone me during his business hours, my very early hours of the morning) I didn't want to wonder too far.

Driving safety is a key part of my life, so I take drowsy driving very seriously.  I felt awake and energetic as the sun finally rose up, but didn't want to risk driving back tired at the end of the day.  A quick session of browsing on the internet pointed me at the direction of Sausalito.  This small and picturesque town is located just opposite the Golden Gate Bridge and sounded like a fun day out. 

It was Saturday.  The pleasant weather drew out numerous people.  Walking, jogging, cycling or just driving along the sea front of this very beautiful small town with the roofs of their cars pulled off.  As I was wondering along one of the back streets of the town I stumbled across a small book shop, with a friendly and chatty owner.  Me being me, I couldn't resist making a few purchases.

It must have been the perfect atmosphere of the day that led me to pick out a very specific book out of the top book shelf located at the back of the store.  This perfect scenery, the clean streets, the fashionable people, the new and shining cars.. Is this for real, or is there a parallel reality hidden from the eye can see?  Ever since I watched “Twin Peaks”, like many others, I am sure you just cannot look at a beautifully groomed American town and not wonder what is happening on the inside of all of those beautiful houses.

These thoughts about what we see, and what may actually happened in reality, I am sure, were one of the causes I left this small bookshop with Tim Winer’s “Legacy of Ashes, the history of the CIA”.  It was also a perfect continuation to the book I have just finished, “Charlie Wilsons War”.  Both books discuss the CIA and let’s just say, neither books holds a very high view of this secret intelligence organization.

As far as intelligence organizations go, their secrecy causes such a stir of interest.  What are these guys up to? Are they protecting us or conspiring against us?  Well.. after reading the “Legacy of Ashes” you are probably right if you answer a third option “all of the above”.

Intelligence organizations, it turns out, can do one of two things.  Either learn about the world (gathering intelligence) or setting to change the world (covert operations).  Executing one or both of these tasks, requires secrecy.  A side from having to worry about gathering valuable information and running operations to influence how other countries are being run, you also need to protect yourself from enemy organizations trying to penetrate yours.  You need to verify that the information provided by sources turned friendly on the other side of the fence can be trusted.  This need usually grows a third arm for any active intelligence organization, the counter intelligence arm.

All of this of course is bread and butter in tyrannies, but very problematic in democracies.  How can a democracy fund an organization involved in secrecy? What checks and balances can be put in place to ensure these very powerful and secretive organizations do not only spy on the enemy but also used to spy on their own countries?

Enter Tim Weiner’s view of the CIA.  According to Tim, the CIA was essentially set up to provide the president with a steady and reliable source of daily information about what was going on in the world.  As history has it, CNN does a better job. Director after director in the CIA found it ever more difficult to acquire quality human based information (i.e. creating spies on the other side of the fence), relied more and more on technology (planes, satellites and the like) and failed to provide the president with valuable information.  Again following Tim’s view of the world, not only did this organization not provide the right information, it felt quite comfortable inventing it when needed.  Latest occurrence – Colin Powell using bogus information to convince the UN Iraq does have mobile chemical labs.

But there are many historical examples.  I reviewed in one of my earlier blogs Paul Dickson’s “Sputnik”.  It turns out the CIA failed to warn the president the Russians are about to shoot a satellite into orbit.  Not too long ago I finished Woodward’s and Bernstein’s “All the presidents’ man”.  Yet another example, in which this famous organization was put into ill use.  And of course there is the whole issue of the assassination of JFK, and the Russian missile crisis, the actions and South America, Irangate and what not.

So supposedly it’s easy enough to launch an attack on such an organization, after all being secretive, it just cannot publish its own response and list their version of successes they had in the past.  Being a part of the free world, I would like to think that it’s not just failures, but also successes that have been made (not an easy argument to hold after completing “Legacy of Ashes”.. according to this book, it has been one failure after the other).

The challenge remains.  A true democracy cannot afford to have a secret service organization – it goes against everything democracy stands for; having said that, any true democracy in its right mind has got to have such an organization to protect it.  Without it, our enemies will have a ball.

So how exactly does one balance security and democracy? Not an easy act that’s for sure.  Tim Weiner’s book relies heavily on archives opened in 2005 and revealing what has happened 30 years ago.  I guess we need to wait an additional 30 years to have some insight into how well this balancing act took place during our lives.

Legacy of Ashes is a relentless catalogue of decades of crippling intelligence failures due to the infiltration of virtually every unit from its inception, of inter-departmental turf wars, of an agency addicted to covert action at the expense of intelligence gathering, whose main agenda seems to have been the buying or toppling of foreign governments (Italy, Japan, Egypt, Iran, the Congo, Guatemala, Vietnam, Chile, who knows how many others).  

 It is a story of rampant alcoholism and ruthless personal ambition amongst agents, of execrable planning and hideous bungles costing thousands of lives, including hundreds of the CIA's own agents. It is the story of out-of-control section heads and gung-ho cowboys operating virtually as laws unto themselves, answerable to no-one, dreaming up insane schemes like throwing live bats out of airplanes with incendiary devices strapped to their backs, to rain down on Tokyo (this one didn't work).

This priceless little gem appears on pages 4 and 5, courtesy of David Bruce, former CIA operative and later U.S. ambassador, whose unenviable task it was to test the bats-as-bombs hypothesis. It tends to set the tone for the whole, sorry saga, which could almost be a Keystone Cops comedy if the effects on the history of so many other nations had not been so devastating and long-lasting.

All in all, Legacy of Ashes is an utterly gripping narrative, one that I have been quite unable to put down - a 700-page catalogue of "swashbuckling of the worst kind", to quote the words of one former agent.  The book's great strength is that everything is on the record, sourced from first-hand reporting and primary documents, with numerous direct quotes from former operatives. There is an addendum of over 150 pages of notes documenting the author's sources.

Frightening stuff.

WINNER: Denis Johnson, Tree of Smoke (Farrar, Straus & Giroux) - Interview

Mischa Berlinski, Fieldwork (Farrar, Straus & Giroux) - Interview
Lydia Davis, Varieties of Disturbance (Farrar, Straus & Giroux) - Interview
Joshua Ferris, Then We Came to the End (Little, Brown & Company) - Interview
Denis Johnson, Tree of Smoke (Farrar, Straus & Giroux) - Interview
Jim Shepard, Like You’d Understand, Anyway (Alfred A. Knopf) - Interview

Fiction judges: Francine Prose (chair), Andrew Sean Greer,
Walter Kirn, David Means, and Joy Williams.NONFICTION WINNER: Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (Doubleday) - Interview

Edwidge Danticat, Brother, I’m Dying (Alfred A. Knopf) - Interview
Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything
(Twelve/Hachette Book Group USA) - Interview
Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution
(Hill and Wang/Farrar, Straus and Giroux) - Interview
Arnold Rampersad, Ralph Ellison: A Biography (Alfred A. Knopf) - Interview

Nonfiction judges: David Shields (chair), Deborah Blum,
Caroline Elkins, Annette Gordon-Reed, and James Shapiro.