There are no longer any Hizballah fighters surrounding the grand red sandstone Beirut town house belonging to Walid Jumblatt, a member of Parliament and one of the leaders of Lebanon's governing coalition. Still, Jumblatt, a top American ally, is under virtual house arrest. After the lightning speed with which opposition Hizballah fighters defeated government supporters in a six-hour battle on Thursday — only to vanish a few hours later — it became clear that it is pointless to resist the Iranian and Syrian-backed militia, which could return at any time. "I am a hostage now in my home in Beirut," he said over the telephone to his rival Nabih Berri, the speaker of parliament and a top opposition leader, while TIME waited nearby for an interview. "Tell [Hizballah leader] Sayeed Hassan Nasrallah I lost the battle and he wins. So let's sit and talk to reach a compromise. All that I ask is your protection."

Celui qui appelait au soutien militaire des Etats-Unis, à des actes de terrorisme à Damas et attendait de pied ferme la guerre civile au Liban en est tout ébahi - le Hezbollah, qui a vaincu l'armée israëlienne, n'a pas eu de problème à écarter d'un revers de main les milices de Hariri et de Jumblatt:

Yet, despite the fact that Hizballah is perhaps the world's most fearsome guerrilla organization, somehow Jumblatt misjudged the ease with which Hizballah could pull Lebanon back into the Syrian and Iranian orbit.

Ses alliés étatsuniens n'ont pas été à la hauteur, semble-t-il:

Sitting in his garden terrace in Beirut, with just a few family members and loyal retainers, Jumblatt is quickly coming to grips with the new political landscape. "The U.S. has failed in Lebanon and they have to admit it," he said. "We have to wait and see the new rules which Hizbollah, Syria and Iran will set. They can do what they want."

Il semblerait que le PSP, le parti-milice de Jumblatt, ait abandonné ses positions en faveur de l'armée. Le Figaro - dont le correspondant au Liban, Pierre Prier, me semble plus proche de la réalite que celle du Monde, Mouna Naïm - nous en apprend un peu plus:

Des affrontements ont opposé la veille et toute la nuit les combattants d'Amal et du Hezbollah aux Druzes du ministre Walid Joumblatt, membre de la majorité. Mardi, dit un officier, les combats ont cessé, les combattants du Hezbollah sont partis, « mais ils ne sont pas loin ». Comme dans Beyrouth-Ouest, l'accalmie ne semble être là que pour entériner la défaite du camp de la majorité. (...)

Walid Joumblatt fait pour l'instant figure de perdant. La présence de l'armée nationale sur la hauteur entérine une nouvelle situation. Après deux jours de combat, Joumblatt a dû faire machine arrière et appeler à l'aide son grand rival, l'émir Talal Arslan, chef d'une famille rivale. Ce dernier dirige un petit parti rattaché, lui, à l'opposition. Il a accepté de collecter les armes du PSP c'est-à-dire les armes lourdes, pas question ici de renoncer aux armes individuelles , et de les remettre à l'armée. L'émir Arslan a cependant prévenu : si les troupes du Hezbollah entrent dans les villages de la montagne, ses hommes se retourneront contre eux.

Pour la première fois en trente ans de règne, Walid Joumblatt se trouve mis en difficulté au cœur de la montagne. Qui tient la montagne tient le pays, dit l'imaginaire libanais. Pendant la guerre civile de 1975-1990, les Druzes ont massacré leurs voisins chrétiens, à qui ils ont livré des combats féroces. Jusqu'ici, jamais la minorité druze, 150 000 membres environ, n'a été dépossédée de ses montagnes, dont elle connaît chaque recoin.

Son nouvel adversaire ne s'était jamais avancé jusque-là. Mais le Hezbollah, avec son allié Amal, semble vouloir peser sur le Chouf comme sur Beyrouth. Dimanche, les chiites ont affronté les milices druzes au pied de la montagne, dans le quartier de Choueifat, qui montre aujourd'hui des façades noircies. Bilan : 16 morts. Les affrontements ont continué à Aley, dans la montagne. Mais le parti chiite s'est bien gardé de prendre la ville, la contournant par les vallons pour aller faire le coup de feu contre les miliciens druzes. (...)

La stratégie du Hezbollah apparaît clairement : sécuriser ses hauteurs en neutralisant la milice de Joumblatt, et contrôler la route qui mène à la frontière syrienne, par laquelle le parti chiite reçoit son approvisionnement en armes et en munitions. Bien plus que les accrochages de Tripoli, au nord, qui opposent sunnites et alaouites ultra-minoritaires, la nouvelle bataille du Chouf revêt un caractère stratégique.

The Guardian confirme:

Despite calls for a ceasefire, Hizbullah fighters defeated militants loyal to the Druze leader Waleed Jumblatt in clashes starting on Sunday night, gaining control of Niha, a village in the southern Chouf mountains, 25 miles south-east of Beirut.

On Sunday, Hizbullah fighters took over key positions in Aley, a Druze town north of the Chouf, which abuts the main Beirut-Damascus highway, giving them control of another key artery. Both Druze areas have since been turned over to the army, which has a longstanding agreement on military cooperation with Hizbullah over Israel.

Selon des observateurs cités par The Guardian, le Hezbollah ne chercherait pas à se débarasser de Jumblatt, mais plutôt à contrôler les voies de communication entre ses fiefs de la Bekaa et de la banlieue sud de Beyrouth:

Despite calls for a ceasefire, Hizbullah fighters defeated militants loyal to Druze leader Waleed Jumblatt in clashes starting on Sunday night, gaining control of Niha, a village in the southern Chouf mountains, 25 miles south-east of Beirut.

Analysts said the village provides the Iranian-backed group, also an ally of Damascus, with a crucial link between its stronghold in the eastern Bekaa Valley and the coastal highway that leads to Hizbullah's bases in Beirut's southern suburbs.

"Hizbullah have shown they are not interested in unseating Jumblatt but rather opening a possible supply route between Bekaa and the southern suburbs," said Ousama Safa, director of Beirut's Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies. "They can now use the area as a second front, behind the Bekaa."

On Sunday Hizbullah fighters took over key positions in Aley, a Druze town north of the Chouf, which abuts the main Beirut-Damascus highway, giving them control of another key artery. Both Druze areas have since been turned over to the army, which has a longstanding agreement on military cooperation with Hizbullah over Israel.

Il faut dire que Jumblatt et Nasrallah furent des alliés il y a quelques années seulement:

Nasrallah and Jumblatt had been good friends and strong allies during the heyday of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. The Druze leader had positioned himself as one of the main protectors of Hezbollah arms throughout the 1990s. A political animal, however, he changed sides when it was clear the Syrians had fallen out with Washington after the Iraq war and he transformed himself into one of the loudest critics of Syrian power in Beirut.

Les parrains séoudiens de la coalition du 14 mars (Hariri, Jumblatt et Ja'ja) sont atterrés. Il est amusant d'ailleurs que les séoudiens, qui chez eux considéreraient sans aucun doute un druze comme un hérétique ou un apostat, tressent des lauriers au zaïm druze - un chroniqueur séoudien dans Al Sharq al awsat parle au sujet du Hezbollah de "holocauste", une opinion pour le moins hétérodoxe par rapport aux normes acceptées en Europe et aux Etats-Unis au sujet de l'usage public de références au génocide juif - mais mon petit doigt me dit que ce chroniqueur ne sera pas cité par MEMRI ou flétri par l'Anti Defamation League.

La presse israëlienne, que ce soit Haaretz ou The Jerusalem Post, est affligée, mais a le sens des réalités. Haaretz estime ainsi, dans un article intitulé "New reality has taken over", que la demande du vieux patriarche phalangiste Amine Gemayel, à savoir que le Hezbollah promette de ne plus utiliser ses armes contre d'autres Libanais, est une reculade par rapport à la résolution 1559 du Conseil de sécurité, adoptée sur pression étatsuno-franco-israëlienne, laquelle résolution exige le désarmement de "toutes" les milices, le Hezbollah étant considéré comme une de ces milices:

"Those who previously demanded that Hezbollah be disarmed are now being compelled to disarm themselves," noted one Lebanese commentator. "Lebanon needs to start getting used to the new reality." (...) The bottom line is that the Arab League delegation due to arrive in Beirut today faces a seemingly irreversible reality that will force it to grant a seal of approval to Hezbollah's political takeover. Over the weekend, Yemen's president said publicly that Siniora ought to resign. And that, it seems, is likely to be the basis for any plan to resolve the crisis.

Le Jerusalem Post, proche du Likoud, constate catastrophé le triste sort de Jumblatt et est outré que l'armée libanaise n'ait pas fait ce que n'a pu faire l'armée israëlienne, à savoir battre le Hezbollah:

Jumblatt has been the March 14 movement's gadfly opposing Lebanon's steady transformation into an Iranian-Syrian proxy through Hizbullah. Sunday he laid bare the powerlessness of the movement when he begged Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah to spare his followers in the Shouf Mountains. Speaking under Hizbullah siege from his home in Beirut, Jumblatt said in a television interview, "Through the LBC I address Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah: If you have a personal issue with me, that's fine. But we cannot allow attacks on the people of Al-Jabel [i.e. Druse villagers in the mountains around the capital city]. We must all work for a ceasefire with the army, and leave personal issues aside."

Jumblatt made his plea for the lives of his people after he was obliged to instruct them to lay down their weapons and place their faith in the Lebanese army on Sunday afternoon.

Le bloggeur attitré du Jerusalem Post au Liban est bien évidemment catastrophé par la défaite de la coalition pro-étatsunienne de Hariri, Ja'ja et Jumblatt. Quant au Yedioth Aharonoth, son chroniqueur estime que la victoire du Hezbollah oblige Israël à négocier un deal avec la Syrie - le Golan pour Israël, le Liban pour la Syrie.

Tiens, à propos de l'armée libanaise, elle aurait conclu un deal avec le Hezbollah - elle ne serait de toute façon pas en mesure de combattre et encore moins de vaincre ce dernier, à supposer qu'elle le souhaite (le général Michel Suleiman est un proche de l'ex-président pro-syrien, le général Emile Lahoud, et n'a strictement rien fait pour entraver la résistance, que ce soit avant ou après la guerre de 2006):

Politicians, analysts and fighters, however, said the army's performance suggests that the better-armed Hezbollah has struck a deal with Lebanese military brass. At the same time, there's bafflement that the army hasn't been able to defend the government despite receiving more than $400 million in U.S. aid since 2006.

"We know that Arab armies are mostly instruments for internal security, and even in this, the Lebanese army has failed," said Hilal Khashan, a Beirut-based political science professor and expert on Hezbollah. "They waited for Hezbollah to launch its attacks and prevail, and then they took charge of roadblocks."

""Sometimes, neutrality is a position," Khashan said. "There is a deal between Hezbollah and the commander of the army, no doubt about it. What the terms of such a deal is, we don't yet know. I wouldn't say the army is an extension of the opposition, but I would say it colluded with the opposition." (...)

Politicians, analysts and fighters, however, said the army's performance suggests that the better-armed Hezbollah has struck a deal with Lebanese military brass. At the same time, there's bafflement that the army hasn't been able to defend the government despite receiving more than $400 million in U.S. aid since 2006.

"We know that Arab armies are mostly instruments for internal security, and even in this, the Lebanese army has failed," said Hilal Khashan, a Beirut-based political science professor and expert on Hezbollah. "They waited for Hezbollah to launch its attacks and prevail, and then they took charge of roadblocks."

""Sometimes, neutrality is a position," Khashan said. "There is a deal between Hezbollah and the commander of the army, no doubt about it. What the terms of such a deal is, we don't yet know. I wouldn't say the army is an extension of the opposition, but I would say it colluded with the opposition."

Bush ne semble pas au courant, lui qui vient de promettre plus d'aide militaire au Liban pour aider l'armée à défendre la coalition pro-étatsunienne. Comme le dit un sécuritaire étatsunien à la journaliste Helena Cobban:

As one former US government officer commented on news that Lebanese Druze leader Jumblatt had basically surrendered to Hizbollah, "Same guys that gave you Gaza gave you this. Do you think any of them are smart enough to see what they've done?" Adds another former US official who served in Lebanon: "This administration is bankrupt in every way -- absolutely hopeless."

Le bloggeur sud-africain Tony Karon le constate aussi:

One of the adages popular in the treatment of recovering alcoholics in America is the notion that repeating the same behaviour and expecting a different result is insanity. President George W Bush, however, appears to have recovered from his own youthful drinking problem without digesting that particular lesson. Last week’s events in Lebanon suggest that his administration remains intent to the very end on repeating the strategies that have failed in Gaza and Basra and Sadr City, expecting that the result in Beirut would somehow be different.

Et c'est peu de dire que le bloc pro-étatsunien Hariri/Ja'ja/Jumblatt en veut à son parrain d'outre-Atlantique - voir par exemple ce qu'en dit le Washington Post, "In Lebanon, a Call for U.S. Action", qui cite des dirigeants du bloc pro-étatsunien appelant à une intervention militaire:

Politicians in Lebanon's Western-backed governing coalition criticized the United States on Monday for not doing enough to counter the opposition Hezbollah movement's recent takeover of West Beirut. (...) "We need the U.S., but we are hearing nothing substantial from them," said Nayla Mouawad, a cabinet minister and leading member of the March 14 coalition. (...)

One March 14 politician, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, called for "tactical strikes" against Syria to pressure the government to rein in Hezbollah.

Bush, in the interview, offered a stock reply to a question about the possibility of U.S. military action: "There's always that option."

The Pentagon denied reports that the USS Cole, a U.S. warship that appeared off the coast of Lebanon in February, was again on its way to the Lebanese coast. A U.S. Navy official said the Cole is in the eastern Mediterranean.

Le Los Angeles Times rapporte les mêmes faits:

Shaken by a Hezbollah military offensive in recent days, Lebanon's pro-Western parties have launched an intensive campaign to lobby allies in Washington, Europe and the Arab world to intervene diplomatically or even militarily on their behalf, officials here said. (...)

The coalition of pro-Western Christian, Sunni and Druze politicians under the so-called March 14 banner has embarked on an effort to draw international backers into the conflict, said coalition leaders and Western diplomats. They fear Hezbollah is trying to use its military strength to cow the government into submitting to its demands, which include noninterference with the militia's drive to build up its arsenal to confront Israel.

The coalition's arguments appear aimed at playing on Western and Arab officials' fears of growing Iranian power. The Lebanese officials want other countries to pressure Iran and its ally, Syria, by seeking condemnation of and perhaps new economic sanctions against the two nations at the U.N. Security Council.

One official went so far as to suggest unspecified attacks on Damascus, the Syrian capital, to punish Hezbollah's backer and restore a regional balance of power.

"Iran took a decision to take Lebanon hostage, and from Lebanon, come back to the Mediterranean Sea to be able to infiltrate much more easily the whole Arab world," said another official, Nayla Mouawad, a minister in the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. "It is very obvious that we're not getting a clear-cut reaction from the U.S., Arabs and the international community which is sufficient to the gravity of the situation."

The faction's officials have telephoned contacts in the White House and the State Department and deployed lobbyists in Washington to press the U.S. government, Mouawad said. They have also canvassed diplomatic contacts in Beirut and abroad to ask for more forceful condemnations of Hezbollah's move, said officials in the March 14 camp. (...)

But despite words of support from Washington, there was little sign it would forcefully rescue its Lebanese allies. The U.S. Embassy in Beirut did not respond to an interview request.

"The Americans are telling March 14 they have to resist," said one Western diplomat in Beirut. "But they're not bringing much operational support." (...)

But the use of force appeared unlikely. The Pentagon squashed rumors that the U.S. warship Cole, steaming to the Mediterranean Sea from the Persian Gulf, was responding to the Lebanon crisis.

"Yes, we are maintaining a watchful eye on the area, but not any more than we have been recently," a Defense official in Washington told The Times, speaking on condition of anonymity.

De vous à moi cependant, le bloc pro-étatsunien du 14 mars ne peut s'en prendre qu'à lui-même:

The Lebanese government made a fatal underestimation of how far leaders of the Shi'ite group Hezbollah would go to preserve what they believe are their rights, such as an intelligence network and the freedom to carry weapons. (...)

Hezbollah secretary general Hasan Nasrallah spoke just hours after the crisis started, saying the communication system and Shuqyar were "red lines" that could not be crossed. He reminded his audience that when Siniora became prime minister in 2005, one of the main points of his political program was "supporting the resistance" and giving it (Hezbollah) a free hand to wage its "war of liberation" against Israel in any way it saw fit.

Veteran Shi'ite cleric Abdul-Amir Qabalan, deputy chairman of the Higher Shi'ite Council, contacted the Lebanese government and advised it to back down, warning that Nasrallah must not be provoked and that he would not stand by and watch his security system being torn down. Qabalan said, "Touching this [communication] system affects our nationalism, integrity and loyalty to the nation."

The government refused to change course, arguing that security must be monopolized by the state and that it was inconceivable that a non-state party like Hezbollah could run a parallel security system at Beirut Airport.

In this stubbornness, the government failed to anticipate the value Hezbollah places on what it believed its key rights. Worse, Defense Minister Elias al-Murr, Interior Minister Hasan al-Sabe and Public Persecutor Said Mirza were tasked to create a team to look into other security violations committed by Hezbollah.

Enfin, le clou de la journée: Hariri accuse le Hezbollah de complicité avec Israël... Well, he would know, wouldn't he? Car les services de renseignement israëliens s'inquiètent du sort du gouvernement Siniora, redoutant que le bloc du 14 mars en perde le contrôle:

Defense officials, meanwhile, expressed concern Sunday that the growing instability in Lebanon would lead to a dissolution of the power of the UNIFIL peacekeepers, as well as pave the way for Hizbullah to obtain control of at least a third in the Lebanese cabinet, granting it the power to veto major government decisions.

Israel is concerned that the March 14 group, led by Saad Hariri - son of assassinated former prime minister Rafik Hariri - could lose control of the government to Hizbullah. The Shi'ite group could then shoot down government initiatives, including the upcoming renewal of UNIFIL's mandate to operate in southern Lebanon.

(1) Attention, 234568987eme degré.

In the pro-opposition newspaper Al-Akhbar, the newspaper chairperson Ibrahim Al-Amine wrote on August 13:

If the majority team is more confused because of the abundance of candidates among its ranks, it is helped by the support of a large swathe of the Lebanese people and influential factions among the Arabs and the rest of the world while the opposition seems to be more comfortable with the fact that it has only one candidate, the head of the Fee Patriotic Movement General Michel Aoun who enjoys strong support from a large popular mass that includes more than half the Lebanese population.

I beg to differ.

Firstly, let's get the facts straight. The only person from the opposition to officially endorse Aoun's candidacy was Wiam Wahab who isn't high enough in the hierarchy. His statement is simply not enough to make Aoun the official opposition's candidate. I want to hear it from Berri. Even more, I want to hear it from Nasrallah. Yet, should we not hear the needed endorsement from such figures, that too will say a lot. Back on December 1, 2006, the opposition took for the streets and launched their first day of occupation over Downtown Beirut. Note that back then only Aoun was present. Berri and Nasrallah did not support the orange leader as he led on the Shi'a crowds (remember, few were the Christians who attended that day). Then, the implications of the absence of the Shi'a leaders was understood: they did not take Aoun seriously. Let's see if they'll take him seriously today.

Secondly, Aoun does not have the support of more than half of the population. If that were the case, why isn't he majority leader in the Parliament?

Now let's go back to Al-Amine's above argument. He is suggesting that March 14 is unsure of itself whereas the opposition (read: FPM) is fully backing one candidate. My question: since when was diversity a problem?

March 14 is not a political party and therefore is not limited to the nomination of one candidate. The FPM is restricted by party regulations and therefore must nominate one candidate to avoid a conflict of interest within the party itself.

Given that March 14 is a cluster of different political parties and groups that do not have political party status, these different groups have the right to present as many candidates as they wish (of course within the rationale of some sort of meritocratic rubric). The result is the nomination of people like Boutros Harb and Robert Ghanem and perhaps in the near future Nassib Lahoud or Nayla Mouawad.

The fact that these people should feel comfortable nominating themselves within the March 14 democratic spirit is impressionable. They will be a source of competition for each other, and at the end of the day, will not insult or discredit each other. Furthermore, the losers of the elections will accept their loss in good team spirit and support the March 14 candidate that makes it through. This, Mr. Al Amine is democracy not confusion.