MINARCHIST: First let’s join forces to trim all the branches. After that, we can argue about whether to kill the root.
ANARCHIST: Since I already know I want to kill the root, why should I wait until we first trim the branches? If I kill the root now, the branches will die of themselves.

Tværtimod var essensen, at religionsfrihed blot er hvad den er - en frihed - når den ikke frembyder tvang eller – med US’ eget eksempel – opfordrer til vold.

Artiklen giver mig anledning til et par kommentarer om religionsfrihed i al almindelighed.

Religionsfrihed er helt korrekt ”begrænset af de øvrige frihedsrettigheder”. Udøver man i forbindelse med sin gudsdyrkelse f.eks. ulovlig tvang over for andre er den tvingende handling ikke derved mindre ulovlig; det være sig både i et sekulært og ikke-sekulært samfund. Handlingens motiv træder derfor, ganske som normalt, tilbage for tilregnelsen.

Religionsfriheden bliver imidlertid ikke irrelevant i disse situationer; at man pga. en religiøs opstemning har opfordret til vold ænder jo ikke på, at der stadig er religionsfrihed. Det er igen handlingen vi fordømmer; ikke guddommen.

Fordi det er handlingen vi straffer og ikke motivet, bliver det ikke nødvendigt at rangordne religionsfriheden i forhold til de andre rettigheder, således, at religionsfriheden, som US vil det, pr. definition, står under ”de øvrige rettigheder”.

I stedet når man meget længere hvis man opfatter religionsfriheden som noget accessorisk; ligesom jeg selv gør det med ”frihed”, ”oprørsret”, ”fred”, ”lighed” og ”demokrati”. Disse begreber/rettigheder er i mine øjne tilknyttet (en konsekvens af, om man vil) ejendomsretten; m.a.o. det private ejerskab til produktionsmidlerne (for at bruge et socialistisk-inspireret begreb). Derfor bliver det slet ikke nødvendigt med en rangordning eller for den ene frihedsrettighed at ”indordne sig” under en anden. De er begge det samme.

Men skal koranen så forbydes, fordi den opfordrer til vold? Skal Biblen fordi den opfordrer til stening af ulydige småbørn eller folkemord? Skal vi forbyde billedkunst fordi de to bøger ikke bryder sig om det? Eller måske at tillade børneægteskaber, fordi en profet havde en svaghed for mindreårige? Svaret giver jo sig selv – og er i øvrigt ikke forskelligt fra hvad det ville have være, hvis f.eks. jeg, her på bloggen, gav mig i lag med  at opfordre til væbnet opstand mod ordensmagten, bare fordi  Frihedens Træ snart skulle gødes.

(Aside: Der er iøvrigt en righoldig samling af især amerikansk retsfilosofi om netop det at opfordre til vold. For en lidt hurtig gennemgang kan man kigge lidt i disputatsen Ytringsfrihedens Væsen, der (he he) opfordrer til, at vi i grundloven har ret til "materiel ytringsfrihed" i § 77. Ellers vil også Harts ordre-koncept kunne bruges.)

Bliver religionsfriheden til et helligt skjold, som galningen kan afskærme sig bag, er vi ikke kommer videre end hekseforfølgelserne. Og vli dét vise sig at blive tilfædet skal vi nok se, at det bliver svært for rationalismens flammende sværd at trænge sig igennem.

Hav en fortsat god – og religionsfri – weekend.

Kommentaren går sådan her:

Well, since mises.org is having database issues or some such, I can't read the article in full. I can however comment on:

"The definition of private property was clear and seemingly immutable"

Wrong, wrong, and dead wrong. The definition of private property changed drastically as you crossed the Mason-Dixon line. The Constitution may have been flawed from the get-go in other ways, but trying to add patches to the Constitution to eradicate slavery, and the leftover problems from slavery, and the leftover problems from original solutions of removing slavery, all in the spirit of good intentions, has left a wide stream of bad precedent. Direct such effects included Plessy v. Fergussen, Brown v. Board of Education, the 14th amendment entire, encroachments on states rights following the Civil War, Jim Crow, race riots, affirmative action, the KKK... Each of these things handed our masters weapons of mass illiberalism. The indirect effects, including the 17th amendment, increased police powers, judicial activism, and others, are countless.

True, the Constitution held seeds of its own destruction, but I think the ones that caused failure the quickest are the simplest to find. Let it be a signal fire to future generations of revolutionaries: DO NOT COMPROMISE ON NATURAL RIGHTS.

Artiklen, hvortil kommentaren er skrevet, er også ret god :-)

30-06-2008 • De argumenten van de SP tegen het volledig openen van de grenzen voor werknemers uit Midden- en Oost-Europa vinden steeds meer weerklank: er tekent zich een Kamermeerderheid af die de grenzen voor Bulgarije en Roemenie niet verder wil open zetten. Het kabinet wil het liefst per 1 januari 2009 de grenzen helemaal openen. De SP pleit al langer voor het invoeren van werkvergunningen. SP-Kamerlid Paul Ulenbelt: “Daarmee kunnen we voorkomen dat we de werkloosheid van andere landen importeren of dat oneerlijke concurrentie op de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt ontstaat.”

In 2007 negeerden CDA, PvdA en VVD de argumenten van de SP in het debat over het openen van de grens voor Polen. Ulenbelt: “Wij zeiden dat Nederland zijn huis niet op orde heeft en geen honderdduizenden Polen kon ontvangen. Zij zouden ten prooi vallen aan uitbuitende werkgevers en huisjesmelkers. Dat baseerden we op ervaringen in Engeland en Ierland. Ons werd nationalisme en angst voor vreemdelingen verweten. Nu zien deze partijen in dat er toen een foute beslissing is genomen. Eindelijk vallen bij hen de schellen van de ogen en zien ze de werkelijkheid.”

Het meest opmerkelijk is de draai van de VVD. Zei deze partij in 2007 nog dat de Polen juist moesten komen om de lonen laag te houden, nu noemen ze het plan van Donner voor het openen van de grenzen voor Bulgarije en Roemenie “onthutsend”. Vooral Rotterdam, Den Haag en Utrecht zien volkswijken verloederen doordat uitzendbureaus er panden opkopen en er veel te veel mensen per woning huisvesten. Er is toenemende overlast.

Uitzendbureaus klagen over de opkomst van malafide uitzendbureaus, 6000 (!) naar schatting, die buitenlandse arbeiders schaamteloos onderbetalen en rechten onthouden. Ook in plattelandsgemeenten, vooral in de tuinbouwgebieden, doen zich deze problemen voor.

In de bouw duiken tienduizenden Polen, zogenaamde zelfstandigen zonder personeel, ver onder de normale tarieven. Dit geeft concurrentievervalsing met kleinere aannemers. Bij sommige scholen is een toestroom van Poolse kinderen op gang gekomen die onderwijzers voor grote problemen stellen.

De noodkreten uit het land zijn voor 40 gemeenten aanleiding geweest om tot tweemaal toe een 'Polentop' te houden en minister Donner en Vogelaar tot maatregelen te bewegen. “Er zijn geen problemen,” zei Donner. Ulenbelt: “Hij kijkt weg van de problemen voor de mensen in de volkswijken en dorpen op het platteland. Hij stelt zich op als loopjongen van werkgevers in de tuinbouw die verslaafd zijn aan goedkope arbeid. Die zien in de Bulgaren en Roemenen een nieuwe prooi.”

In november beslist de Tweede Kamer definitief of de grenzen wel of niet verder open gaan.

Als radikaal-rechts praat over economische slavernij, dan zijn wij zogezegd racisten omdat wij iets tegen die mensen zouden hebben vanwege hun afkomst. Als wij praten over de oneerlijke concurrentie, dan zijn wij rotzakken die enkel aan economie denken. Benieuwd of de SP nu ook racisten zijn...

 http://hidayatullah.com/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7018&pop=1&page=0&Itemid=1

Introduction

            The development of neoliberalism as a theoretical approach to international institutions has not been accompanied with an adequate academic assessment of this approach. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the scholars associated with the neoliberal thinking have undoubtedly presented a host of theoretical works that addressed institutions as an international phenomenon (see esp. Keohane 1983; 1984; 1989a; Martin 1992; Snidal 1985c; Stein 1982). The significance of these works is reflected, among other things, by the fact that neoliberalism currently belongs, together with realism and constructivism, to the main theoretical approaches to international institutions (e.g. Hasenclever et al. 1997; Simmons – Martin 2002).[1] However, deeper and focused assessments of the theoretical qualities of neoliberalism as a perspective on institutions remain rather scarce.[2] Simultaneously, the majority of works applying neoliberalism to the empirical sphere of institutional issues provides an illustration of its validity (Haftendorn et al. 1999; Keohane 1984, et al. 1993; Koremenos et al. 2001c; Oye 1985b) rather than a rigorous testing of this approach.  

To contribute to the closing of the described gap, this paper provides an evaluation of neoliberalism as a theory of international institutions assessing both the theoretical qualities as well as empirical value of this approach. Because neoliberalism deals with a large number of institutional issues, the paper concentrates on the form of international institutions (henceforth institutional form) as one particular question situated at the centre of the neoliberal research agenda.[3] To be sure, neoliberalism pays attention to several important questions related to international institutions such as their origin, form, impact or stability. Still, if one intends to make a focused analysis concerned with one of the main issues addressed by neoliberalism, s/he inevitably has to select one of the mentioned questions and disregard the others.   

The paper argues that while neoliberalism constitutes a quite precise approach to institutional form at the purely theoretical level, its empirical validity is limited.[4] More specifically, neoliberalism offers a considerably more detailed theoretical analysis of institutional form than realism and constructivism as the other main lines of thinking on international institutions. Yet the case study carried out in this paper and focused on the security regime of the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) also demonstrates the limits of neoliberalism.[5] Since only a minority of the hypotheses on institutional form suggested by neoliberalism is confirmed in this case study, there is an apparent need for exposing neoliberalism to further empirical tests that would determine its real empirical accuracy.    

            The paper is structured as follows. In the first part, the main ideas of neoliberalism are briefly presented. In the second part, I compare the theoretical precision of neoliberal ideas on institutional form with the similar ideas of realism and constructivism. In the last part, neoliberal hypotheses are tested in the mentioned case study.

1. Neoliberalism as a theoretical approach to international institutions

1.1. The general ideas of neoliberalism

            As a full-fledged theoretical approach to international institutions as well as to international relations, neoliberalism involves a great deal of important assumptions and propositions. Nonetheless, the intellectual core of neoliberalism appears to rest especially on the following six ideas. First, neoliberalism considers state to be the most important actor of international relations (Keohane 1984: 25; 1989a: 8; Oye 1985a: 1). Second, state as the main actor behaves according to the neoliberal understanding as a rational actor (Keohane 1984: 26; Snidal 1985b: 35).

Third, international politics is, according to neoliberals, often marked by the so-called collective action problems, which can, however, be overcome (Keohane 1984: 65, 67-69; Oye 1985a: 1; Snidal 1985b: 28, 1985c: 923-925; see also Stein 1982). These problems arise when states have an interest in cooperation, but are nevertheless unable to cooperate. [6] To describe such situations, neoliberals frequently use game-theoretic models, in particular the so-called coordination and collaboration games (which are more concretely described below).

Fourth, international politics is from the neoliberal perspective substantially determined by the structure of state interests (Oye 1985a: 4-11; Snidal 1985b: 35; Stein 1982:  300, 319). Fifth, neoliberals assume that international politics is also influenced by the anarchical character of the international system (Keohane 1989a: 7-8; Oye 1985a: 1; Snidal 1985b: 36; Stein 1982: 300). Sixth, the impact of the structure of state interests and anarchy is, according to neoliberalism, accompanied by the influence of several other factors, namely the time horizon of actors (Keohane 1984: 75-78; Oye 1985a: 12-18; Snidal 1985b), the number of actors (Oye 1985a: 18-22; Snidal 1985b), international institutions (Keohane 1989a: 2-3, 10-11; Oye 1985a: 11, 16-17, 20; Stein 1982: 311-316) or interdependence (Keohane 1984: 6; Keohane 1989a: 9).

1.2. Neoliberalism and institutions   

            With regard to the impact of institutions, neoliberals argue that international institutions help states overcome collective action problems (Keohane 1984; Oye 1985a: 11, 16-17; 20; Snidal 1985c: 926; Stein 1982: 304-311). To describe the specific functions that institutions perform in this respect, neoliberals draw, in the first place, on game-theoretic models. In the works of neoliberals, especially the following two types of game-theoretic models and two types of collective action problems resulting from them are discussed: coordination games (coordination problems) and collaboration games (collaboration problems) (Martin 1992; Snidal 1985c; Stein 1982).

            Before a short explanation of coordination and collaboration games, the basic parameters of game-theoretic models must be introduced. The basic elements of each game are represented by 1) the number of players, 2) number of strategies of each player, and 3) preferences of each player (Drulák 2003: 94-95). This framework is further connected with a few other assumptions and definitions. Above all, game theory regards actors as rational and interdependent players that need for their decisions information about the decisions of other players. As follows from another assumption of game theory, actors have stable preferences, which determine actors’ goals and also strategies that actors choose for achieving the goals. The preferences of actors also stipulate the utility functions of actors and their values (pay-offs). Each actor seeks to maximize its pay-offs.

            Coordination games (coordination problems) contain two equilibrium points[7] that are pareto-optimal[8] (Drulák 2003: 97-99; also Stein 1982: 309-311). Yet the two pareto-optimal points constitute an obstacle to cooperation in situations in which players cannot communicate and thus agree on the selection of the same strategy (i.e. of the same point of the game). A coordination game leads to yet another type of problem when the gains in the Nash equilibrium are distributed unevenly. Under such circumstances, players will prefer different strategies.

            On the contrary, collaboration games and problems are distinguished with just one Nash equilibrium point, which is not, however, pareto-optimal (Drulák 2003: 100-101; see also Keohane 1984; Stein 1982: 304-308). This results from the fact that in this game players have strong incentives to violate the agreement or at least to be afraid that the agreement will be violated. A collaboration game is frequently exemplified by the Prisoners’ Dilemma game.

            From the neoliberal perspective, institutions can help states resolve both of the described collective action problems and thus enable them to cooperate. In coordination problems, institutions shape the expectations of actors and, in this way, find a solution to the problem of multiple-equilibrium points that are pareto-optimal (Stein 1982: 314). In collaboration problems, institutions specify an appropriate behavior and ensure that such behavior is observed (Stein 1982: 312).         

The assumption about institutions as a solution to collective action problems also serves as the basis for the neoliberal explanation of the emergence of institutions. Here, neoliberals proceed from a functional explanation that considers a rational response of states to the problems of collective action as the main source behind the origin of institutions (esp. Keohane 1984: 80; Stein 1982: 307).                                       

2. Neoliberalism and institutional form – theoretical precision

In line with the criteria outlined in the introduction, the first part of the assessment submitted in this paper centers on the precision of neoliberalism as a theory of institutional form. To avoid the hard issue of what a theoretical approach needs to fulfill to qualify as precise, I compare the precision of neoliberalism with the precision of realism and constructivism as the other main theoretical approaches to international institutions. While judging the precision of all the three mentioned theoretical approaches, I seek to find out how detailed analysis of institutional form the works drawing on those approaches offer. More specifically, I examine whether and to what extent the approaches in question specify 1) the dimensions of institutional form (henceforth institutional dimensions), 2) sources of institutional form, and 3) concrete propositions or hypotheses on institutional form.      

2.1. The competing approaches – realist and constructivist state of art on institutional form

2.1.1. Realism

Realism claims that both the origin and impact of international institutions are determined by state interests and power. According to the basic writings and interpretations of realism, institutions are constructed and controlled by the most powerful states, that is, by great powers (Carr 1939/1941: 132; Mearsheimer 1994-1995: 7, 13; Schweller – Priess 1996: 8). Likewise, realists also argue that the impact of institutions completely depends on or is importantly conditioned by other factors,[9] particularly by the mentioned state interests and power (e.g. Carr 1939/1941: 38-42, 133; Hasenclever et al. 1997: 83-86; Grieco 1995: 27; Mearsheimer 1994-1995: 7, 13; Simmons – Martin 2002: 194-195; Waltz 1979: 88). Generally speaking, realism does not, therefore, assign a great influence to institutions and does not treat them as an explanatory variable. In the realist understanding, institutions function at best as an intervening variable that modifies, to some extent, the impact of other, essential variables (e.g. Krasner 1983; Mearsheimer 1994-1995: 13).

Related to this is the fact that institutions do not belong to the main subjects of the realist research. This state of affairs is logic: when realists do not associate institutions with an autonomous influence, one cannot expect that they will devote to them a lot of attention in their effort to analyze international politics. A number of works proceeding from realism and, at the same time, focusing on institutions did, nevertheless, arise (mainly Grieco 1995; Keohane 1980; Schweller – Priess 1996). These works do not depart in a significant way from the described realist perspective on institutions. Instead, what makes them different from the standard realist perspective, which rather overlooks institutions as a relatively unimportant subject, is that they pay to institutions their primary attention.[10]

However, even these realist works that concentrate on institutions do not offer a large amount of concrete ideas on institutional form. According to my knowledge, one of the two realist works addressing this phenomenon in a more extensive manner is the contribution by Randall Schweller and David Priess (Schweller – Priess 1996).[11] Still, Schweller and Priess distinguish “the degree of institutionalization” as the only institutional dimension (Schweller – Priess 1996: 15).[12] Moreover, institutional form is in their perspective linked to an unselected host of general determinants of institutions ranging from state interests to the systemic distribution of power. The predictions about institutional form that Schweller and Priess put forward are thus rather unspecified (esp. Schweller – Priess 1996: 16). As a result, their analysis of institutional form remains considerably vague.  

Another realist work touching upon the issue of institutional form is represented the most concrete neorealist writing on institutions to date submitted by Joseph Grieco (Grieco 1995). In this work, Grieco argues that the particular form of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) adopted by the EU in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty results from state quest for “greater symmetry in voice opportunities“ (Grieco 1995: 36). Yet even Grieco’s analysis of the EMU discusses merely “institutionalization” and “rules” and does not establish more specific institutional dimensions.

2.1.2. Constructivism

Like realism, the constructivist theorizing on international institutions has also not developed a more detailed conceptualization of institutional form. Although constructivists still probably lack a deeper and consensual theoretical interpretation of the origin of institutions, one of the main claims of this approach is the argument about the significant impact of institutions. Here, it is necessary to clarify that constructivists define institutions in a very different way than realists and neoliberals. While realists and neoliberals are mainly concerned with international regimes and international organizations (IOs), constructivists put the main emphasis on institutions represented by cultural practices, norms, and values (Keohane 1989b). Keohane generalizes this observation by concluding that whilst the traditional approaches (realism and neoliberalism) concentrate on “specific” institutions, constructivist tend to highlight “general” institutions. For a constructivist, institutions can be defined as relatively stable sets and structures of identities and interests, which may take the form of formal rules and norms but are, in the first place, embedded in collective knowledge (Wendt 1992: 396-397).

More importantly, unlike neoliberals and possibly also realists, who associate institutions just with a causal impact on state strategies, constructivists go much further and argue that institutions constitute the very state identities and interests (Keohane 1989b: 144). As the above introduced Alexander Wendt’s definition reveals, institutions are in the constructivist perspective based on actors’ identities. But what is crucial is that institutions in the constructivist view simultaneously also constitute those identities. In this way, state identities and institutions “mutually constitute” each other (Wendt 1994: 389).                

The high concern of constructivists with institutions has not, however, led so far to a more precise constructivist study of institutional form. To begin with, institutional form belonged to the main issues on the research agenda of John Ruggie, who is definitely one of the leading scholars, if not the leading scholar, of constructivism regarding institutions. More specifically, in his important study on multilateralism Ruggie established multilateralism (in opposition to imperialism and bilateralism) as one of the main institutional dimensions in international relations (Ruggie 1998). Still, this emphasis on multilateralism was not accompanied with a specification of any other institutional dimensions. Ruggie’s treatment of the sources of institutional form also remained to be rather underdeveloped. Even though his contribution lists several factors which induces multilateralism (e.g. the problems of property rights, coordination problems and collaboration problems), it does not point out any concrete propositions regarding this phenomenon.

Similarly selected conceptualization of institutional form can be, for example, found in a constructivist study of Thomas Risse-Kappen on NATO as a security community of democratic states (Risse-Kappen 1996: 368-369). In this case, “democracy” as a particular institutional dimension makes one of the main elements of the author’s conceptual framework. In his understanding, democratic states are likely to form democratic institutions even at the international level. Yet such an argument, whatever valuable it might be in itself, does not tell us anything about institutional form as a phenomenon presumably involving much more issues that just the degree of democracy.

The constructivist study of institutional form has been relatively recently deepened by Wendt’s reaction (Wendt 2001) to the latest general neoliberal contribution on institutional form (Koremenos et al. 2001a, b). In this reaction, Wendt explicitly identified the sources that could function, from the constructivist perspective, as the most crucial concerning institutional form (such as logic of appropriateness, uncertainty, or path-dependence). Still, even this Wendt’s work cannot be considered a full-fledged theoretical exploration of institutional form since it does not define any concrete institutional dimensions, let alone predictions that would link the form of institutions to its possible sources.           

2.2. Neoliberalism as a precise theoretical perspective on institutional form

            The explanation of institutional form has belonged to the main interests of neoliberalism since its beginning in the 1980s. Some of the founding works of neoliberalism therefore also represent the basic neoliberal writings concerning institutional form (Snidal 1985c; Stein 1982). Already those works put forward the main neoliberal thesis on institutional form, according to which this form is primarily determined by a specific structure of state interests and a specific collective action problem resulting from this structure. Subsequently, the conceptual and theoretical perspective of neoliberalism on institutional form was considerably deepened by Lisa Martin’s work from the beginning of the 1990s (Martin 1992) and even more substantially by a collaborative project of Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal (Koremenos et al. 2001a, b).

            Already this introductory information indicates that compared to realism and constructivism neoliberalism offers a quite developed perspective on institutional form. As the following overview confirms, the works proceeding from neoliberalism elaborated over time several dimensions and sources of institutional form and eventually led to a specification of a set of concrete propositions linking the various institutional dimensions to their alleged sources. In a consequence, neoliberalism currently provides a conceptualization of institutional form that is not only much more precise than the realist and constructivist analysis of the same phenomenon, but it can be regarded as a quite detailed conceptualization in general terms as well.    

2.2.1. Institutional dimensions

            Taken as a set of theoretical studies on institutional form, the neoliberal analysis of this issue has built a quite complex analytical framework. On the one hand, it must be pointed out that the majority of neoliberal contributions distinguish only a limited number of institutional dimensions. In fact, the basic neoliberal works concentrated on differentiating two particular and opposite types of international institutions rather than on specifying a higher number of institutional dimensions.

            More specifically, neoliberals originally focused on the difference between collaboration and coordination regimes (Stein 1982) or, in alternative terminologies, contracts and conventions (Snidal 1985c) and IOs and multilateral norms (Martin 1992). We can identify two institutional dimensions in the initial neoliberal research in relation to the two mentioned types of institutions: formalization and centralization.[13] This is so because the mentioned neoliberal works find the main difference between the above listed collaboration regimes (and contracts and IOs) on the one side and coordination regimes (and conventions and multilateral norms) on the other side exactly in their diverging formalization and centralization. While collaboration regimes, contracts and IOs represent, generally speaking, formal institutions, coordination regimes, conventions and multilateral norms are, in turn, informal (Martin 1992; Snidal 1985c; Stein 1982). On the top of that, contracts and IOs tend to be centralized, whereas conventions and multilateral norms do not (Martin 1992; Snidal 1985c).

            In fact, the concept of formalization makes a little bit problematic point in the neoliberal analysis as this analysis does not define it in an accurate way. Yet we can regard as formal an institution that rests on a written agreement of the participating actors (in turn, informal institutions are based on oral or even tacit agreements) (see Lipson 1991). Centralization as the other pointed out institutional dimension depends in a neoliberal understanding on the extent to which tasks are performed by “a single focal entity” (Koremenos et al. 2001a: 771).     

            Subsequently, the neoliberal conceptualization of institutional form became nonetheless quite complex and this occurred exactly thanks to the work of Koremenos et al. (Koremenos et al. 2001a, b). Whereas the previous neoliberal contributions dealt just with formalization and centralization, Koremenos et al. introduced four another institutional dimensions. More specifically, they pay attention to the following five dimensions: (1) membership rules; (2) scope of issues covered; (3) centralization of tasks; (4) rules for controlling the institution; (5) flexibility of arrangements (Koremenos et al. 2001a: 763, 768-773).

2.2.2. Sources of institutional form

            Institutional form is according to neoliberalism shaped mainly by the structure of state interests and the resulting problems of collective action (Koremenos et al. 2001a: 764-766; Martin 1992: 768-769; Snidal 1985c: 936-939; see also Stein 1982: 311-312). As has been already clarified, neoliberalism considers the structure of interests to be the key determinant of the international political development. In this vein, it also explains the origin of institutions as a response of states to collective action problems, mainly to coordination and collaboration problems.    

            As was also pointed out above, the initial neoliberal perspective on the dimensions of institutional form (Martin 1992; Snidal 1985c; Stein 1982) was significantly deepened by Koremenos et al. (2001a, b). As far as the sources of institutional form are concerned, a considerable shift was brought about already by the mentioned Martin’s contribution (Martin 1992). Martin, who in her contribution analyzed formalization and centralization in relation with IOs and multilateral norms, connected the level of these two institutional dimensions not only to coordination and collaboration problems, but also to several other factors. In addition to coordination and collaboration problems, she highlighted, in the first place, suasion games (problems) and assurance games (problems).

            Suasion games, illustrated for example by the Game of Chicken, are marked by equilibrium points in which neither actor maximizes his/her utility (Martin 1992: 778-780; also Drulák 2003: 99-100). The only equilibrium point of assurance games is pareto-optimal, but a problem nevertheless arises when an actor is not certain about the pay-offs of other actors or about their rational and unitary character (Martin 1992: 780-782). Martin adds that the particular form of international institutions is also influenced by the power distribution in the international system and the interests of the hegemon, especially by the time horizons from which the hegemon’s calculation proceeds.

            Similarly to Martin, Koremenos et al. accept the basic neoliberal framework emphasizing coordination and collaboration problems and slightly modify this framework and supplement it with other variables. Concerning the modification of the initial neoliberal framework, Koremenos et al. replace coordination and collaboration problems with distribution and enforcement problems (Koremenos et al. 2001a: 765). This modification is, nonetheless, more modest than it might seem. The reason is that distributive problems form a sub-group of coordination problems – like coordination problems they also involve several pareto-optimal equilibrium points. The only different feature of coordination games with distributive consequences is that their pareto-optimal points provide individual actors with different pay-offs (see Drulák 2003: 98-99). Most importantly, the conditions resembling coordination situations typically do contain some distributive consequences and the focus on distribution problems does not, therefore, lead to a significant narrowing of coordination problems as a broad category. Moreover, the difference between collaboration problems and enforcement problems is, as the definition of Koremenos et al. shows, purely terminological. In consequence, I use in this paper even in connection with the work by Koremenos et al. the term collaboration problems and I do not employ the term enforcement problems.

            Besides interest structure and collective action problems, Koremenos et al. link institutional form also with the number of actors (and asymmetries among them) and uncertainty. The number of actors as a variable appears in the previous works of neoliberals (Oye 1985a; also Snidal 1985c) and the same applies to uncertainty (Keohane 1984). Korenemos et al. divide uncertainty into the three following categories: uncertainty about a) environment, b) preferences, and c) behavior.                          

2.2.3. Propositions about institutional form

            Since neoliberals concentrate on formalization and centralization, I will start the overview of neoliberal propositions on institutional form with the propositions related to these two dimensions. Neoliberalism claims that formal institutions emerge when collaboration problems exist (Martin 1992; Snidal 1985b: 936-939; Stein 1982: 311-316). With coordination problems neoliberals associate, in turn, informal institutions.

            These arguments about formalization neoliberals derive from the functions that enable regimes to contribute to the resolution of particular collective action problems. Under collaboration problems, the main obstacle of cooperation stems from the non-enforceability of agreements (Martin 1992: 770; Stein 1982: 312-313). Institutions are thus under such circumstances supposed to specify appropriate behavior and detect possible non-compliance of the participating states with the common agreement. For this reason, “collaboration” institutions need to be formalized. On the contrary, the main problem of coordination games lies in the absence of communication. The resolution of this problem does not, contrary to collaboration problems, require formalized institutions (Martin 1992: 777; Stein 1982: 314-315). For the resolution of coordination problems, it is sufficient when institutions create some standards that make possible for actors to select a common strategy.

Neoliberals make similar claims also about centralization, which in the founding neoliberal writings functioned together with formalization as one of the two institutional dimensions (see above). In this way, neoliberalism argues that centralization emerges in reaction to collaboration problems and decentralization takes place in connection with coordination problems (Martin 1992; Snidal 1985b: 936-939; see also Koremenos et al. 2001a: 787-791).

Martin (1992) shares the basic ideas of neoliberals about formalization and centralization, but links those two institutional dimensions also to suasion and assurance problems. She argues that formalization/centralization occurs under suasion problems, but is not typical for assurance problems. Koremenos et al. also accept the grounding neoliberal thesis that finds a relation between centralization and collaboration problems (they use the term “enforcement problems”, see above) (Koremenos et al. 2001: 788). Still, they simultaneously regard the number of actors, uncertainty about behavior and uncertainty about environment as factors also accounting for the level of centralization. In their understanding, centralization becomes stronger when the levels of the three mentioned factors increase. 

            As was mentioned, Koremenos et al. (2001a, b) enriched the neoliberal analysis of institutional form when they extended this analysis, previously focused on formalization and centralization, with new institutional dimensions. At the same time, they considerably developed the neoliberal study of institutional form by formulating their propositions in form of explicit hypotheses. The remaining part of this section offers an overview of other neoliberal propositions about institutional form submitted by Koremenos et al.

            Membership rules are, according to Koremenos et al., conditioned by distribution problems, collaboration problems, and uncertainty about preferences (Koremenos et al. 2001a: 783-785). More concretely, the propositions of Koremenos et al. predict that the inclusiveness of membership increase in response to the magnitude of distribution problems and decrease with the magnitude of collaboration problems and uncertainty about preferences. Here, Koremenos et al. suppose that if an institution is allowed to involve a higher number of members, a successful resolution of coordination problems is more likely due to a greater scope of possible mutual concessions. Conversely, an exclusive membership paves the way for cooperation in the conditions of collaboration problems since it decreases the number of potential defectors.

            The scope of issues is according to Koremenos et al. connected with distribution and collaboration problems, but also with the number of actors (Koremenos et al. 2001a: 785-787). As the authors argue, the scope of issues is directly proportional to all the three underlined factors. The scope of issues increases as distribution problems become more serious since the extension of agreement makes possible to compensate the actors that gain less in its core areas. A greater scope of issues also helps to resolve collaboration problems. The reason is that an issue-linkage leads to a low likelihood of non-compliance because non-compliance can be in such a situation retaliated in the linked issue areas.

            When it comes to the rules of control, Koremenos et al. consider this institutional dimension to be directly proportional to uncertainty about environment and indirectly proportional to the number of actors and the asymmetry of their contributions to the functioning of the institution (Koremenos et al. 2001a: 791-793). The flexibility of arrangements as the last institutional dimension identified by Koremenos et al. increases, in their opinion, as distribution problems and uncertainty about environment grow and decreases, on the contrary, with the number of actors (Koremenos et al. 2001a: 793-795). The connection between the flexibility of arrangements and distribution problems stems here from the fact that if states face such problems, they tend to create flexible institutions that could be adapted in the future at relatively low costs.                      

3. The empirical challenges to the neoliberal analysis – the institutional structures of UN security regime, NATO and the CFSP

3.1. Methodological framework

            To assess the empirical value of neoliberalism with regard to institutional form, I also test this approach in this paper in a comparative case study dealing with the institutional form of UN security regime, NATO and the CFSP. In building this case study, I rely on the method of the “structured, focused comparison” developed by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (e.g. Bennett – George 1997). Consequently, I base the study’s methodological framework on the specification of a research design and implementation as the first two of the three basic phases of case studies according to this method (on the contrary, I leave out the reformulation of theory as the third phase as this paper centers on the assessment of neoliberalism and not on its theoretical development). In line with the mentioned method, I also divide research design as the first methodological phase into the five subsequent tasks: 1) specification of the problem and research objective, 2) specification of variables, 3) case selection, 4) description of the variation in variables, and 5) formulation of data requirements.

3.1.1. Research objective and variables

            Since this paper seeks to evaluate neoliberalism as a theoretical approach to institutional form, the case study that makes part of the paper primarily tries to test the empirical validity of neoliberalism in relation to this specific phenomenon. In selecting the variables involved in the study, I proceed from the already presented conceptual and theoretical framework of neoliberalism. With regard to the dependent variables, I focus, in the first place, on formalization and on centralization re-framed as task delegation as two variables that are recognized by the majority of neoliberal writings on institutional form.

The necessity to redefine centralization stems from the vagueness of this concept. Even when centralization is defined as the exercising of tasks by “a single focal entity” (i.e. task centralization) (Koremenos et al. 2001a: 771), it still remains too imprecise (Duffield 2003: 416; Koremenos – Snidal 2003: 434). In this paper, I thus further concretize task centralization through the concept of task delegation (for this hint see Duffield 2003: 416; Koremenos – Snidal 2003: 434). I define task delegation as a transfer of tasks by the members (member states) of the institution to a limited number of actors.

Furthermore, I also make a distinction between interstate and suprastate task delegation. In interstate task delegation, member states transfer tasks to “privileging” interstate institutions, that is, to institutions consisting of only a limited number of member states (Archer 1983/1992: 59-68; Feld et al. 1983/1994: 12-13; Martin 1992: 773). On the contrary, in suprastate task delegation tasks are transferred to suprastate institutions, i.e. institutions composed only by non-member (non-government) representatives (typically by bureaucratic actors) (Abbott – Snidal 2000; Archer 1983/1992: 59-68; Pollack 1997).        

In order to extent the number of institutional dimensions in which neoliberalism is tested in this paper, I also include among the dependent variables other dimensions that are emphasized by neoliberalism and can be identified in the selected case. Since the two of the three security regimes analyzed in this paper are not marked by autonomous membership rules and arrangements’ flexibility, I do not make an analysis of these two institutional dimensions.[14] Instead, I extend the dependent variables with issue scope and with controlling rules (conceived of here as voting power delegation) because all the three regimes dispose with particular issues and controlling rules.

Like task centralization, controlling rules also need to be specified into a more precise concept. This is admitted even by Koremenos et al., who introduced this variable to the set of institutional dimensions recognized by neoliberalism (Koremenos et al. 2001a: 772). Using the solution adopted by Koremenos et al. themselves, I concentrate in connection with controlling rules on voting rules (or, as Koremenos et al. put it, “voting arrangements”) as “one important and observable aspect” of controlling rules (Koremenos et al. 2001a: 772). As a result, I transform the initial dimension of controlling rules into voting power delegation as an essentially identical, but more concrete institutional dimension. As my labeling of this dimension suggests, regarding this dimension I concentrate on whether and how voting power is delegated. The focus on delegation is implied by the fact that it is exactly delegation as one aspect of voting power that determines how voting power enables particular members of the institution to control the institution.[15]  

As far as the independent variables of this case study are concerned, I test the explanatory power of neoliberalism on the basis of the two sources of institutional form that are consensually highlighted by all the neoliberal works – coordination problems and collaboration problems (for the description of these variables see section 2.2.2. above). Although my approach to dependent variables is “inclusive” (i.e. incorporates as many neoliberal variables as possible), I choose a more “restrictive” attitude to the independent variables. Since my aim is to test neoliberalism as a theoretical body and not individual neoliberal theories, I need to limit my attention only to those independent variables that are accepted across various neoliberal works. By contrast, it is possible to include dependent variables that appear only in some neoliberal works as far as those variables can be linked to coordination and collaboration problems as the independent variables emphasized by neoliberals as a group.            

3.1.2. The cases

            Since Bennett and George (1997) do not pay a greater attention to the issue of case selection, I rely in this part of the methodological framework on the criteria defined by Stephen Van Evera (1997). Here, it must be admitted that Van Evera’s list contains in sum 11 criteria (Van Evera 1997: 88). Yet it seems that not all those criteria can and should be applied in one case selection as some of them are in certain circumstances clearly non-applicable and some even appear to be mutually exclusive. Apparently, the list subsumes criteria related to divergent research objectives and testing methods. One must, therefore, select from the criteria identified by Van Evera those that are relevant for the particular type of his/her research objective and testing method.

Given that the case study presented in this paper tries to test a single theory and uses a congruence method (see subsection 3.2.5 below), it should fulfill the following four criteria: (1) data richness, (2) extreme values on the independent variables, (3) resemblance to current policy-problem cases, and (4) good case for replicating previous tests or introduction of new type of test (for comparison of this deduction with all Van Evera’s criteria see Van Evera 1997: 88). The comparison of UN security regime, NATO and the CFSP as the case study carried out in this paper does undoubtedly meet all the four criteria. First, the comparison of the three selected security regimes can use a plenty of available data ranging from the basic political documents underlying those regimes to the large secondary literature on the UN, NATO and the EU as (also) security institutions. Second, the following analysis substantiates that there are high values on coordination and collaboration problems as the independent variables in one of the examined security regimes (UN security regime) compared to the other two regimes.

Third, policy prescriptions that could be derived from this case study would be highly relevant because the study touches upon numerous and significant issues such as the institutional structures of international organizations, the similarities and differences of the main security institutions or the institutional environment of European security. Finally, the three chosen cases help close the gap in the empirical application of neoliberalism, which has previously rather neglected security institutions (for an exception see e.g. Wallander et al. 1999) as well as IOs (for an exception see e.g. Nielson – Tierney 2003).                              

3.1.3. The values of variables

            The methodological framework of this case study distinguishes two values or levels (high and low value/level) of each of the four analyzed dependent variables (i.e. institutional dimensions).[16] Task delegation as one of the four institutional dimensions can, therefore, be in my understanding categorized as either strong or weak task delegation. To determine the exact value of task delegation, I concentrate on the rules delimiting the tasks performed by member states, any limited groups of member states or non-state actors (the distinction between these groups of actors results from the existing types of task delegation, see 3.2.1.).

Essentially, I therefore examine the tasks carried out by interstate, “privileging” interstate and suprastate institutional bodies of the discussed regimes.

Furthermore, I also disaggregate (1) agenda-setting, (2) decision-making and (3) implementation as three stages of the political process in international institutions (e.g. Elgström – Jönsson 2000: 692-693; Marks et al. 1996: 356; Richardson 1996: 5; Wallace 2000: 73).[17] The concrete level of task delegation then depends on the number of stages in which some task delegation occurs. More specifically, task delegation can be classified as strong when limited groups of member states or non-state actors perform some tasks in all the three stages of political process (i.e. in agenda-setting, decision-making as well as implementation).

            The assessment of issue scope is based on the number of key objectives to which an institution can commit itself in the respective field of international relations. In the field of multilateral security cooperation, one can recognize four possible objectives: collective defense, collective security, crisis management and conflict prevention.[18] Given this, I define an institution that covers at least three of the four mentioned objectives as an institution involving a large scope of issues.

            With regard to voting power delegation, I focus on the voting rules existing in the institution. According to this paper, strong voting power delegation occurs when majority voting is allowed. The reason is that compared to other types of voting power delegation (voting power redistribution, a unique veto power), majority voting represents the strongest case of voting power delegation. Finally, the basic indicators of all the three discussed institutional dimensions (task delegation rules, objectives, and voting power rules) also determine in this paper the value of formalization. I assume that weak formalization exists when the majority of institutional elements (rules or objectives) are not formally defined in at least two of the three mentioned institutional levels (i.e. task delegation rules, objectives, and voting power rules).

            The measurement of coordination and collaboration problems as the independent variables is certainly not less important that the evaluation of the dependent variables. To assess both types of collective action problems, I draw on the works by Snidal (Snidal 1985b, 1985c), which put, in this respect, emphasis on the impact of 1) an issue area and of 2) the three following interrelated factors:[19] 1) the number of states, 2) the scope of asymmetries among states,[20] and 3) time.[21] First, the characteristics of the particular issue-area enable us to determine what type of game is actually played. As Snidal claims, the delimitation of specific “political-institutional environments” designates “rules of the game” (Snidal 1985b: 35, 40-44). Hence, by the analysis of security as a distinct issue area we can determine if the examined regimes are marked by coordination or collaboration problems or by both of them (this is basically the way taken in e.g. Lepgold 1998; Wagner 2003, Wallander – Keohane 1999).

Second, proceeding from Snidal’s work I also suppose that the magnitude of coordination or collaboration problems in individual regimes depends on the value of the mentioned three interrelated factors (the number of states, asymmetries among states, time).[22] As Snidal (1985c: 926-936) suggests, the intensity of coordination problems is directly proportional to the number of actors, present time and future time and indirectly proportional to the scope of asymmetries among actors and past time. The magnitude of collaboration problems is directly proportional to the number of actors and indirectly proportional to the scope of asymmetries among them, present time and future time. We can summarize these assumptions by, for example, focusing on when collective action problems attain high values: 

1. Coordination problems are strong when (1) the number of actors is high; (2) the asymmetry among actors is low; (3a) past cooperation is short-term; and (3b) future cooperation is likely to be long-term.

2. Collaboration problems are strong when (1) the number of actors is high; (2) the asymmetry among actors is low; (3) future cooperation is likely to be short-term[23]   

Given that there are currently more than 190 states existing in the world, this paper assumes that the number of actors in a particular institution is high when the institution has more than 95 members. Furthermore, I also assume that the asymmetry among actors is low when the institutions function under the circumstances of bipolarity or multipolarity (as opposed to unipolarity). For the purpose of this paper, I define unipolarity is a situation in which the GDP (purchasing power parity) of the state with the greatest GDP is at least two times higher that the GDP of the state with the second best result on this indicator. Finally, this paper presumes that short-term cooperation lasts for a shorter time than a decade, whilst a long-term cooperation takes more than one decade.

3.1.4. Data  

             To identify the respective rules and objectives of the examined security regimes, I construct and use a synthetic data-collection approach. This approach takes into account rules and objectives anchored in formal and informal documents as well as in the behavior of the states participating in the analyzed institutions. In this way, I combine the so-called formalist and behavioral approach as two of the three most discussed methodological approaches to international institutions (see esp. Haggard – Simmons 1987; Hasenclever et al. 1997; Keohane 1993).[24] In order to analyze the formalization of the individual regimes, I nevertheless supplement a synthetic approach with a simultaneous disaggregation of this approach into a “formal” and “informal” approach.

            The “formal” approach concentrates on the institutional elements laid down in the basic treaties establishing the analyzed regimes (UN 1945; NATO 1949a; EU 2001). By contrast, the “informal” approach incorporates variables that are set not only by the basic treaties, but also by lower-level formal documents and actors’ behavior. Due to the limited access to the sources displaying “informal” variables, I use for the “informal” dimension of my analysis alternative sources represented by the official literature published by the examined institutions (UN 1998, 2005; NATO 2001, 2005; EU 2005) as well as secondary literature.[25] The separation of the “formal” and “informal” approach also makes possible to distinguish treaty (“formal” approach) and outside-treaty (“informal” approach) institutional elements. All the mentioned types of sources (documents, official literature, and secondary literature) make, at the same time, also the basis for the specification of coordination and collaboration problems as the independent variables of the case study.                        

3.1.5. Case study implementation

            In this part of the methodological framework, the method of “structured, focused comparison” requires a researcher to develop an explanation for the studied case or cases and choose a method to test this explanation. This paper has already overviewed the neoliberal explanations of institutional form (section 2.2.3.). For this reason, the only step that needs to be made now is to select the explanations that relate to those neoliberal dependent and independent variables that make part of this paper’s analysis (see section 3.2.1.). Simultaneously, the selected explanations should also be restated in the form of hypotheses that will be tested at the subsequent stage of the case study. Given the chosen variables, the following four neoliberal hypotheses can be tested:

1. Issue scope is large when coordination problems are strong

2. Issue scope is large when collaboration problems are strong

3. Task delegation is strong when collaboration problems are strong

4. Formalization is high when collaboration problems are strong

In addition to those four hypotheses deduced from the basic neoliberal theoretical writings on institutional form, I put forward yet another neoliberal hypothesis, which makes a prediction about voting power delegation. As follows from the propositions of the basic neoliberal works (section 3.2.1.) on controlling rules (here reframed as voting power delegation), these works make no prediction on this particular institutional dimension that would emphasize the role of coordination or collaboration problems. However, this “missing” connection between voting power delegation and collective action problems can be supplemented by work by Wagner (2003: esp. 588-589), which also draws on neoliberalism. In this work, Wagner connects majority voting (which has been in this paper equaled with voting power delegation) to coordination problems. Proceeding from Wagner’s work, I thus state the fifth neoliberal hypothesis tested in this paper:

5. Voting power delegation is strong when coordination problems are strong

In testing the hypotheses, this paper relies on the congruence method as one of the methods suggested by the method of “structured, focused comparison”. One way of implementing the congruence method, which I choose here due to its suitability in this case, stipulates the researcher to ask whether the independent and dependent variables “vary in the expected directions” (George 1997). In other words, if the two types of variables examined in the case study varied in line with the neoliberal hypotheses, the neoliberal explanation of institutional form could be, in light of this particular case study, considered empirically valid. Since I test the neoliberal explanation in this case study by means of five specific hypotheses, I make the conditions for the empirical validity of neoliberalism more specific: neoliberalism could be regarded as empirically valuable if all or at least the majority of the neoliberal hypotheses were confirmed.                    

3.2. The cases – the institutional structures of UN security regime, NATO and the CFSP[26] 

3.2.1. Issue scope

            The analysis of the objectives of UN security regime, NATO and the CFSP reveals that while the first two mentioned regimes are marked with a large issue scope, the CFSP involves a rather narrow scope of issues. From the “formal” view focusing on UN Charter (UN 1945: Art. 1), UN security regime involves collective security, conflict prevention and crisis management as three out of the four possible goals of multilateral security policies (see section 3.1.3.). More specifically, UN Charter divides UN security policies into two areas. First, the Charter establishes “peaceful settlement of disputes” (UN 1945: Chap. VI), which corresponds to crisis management and conflict prevention. Second, UN Charter also defines “action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression” (UN 1945: Chap. VII). This action is essentially equal to collective security.

            Overall, NATO also has three objectives: collective defense, conflict prevention and crisis management. The first two of these objectives are formally based. First, Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty sets a clear collective defense commitment when it declares that a military attack against one or several member states will be regarded as an attack against all the member states (NATO 1949a: Art. 5). Second, “formal” approach also allows us to consider conflict prevention to be one of the NATO’s objectives. This is indicated by Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which mentions that member states will contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations (NATO 1949a: Art. 2; see also Sloan 2003: 9). Furthermore, during the 1990s NATO also accepted lower-profile documents and carried out activities that established crisis management as yet another organization’s goal (NATO 2005; also e.g. Carr 1996: 110-131). The “informal” view therefore leads us to identify crisis management as the third NATO’s fundamental security objective.

            The Treaty on the European Union (EU 2001) lays down crisis management as the only EU’s security goal. Apart from general declarations on security, the Treaty defines more specific EU security aims through a set of arrangements that were literally transferred to the Treaty in 1997 from the so-called Petersberg Tasks adopted by the Western European Union in 1992. These arrangements include the following activities: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. As this list reveals, the Treaty’s security provisions can be subsumed under crisis management as a type of security policy. In addition, lower-profile documents adopted since the mid-1990s also attached conflict prevention to EU security objectives (e.g. EU 2001/2002).                           

3.2.2. Task delegation

            Out of the three analyzed security regimes, it is only UN security regime where a strong task delegation occurs. The reason is that only this regime involves a transfer of agenda-setting, decision-making as well as implementation tasks (for the measurement of task delegation see section 3.1.3.). It is also noteworthy that UN member states delegate the majority of substantial tasks to “privileging” and suprastate institutions on the formal basis. On the one hand, UN Charter declares that individual member states and the General Assembly (GA) as an interstate institution can take part in agenda-setting (UN 1945: Art. 11, 14, 35). On the other hand, the right to set agenda is, however, also given to the Security Council (SC) (UN 1945: Art. 34, 39) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) (UN 1945: Art. 46, 47) as “privileging” institutions. On the top of that, the Secretary-General (SG) as a suprastate institution is also allowed to participate in agenda-setting (UN 1945: Art. 99).

            As mentioned, formally anchored task delegation takes place in UN security regime also in the decision-making and implementation stage of the political process. Even though some decision-making power is in this regime vested to the GA (UN 1945: Art. 11, 14), the main decision-making body of UN security regime is constituted by the SC (UN 1945: Art. 12, 24, 36, 39, 42). Likewise, the SC is also the main implementation body (UN 1945: Art. 43, 44, 45) and some implementation tasks are simultaneously transferred to the MSC (UN 1945: Art. 47). As far as the informal extension of task delegation is concerned, one additional case of a considerable task transfer is represented by a delegation to the SG at the implementation stage (UN 1998: 15, 17-18, 69-70, 74; see also Bennett 1977/1991: 126-127; Gordon 1994: 61-62; Mingst 1995: 59-64; White 1997: 55).

On the contrary, the North Atlantic Treaty establishes only the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and a prototype of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) as two interstate institutions (NATO 1949a; see also Schimmelfennig 2005: 11). At the same time, it does not specify any functions of even those two institutional bodies. Hence, there is no formal task delegation in NATO.

From an “informal” perspective, NATO member states delegate to “privileging” and suprastate institutions only agenda-setting and implementation tasks. The overall task delegation in NATO is therefore weak even from this perspective. Concerning agenda-setting in NATO, member states as well as some interstate bodies have the right to participate in this process. More specifically, three purely interstate bodies involved in agenda-setting are represented by the DPC, Military Committee (MC) and Regional Planning Groups (RPG) (NATO 1949b; NATO 1952a). Yet agenda-setting tasks are also shared by MC Standing Group and the Supreme Allied Commanders as “privileging” institutions (NATO 1949b; NATO 2001) and by the International Staff (IS) with the Secretary-General (SG) and the International Military Staff (IMS) as (partially) suprastate institutions (NATO 2001: 150, 219-220; see also Cortell – Peterson 2003: 13-20).

Task transfer also takes place at the implementation stage, where some powers are delegated to the SG (NATO 2001: 219-220; Cortell – Peterson 2003: 16) or the Supreme Allied Commanders (NATO 2001: 259, 264; Cortell – Peterson 2003: 14, 19). However, all the main decision-making powers are reserved to NATO interstate institutions like the NAC, DPC, MC or Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

Like NATO, the CFSP also embodies only a weak task delegation since we find only a delegation of agenda-setting and implementation tasks in this regime. But unlike NATO, the CFSP is distinguished with a formal delegation of the majority of significant tasks. The Treaty on the EU acknowledges the agenda-setting power of the member states (EU 1992: Art. J.8(3)),[27] the Council of the EU (EU 1992: Art. J.3(3)) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) (EU 2001: Art. 25) as interstate institutions. Simultaneously, the Treaty also transfers the right to set agenda to the following suprastate institutions: the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR), the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), the European Commission, and the European Parliament.[28]

With regard to the implementation stage, the tasks are carried out by EU Council and the PSC (EU 1992: Art. J. 8(5), 2001: Art. 25), but also by the Council Presidency (EU 1992: Art. J.5, 1997: Art. 24) as a “privileging” institution. In addition, the SG/HR (EU 1997: Art. J.8(3), J. 16, 2001: Art. 27d) and the European Commission (EU 1992: Art. J.5, 1997: Art. J. 14) also dispose with implementation functions.[29] Still, the EU does not differ from NATO in that the decision-making tasks are performed by purely interstate institutions (the European Council, EU Council and also the PSC).

3.2.3. Voting power delegation

With regard to voting power delegation, only UN security regime is marked by a strong voting power delegation since only this regime allows majority voting in a substantial manner. As the voting rules of the GA state, the GA votes either by a 2/3 majority or by a simple majority (UN 1945: Art. 8; Bennett 1977/1991: 86). The SC also uses majority voting, both in substantive and procedural questions (UN 1945: Art. 27).[30] Voting power delegation is within UN security regime mostly based on treaty arrangements, though the UN also accepted some additional informal rules regarding voting principles (Bennett 1977/1991: 84-85, 87; Gordon 1994: 28; Mingst 1995: 23).

By contrast, NATO does not involve any voting power transfers. The North Atlantic Treaty does not discuss voting rules at all. Even the outside-treaty NATO rules do not stipulate a voting power transfer. In fact, NATO declares that its decisions are taken on the consensus basis (NATO 2001: 149-150, 275; Cortell – Peterson 2003).    

On the one hand, the Treaty on the EU introduces the use of majority voting within the CFSP in EU Council (EU 1992). However, the voting power delegation in the CFSP cannot be, at least according to the criteria applied in this paper, classified as strong. First, member states retain the right to veto a particular decision if it clashes with their declared and important interests (EU 1997: Art. J. 13(2)). Second, the European Council as the other CFSP decision making body functions merely on unanimity principle. Finally, the application of majority voting in EU Council remains limited to only some CFSP issues (EU 1997: Art. 13(2), 2001: Art. 23(2), 24(3), 27e).

3.2.4. Formalization

The above provided analysis of the institutional structures of the three analyzed security regimes reveals that both UN security regime and the CFSP reach a high level of formalization since both regimes are highly formalized in all the three examined dimensions (issue scope, task delegation, and voting power delegation). All the three objectives of UN security regime (collective security, conflict prevention, and crisis management) are laid down in UN Charter and, therefore, strongly formalized. Similarly, the majority of UN substantial rules regulating the distribution of tasks and voting power are treaty-based (for details see the above sections).

The formalization of the CFSP also attains a high level. Again, most of the CFSP basic rules concerning task division and voting are defined in EU Treaty. At the same time, while conflict prevention as one of the two policy’s main objectives is not formally defined, the treaty recognizes crisis management as the other of the two objectives.

NATO also makes a clear-cut case regarding formalization as it is conceived of in this paper, but belongs to the other pole of the possible formalization values. It is necessary to concede that the North Atlantic Treaty outlines two of the three NATO’s security objectives, namely collective defense and conflict prevention. Overall, the informal character of NATO, however, prevails since virtually all the rules dealing with task distribution and voting are delimited outside the treaty.     

3.3. Testing neoliberalism

3.3.1. The magnitude of coordination and collaboration problems

Before the results of the empirical evaluation of the neoliberal hypotheses are presented, we need to specify the level of coordination and collaboration problems (the independent variables) existing in the studied regimes. Essentially, we only need to find out the intensities of those problems and we can simply take for granted that they as such indeed in the analyzed regimes exist. This is so because security as a field in which the examined regimes function belongs to the most fundamental and also extensive issue-areas of international relations. It is, therefore, possible to assume that in such a large issue-area both mentioned types of collective problems arise.[31]  

            Having justified why it is possible to assume the presence of coordination and collaboration problems in the analyzed regimes, we can make the magnitude of those problems more concrete. Concerning coordination problems, this type of collective problem is strong in UN security regime and weak in NATO and the CFSP. The problems of coordination arising in UN security regime can be categorized as strong since two of the three preconditions for the high value of coordination problems are met in this regime (compare with section 3.2.3). First, UN security regime certainly involves a high number of actors as it nowadays involves almost all the existing states. Second, given that in UN security regime the greatest GDP (USA) does not double the second greatest GDP (China), the asymmetries within the regime are low.[32] The only factor that does not reinforce the intensity of coordination problems in UN security regime is time. Even though the likelihood of a long-term cooperation also strengthens coordination problems within this regime, this tendency is balanced by the long-term past cooperation. 

            On the contrary, coordination problems occurring within NATO and the CFSP have a weak intensity. The CFSP disposes merely with one precondition for high coordination problems. Like in UN security regime, we also find a low asymmetry within the CFSP since the greatest GDP (Germany) is not two times higher than the second greatest GDP (Britain).[33] Still, time does not have a significant impact on coordination problems because (again like in UN security regime) the negative influence of a long-term future cooperation is neutralized by the positive influence of the long-term past cooperation, which started within the European integration process several decades ago. Moreover, strong coordination problems are prevented by a low number of members (the regime assembled less than 10% of the existing states when the 2001 version of the Treaty on the EU was accepted).

            In NATO, coordination problems are also weak due to the fact that no precondition for strong coordination problems exists in this institution. Like the CFSP, NATO is not marked by a high number of actors and the “time” inhibitor of cooperation. What is more, asymmetry does reach a high level in NATO. The reason is that the USA’s GDP is more than two times higher than the GDP of Germany as the country with the second highest value on this factor.[34]

            Likewise, there are also strong collaboration problems in UN security regime while member states of NATO and the CFSP face only weak collaboration problems. The strong collaboration problems in UN security regime result from the fact that the regime involves a high number of states, which simultaneously have, given the metric applied in this paper, only lowly asymmetric relations. The high intensity of collaboration problems is this case moderated only by time, more specifically by the likelihood of long-term cooperation. The collaboration problems existing in the CFSP are again intensified by a low asymmetry, which is, however, outweighed by a low number of actors and a long-term time horizon. NATO also displays, due to a low number of actors, high asymmetry and long-term time horizon, only weak collaboration problems.

3.3.2. Empirical validity of neoliberalism - the resulting findings    

            The detailed comparison of the dependent and independent variables involved in this case study reveals that the variables vary only partially in accordance with the neoliberal hypotheses. More specifically, even though two of the tested neoliberal hypotheses turned out to be confirmed, the other three hypotheses were refuted. The empirical validity of neoliberalism can therefore be, in light of this case study, considered rather limited.

To begin with, one of the neoliberal hypotheses that was confirmed is the hypothesis according to which task delegation is strong when collaboration problems are also strong. As has been presented above, while UN security regime is distinguished with a strong task delegation, in NATO and the CFSP the delegation of tasks attains only a low value. Simultaneously, collaboration problems reach the high level in UN security regime and the low level in the other two regimes.

            Furthermore, the neoliberal hypothesis associating strong voting power delegation with strong coordination problems was in this case study also confirmed. Out of the three examined regimes, it is only UN security regime in which a strong voting power delegation occurs. This proves the empirical validity of neoliberalism as coordination problems are also strong only within UN security regime.

However, the case study refuted the hypothesis that establishes a link between large issue scope and strong coordination problems and, at the same time, also the hypothesis that declares large issue scope to stem from strong collaboration problems. To recall the findings on the variation in issue scope among the three regimes, UN security regime and NATO are marked with a large issue scope, but the CFSP has only a narrow issue scope. Yet coordination as well as collaboration problems are strong only in UN security regime and not in NATO.

Moreover, the findings also disconfirm the hypothesis according to which high formalization arises in response to strong collaboration problems. The empirical results display a clear difference between UN security regime and the CFSP as highly formal institutions and NATO as an institution that is lowly formalized. This contradicts the mentioned neoliberal hypothesis because collaboration problems reach the high level in UN security regime, but not in the CFSP.         

Conclusion

            This paper has revealed that the neoliberal study of institutional form seems to perform considerably better at the purely theoretical level than in empirical application. Compared to realism and constructivism, neoliberalism submitted a relatively highly precise conceptual and theoretical ideas and propositions on institutional form. Yet the empirical case study carried out in this paper and comparing the institutional structures of UN security regime, NATO and the CFSP disconfirms a majority of the neoliberal hypotheses.

To be sure, even the best designed case study could hardly make a theoretical approach completely refuted. Still, it should be recalled that the presented study case was crafted in line with generally recognized case-selection criteria, which reinforces the validity of its findings. Even though those findings do not allow us to regard neoliberalism as an empirically absolutely weak perspective on institutional form, they definitely make the empirical validity of neoliberalism in relation to institutional form questionable.

This implies that the future neoliberal research on institutional form should, above all, concentrate on the conduct of a higher number of empirical case studies that would enable us to make a more evidence based and definite conclusion on the empirical value of the approach. The obvious next step of such research would also be a re-framing of neoliberal propositions on institutional form in light of the assembled empirical evidence. Nevertheless, the need for empirical application of neoliberalism should not completely overshadow a further deductive refining of neoliberal propositions. For in spite of its above presented significant contribution, even the neoliberal perspective on various institutional dimensions and their determinants still could be made considerably more theoretically precise than it currently is.              

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