Expo-souvenirs herinneren ons aan lang vervlogen tijden. Zo was België anno 1958 nog een koloniale grootmacht die het hart van Centraal-Afrika controleerde. Hoewel het in deze dagen al giste in de Congo, vertoefde een groot deel van het toenmalige establishment nog in de vaste veronderstelling dat ze nog jaren stevig in het zadel zou zitten in Afrika. De overzeese gebiedsdelen kregen dan ook een prominente plaats toebedeeld op de Expo.

Naast Belgisch Congo controleerde België sinds de eerste wereldoorlog ook nog twee districten van het voormalige Duits-Oost-Afrika. Deze mandaten, Ruanda en Urundi (Rwanda en Burundi), waren, hoewel officieel slechts mandaatgebieden, volledig in het Belgische koloniale rijk geïntegreerd en hadden ook een plaats gekregen op de Expo. Uiteraard kon men in het paleis van Ruanda-Urundi een filatelistisch souvenir kopen, getuige daarvan bovenstaande enveloppe.

Expo-souvenirs remind us of times long gone. So does the above featured expo-cover which was issued as a souvenir from the Palais de Ruanda-Urundi. The expo-hall in which the two Belgian mandated territories, Ruanda and Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi) were represented. Of course, there too, one could obtain a postal souvenir.

Ook de ministaatjes sprongen in de Expo-dans. Liechtenstein vierde de wereldtentoonstelling met de uitgifte van twee Expo-zegels.

Europe's micronations also celebrated the World's Fair. On occasion of Expo '58 Liechtenstein issued 2 stamps.

FDC met een van de Tsjechoslovaakse Expo-zegels. Naast deze zegel gaf Tsjechoslovakije ook een hele reeks luchtpost (legiposta) zegels uit ter gelegenheid van Expo '58. Op de zegel is het pavilioen van de Tsjechoslovaakse Volksrepubliek te zien.

An FDC with the Czechoslovakian Expo '58-stamp. Besides this stamp Czechoslovakia also issued a series of airmail stamps (legiposta) also on the Expo '58-theme. The pavilion of the Czechoslovakian People's Republic is featured on the above stamp.

Opnieuw een landendag-FDC. Op 6 september 1958 hield men op de Expo de Benelux-dag, exact 14 jaar na het ondertekenen van het Benelux-verdrag op 5 september 1948. Let ook op de rechthoekige stempel. Geslaagde samenwerking van vrije mensen lezen we, in ene periode waarin enerzijds de herrinnering aan de onderdrukking van de 2de wereldoorlog nog levendig was en anderzijds het concept Vrijheid door het Westen gebruikt werd in de ideologische strijd met het Oost-Blok.

Again a country-days-FDC. On September 6th World's Fair celebrated the BENELUX-union, an economic union between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, only a day after the union's 14th anniversary. Mind the square marking stating the BENELUX was a succesfull cooperation of free people. A small mark that says a lot about the period it was used in. The memories of brutal oppresion during the Second World war were still fresh and on the other hand the West fought a cold war with the Soviet Bloc in which the concept of freedom was used as an ideologic weapon.

Twee FDC's met de Italiaanse Expo-zegel, afgestempeld in Milaan en Pescara.

Two FDC's with the Italian World's Fair issue, canceled at the Milan and Pescara philately office.

FDC met de Spaanse gelegenheidszegels over Expo '58. Info over een eventueel Spaans postkantoor op de Expo is altijd welkom.

A FDC with Spanish Expo-stamps. Info on a possible Spanish postoffice at the World's Fair is always welcome.

By TAKIS MICHAS

FROM TODAY'S WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
April 29, 2008

Athens

After a recent visit to Skopje, the U.S. envoy to NATO, Victoria Nuland, said that the argument between Greece and Macedonia could be settled "within days or weeks." If only. Unfortunately, the so-called name dispute is far too complex for easy fixes.

First there is the name: Greece wants its northern neighbor to change its constitutional designation, Republic of Macedonia, to something else, perhaps with "New" or "Upper" prefixed. Unless it does so, Greece will continue to block Macedonia's entry into NATO, as it did at this month's Bucharest summit, and presumably the European Union. Athens claims the current name reveals territorial ambitions against its own northern province of Macedonia.

There is also the dispute over the existence of a Macedonian nation. Since the end of World War II, Greece consistently refused to acknowledge such a nation or ethnic group, arguing that it was the "artificial creation" of former Yugoslav strongman Tito. According to this view, the only real Macedonians are ethnic Greeks. Greek officials and most of the media here today refer to Macedonia by the demeaning term "Skopjans."

Then there is the question of language. Greece denies the existence of a Macedonian language, claiming that this is merely a "local idiom" or "dialect."

There is, lastly, the issue of Slav Macedonians who fled Greece after World War II. Greece denies these political refugees and their descendants any "right of return," saying they were traitors who forfeited their claims to citizenship by fighting alongside the Communist-led Democratic Army, which sought the secession of (Greek) Macedonia from Greece. After the defeat of the Communist forces in the Greek Civil War, many of the militants settled in the countries of the former Soviet block, including approximately 30,000 in the neighboring then-Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Their properties in Greece were confiscated by the state and reallocated to the inhabitants of the region. In 1983, then Socialist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou passed a law allowing for the repatriation of the communist political refugees. However, Slav Macedonians were excluded from this deal since the law applied only to ethnic Greeks.

All four areas of dispute are interrelated. All tend to confirm the fears and stereotypes the inhabitants of both countries have about the other.

For the Greeks – especially in the northern regions – the claims concerning the existence of a "Macedonian" nation, language or country as well as for the return of the refugees are seen as part and parcel of Skopje's "irredentism." Recent actions by the Macedonian government, such as the decision to rename the airport in Skopje after Alexander the Great or the circulation in public of maps of "Greater Macedonia" that include parts of Greece, did nothing to allay the fears of many Greeks that the "expansionist" ideology of their neighbor poses a threat to territorial integrity.

On the other side of the border, the picture is inverted. For the Macedonians, Greek attempts to deny them a name, a language, an ethnicity and basic human rights (like "the right to return") are part of the "cultural genocide" of Slav Macedonians that Greece has been waging for the past century. By this view, the ethnic homogenization of northern Greece – which started with the Balkan wars at the beginning of the last century and culminated in the post-World War II settlement in the region – was intended to Hellenize the Slav populations of Northern Greece.

According to this view, in the course of the nation-building of modern Greece, key aspects of history, life and culture that didn't conform with the official vision of a single, unitary nation that could trace its lineage back to the days of Pericles were erased. Entire towns and villages disappeared from the map as did the names of a host of public spaces, churches, monasteries, mountains, lakes and rivers. Slavic family and individual names were changed into Greek names. The public use of the Slavic Macedonian language was prohibited.

Contrary to received wisdom, the dispute between Greece and Macedonia isn't over a mere name, but concerns competing national mythologies, symbols and histories. In other words, we have here all the usual Balkan issues over which people in this part of the world and elsewhere have butchered each other in the distant and not-so-distant past. No easy fix is possible, and a compromise over the name won't put to rest the basic conflict. Unless all the problems are addressed openly and honestly, mutual distrust will persist, ready to erupt again at the first opportunity – or once EU reconstruction funds dry up.

Had Athens and Skopje engaged in serious bilateral or multilateral talks during the past decade on all the points of contention, and not focused simply on the "name," perhaps they would not find themselves in their current, absurd predicament.

Mr. Michas, a Greek journalist, is author of "Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic's Serbia" (University of Texas A & M Press, 2002).

Macedonia Dispute is Not About a Name 

Even if the two countries agree on a compromise title for the former Yugoslav republic, their disputes will not be solved. 

By Takis Michas in Athens  

There is little doubt that a large part of the Greek population, especially in northern Greece, feels sincerely threatened by what it perceives as “irredentism” on the part of the Skopje government.  Recent actions, such as the decision to rename the airport in Skopje after Alexander the Great, or the circulation in public of maps of “Greater Macedonia”, confirm the fears of many Greeks that the “expansionist” ideology of their neighbour poses a threat to Greece’s territorial integrity.  

While some foreign observers concede that Greek fears are well founded, the majority sees them as ludicrous. Yet, one question is rarely posed: Even if one accepts that Greek fears are justified, how will changing the country’s name remove the grounds upon which those fears are based?

If that is the case, Greece’s policy over the last 20 years, focusing on forcing Skopje to change the country’s constitutional name, makes little sense.

 Let us assume the government in Skopje succumbs to international pressure and accepts the name “Upper Macedonia”. The Greek government, so the story goes, will then welcome “Upper Macedonia” into NATO with open arms. The question, however, is why?  Why should the adoption of a composite name like “Upper Macedonia” make Greeks feel less threatened by their neighbour’s so-called “irredentism”?   Irrespective of which name is adopted, the respective historical discourses on which the two countries base their national identities will not only continue to diverge but will also continue to come into conflict with one another. And it is those discourses – not the name itself - that lie at the heart of the dispute. 

Today, Greece claims that the country is “an artificial creation” of the former Yugoslav strongman Josip Broz Tito. Macedonian historians on the other hand see the creation of a republic within Yugoslavia as the outcome of long historical processes.  Greece does not recognize the existence of even traces of a “Macedonian” ethnic consciousness among the Slav-speaking population of the region during the 18^th and 19^th centuries. To the north, the exact opposite view is held.  Greece refuses to recognize that the everyday means of communication in its neighbour is a “language”, terming it in all official documents a “spoken idiom” or “dialect”.  Finally, Greece denies any “right of return” to the Slav-speaking Macedonians who fled Greece after the Second World War, claiming they were traitors who forfeited their claims to citizenship. 

Whether this situation will change if the country adopts the name “Upper Macedonia” is doubtful. The Slav Macedonians who left Greece after the War will not suddenly get a welcome mat in Greece. Nor will Greece recognize that the speech people use in Skopje constitutes a “language” rather than an “idiom” because it is now called the “Upper Macedonian language”. Nor should one expect official Greek historiography to suddenly accept that once upon a time groups of people living in Greece developed a “Macedonian” (or should we say “Upper Macedonian”?) ethnic consciousness.   

Put bluntly, all the serious points of contention between the two countries, all the claims and counter-claims, will persist, irrespective as to whether the name of the country changes or not - because the problem between the two countries is not a “name dispute” but a general dispute concerning competing national mythologies, symbols and historical points of reference.  

In other words, it is a conflict that concerns all the items over which people in the Balkans have been happily butchering one another in the distant and the not-so-distant past and will probably continue to do so in the future if the opportunity presents itself and if European Union funds dry up. If this is correct, both Athens and Skopje have committed a tremendous blunder by focusing exclusively on the name issue.  Had the two countries engaged in serious bilateral or multilateral talks during the past ten years on all issues and points of contention, and not simply on the “name”, perhaps they would not find themselves in their current absurd situation – a situation that only confirms international suspicions that the Balkans are after all - the Balkans! 

 Takis Michas is a Greek journalist and author of the book “Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic’s Serbia” (Texas A & M University Press 2002). Balkan Insight is BIRN`s online publication.     

(18/02/08)

(At the end of the Interview some extracts are provided in English)

Intervju: Takis Michas

Grci se ne kaju zbog podrške zločincima

Novinar dnevnih novina Eleftherotypia i saradnik Wall Street Journala, autor knjige “Nesveta alijansa” po prvi put za bh. medije govori o reakcijama koje je izazvala njegova knjiga, prijetnjama i pritiscima koje je doživio nakon objavljivanja knjige te odgovornosti grčkih političara za učešće u zločinu. Nazavan je i crnom ovcom grčkog novinarstva, a o načinima na koji mu je prijećeno te profesionalnim pritiscima koje je doživio ne želi direktno govoriti, kaže – to je iza njega i ne želi se na to vraćatiRazgovarao: Almir PanjetaGrčki novinar Takis Michas suočio se sa burom javnog nezadovoljstva kada je objavio knjigu Nesveta alijansa u kojoj govori o umiješanosti Grčke u zločine u BiH i pad Srebrenice. Doživio je i osude grčkih kolega novinara, među kojima je poznat kao crna ovca jer se odbijao priključiti trendu pune podrške pravoslavnoj braći tokom rata u nekadašnjoj Jugoslaviji. U početku knjige, Michas je citirao jednog od grčkih boraca koji su učestvovali u osvajanju Srebrenice. - Nakon što je artiljerija prestala bombardovati, uletjeli smo i ‘počistili’ mjesto! – kazao je tad pripadnik Grčke dobrovoljačke garde, jedinice koja je operirala u Vlasenici. Prema podacima iz knjige, garda je formirana u martu 1995. na zahtjev generala Mladića, glavnokomandujućeg vojske bosanskih Srba, i bila je potpuno integrirana u njegove snage. Iako su mnogi ovu knjigu nazvali knjigom koja govori o grčkim dobrovoljcima, ona je, kaže Michas u eksluzivnom razgovoru za Start, više knjiga koja govori o ukupnoj umiješanosti Grčke u rat u BiH, i to ne samo vojno, već moralno i ekonomski.  Iako je Grčka uloga u probijanju sankcija tokom ratova prilično poznata, knjiga po prvi put bilježi primjere dostupne čitalaštvu s engleskog govornog područja. Tri dana prije nego što je ubijen u oktobru 2000., srpski biznismen i lik iz svijeta podzemlja Vladimir Bokan dao je intervju Michasu. Bokan je preselio u Grčku 1992., a grčko državljanstvo je primio dvije godine potom. Michasu je pričao kako su grčke vlasti pomagale da se slomi ratni embargo na naftu za Srbiju i Crnu Goru a objasnio mu je kako je 1994. kupio plovilo da prevozi naftu iz državne rafinerije u Grčkoj do crnogorske luke Bar, odakle je išla dalje za Srbiju. Takis Michas, novinar dnevnih novina Eleftherotypia i saradnik Wall Street Journala, po prvi put za bh. medij govori o reakcijama koje je izazvala njegova knjiga, prijetnjama i pritiscima koje je doživio nakon objavljivanja knjige Nesveta alijansa te odgovornosti grčkih političara za učešće u zločinu.

Da li je bilo teško skupiti materijal za knjigu Nesveta alijansa u kojoj govorite o umiješanosti Grčke u rat u BiH te o učešću grčkih dobrovoljaca?

- Niko ne želi da priča o toj temi. U Grčkoj kao i u ostatku balkanskih zemalja nacionalizmi diktiraju situaciju u kojoj zločini počinjeni u ime nacije ustvari nisu zločini, dok još više iritiraju stavovi prema kojima sve treba skloniti ustranu s očiju javnosti.

Da li su Milošević i Karadžić imali otvorenu podršku grčkih vlasti?-          

Moja knjiga pokazuje da je postojala masovna podrška naroda, medija, crkve i političke elite Miloševiću i njegovim pristalicama Karadžiću i Mladiću. U svojoj knjizi dokazujem da je ta podrška bila moralna, ekonomska, diplomatska i vojna.

Da li bi neko trebao odgovarati zbog takve podrške?-       

  Nije pitanje da li bi neko trebao za to odgovarati ili ne. Svakome se desi da napravi političku grešku. Problem grčkih političara je taj što ne žele priznati svoje greške. Nijedan grčki političar nije imao snage reći Bosancima: Vidite, svjesni smo da smo bili na strani sa koljačima i zaista nam je žao zbog toga.

Kako javnost u Grčkoj generalno reagira na temu umiješanosti Grčke u rat u BiH?-        

Većina ih je ravnodušna. A među onima koji pokazuju bilo kakav interes većina je onih koji još podržavaju rat koji su Srbi vodili u BiH.

Kako reagiraju na činjenicu da su se grčki dobrovoljci borili i ginuli u BiH?-

Mnogi ljudi ili ne znaju ili ih nije briga. Kakogod, većina njih vrlo vjerovatno podupire napore naših hrabrih momaka koji su otišli da se bore na strani naše srpske braće.

Da li Vam je ikada neko prijetio?-

Mnogo puta. Također, bilo je i određenih profesionalnih pritisaka, a to se dešava svakome ko se usudi pisati o nacionalno osjetljivim pitanjima i to na način koji ne odobravaju vladajući moćnici. .

Na koji način su Vam prijetili?- To je sad iza mene i zaista ne bih o tome želio pričati.

Kako su grčke vlasti reagirale na knjigu?-       

  Potpuna zvanična tišina. Ali nezvanično, i socijalistička PASOK vlada kao i konzervativna ND vlada napravili su nekoliko pokušaja da me profesionalno ugroze. Naravno, nisam ni očekivao ništa drugo. 

Da li su, po Vašem mišljenju, grčke vlasti zaista podržavale volontere koji su dolazili da se bore u Bosnu?-

Da. Regrutiranje tih dobrovoljaca kako bi išli i borili se protiv vlade u Sarajevu koju je priznavao i UN ali i Grčka, dešavalo se otvoreno i usred dana. Grčke vlasti nikada nisu pokušale to da spriječe.

 Znate li kako danas žive grčki dobrovoljci koji su se borili u BiH?-        

 Ne. Nisam ragovarao s njima, s obzirom da su oni samo dio priče o grčkoj umiješanosti. Njihove izjave nalazio sam u intervjuima koje su davali nekim od grčkih novina.

Mislite li da su oni zadovoljni svojom ulogom u ratu u BiH?-  

       Do sada nisam vidio da se neko od njih javno požalio. Mislim da oni i dalje smatraju kako su Bosanci krivi za rat i za sva počinjena zlodjela.

Koja je, prema informacijama koje ste prikupili, bila uloga grčkih dobrovoljaca u genocidu u Srebrenici?-        

Neki od njih bili su prisutni prilikom podizanja grčke zastave nakon pada Srebrenice. Šta su tačno tamo radili prilična je nepoznanica, a oni sigurno neće hodati naokolo i reklamirati svoja djela iz straha od Haškog tribunala.  

Koliko ih se borilo u BiH?-

Prema do sada dostupnim podacima, bilo ih je 100-tinjak. Ne znam koliko ih je poginulo ili ranjeno, niti sam čuo da postoje neki socijalni programi koji bi im pomagali.

Planirate li knjigu izdati i na bosanskom jeziku?-    

     Ako neko od izdavača ima interes da je objavi, to neće biti problem. Također, ukoliko me neko pozove, rado ću gostovati u BiH. 

Translation of parts of the interview

 -You said that your book “Unholy Alliance :Greece and Milosevic’s Serbia” is about the Greek involvement in the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Can  you give me some more details about that involvement? Was there , in your opinion, open support to Milosevic and Karadzic? 

My book shows that there was open and massive support by the people, the media, the church and the political elite  for Milosevic and his henchmen Karadzic and Mladic.In my book I show  that this support was moral, political, economic, diplomatic and military.

-Who should be charged for that support? 

The question is not whether somebody should be charged. Everybody makes political mistakes. The problem with the Greek politicians is that they refuse to recognize their mistakes. Not a single Greek politician had the courage to say to  the Bosnians:”Look we recognize that we sided with those that massacred  your people and we are sorry for that!” 

-How do people in Greece react to  such a topic? 

Most are indifferent. However among  those that show a certain interest, the majority still supports the Serb led war.

-How did the goverment react to your book? 

Total official silence . But  unofficially  both the socialist PASOK government and the conservative ND government did not exactly try to help me in my  professional career. Of course I did not expect much else.

-What do people in Greece generally think about the presence of Greek military volunteers in Bosnia fighting on the side of the Serbs ? Do they support or condemn them? 

Most people don’t know or don’t care. However  among those that know the majority would certainly support the effort of our brave lads that went to fight on the side of our Serbian brethren.

-Do you think that Greek officials have supported the Greek volunteers in Bosnia?

Yes. The recruitment of those volunteers to go and  fight  against the Sarajevo government that was recognized officially by Greece and the UN, was taking place openly and in broad daylight in the early nineties. The Greek authorities never tried to stop it.

-What do the volunteers  generaly think about the war in Bosnia?

That the Bosnians were to blame for the war and for the atrocities

-What was their role in the Srebrenica genocide?

Some of them were present and helped hoist a Greek flag after the fall of the city. What they did exactly is unknown-in any case they would not go around advertising their acts  for fear of the Hague Tribunal.

Recent ontvangen; twee nieuwe kaartjes uit het Chili van de betreurde Salvador Allende.

Zonder twijfel twee nieuwe prachtstukjes met dank aan Annie-Hall van Postcrossing.

---------------------------

Two cards I recently received from Annie-Hall, another Postcrossing member. Beautifull Chilean cards from the Salvador Allende era.

For an English version scroll down

Op 8 april 1904 sloten het Verenigd Koninkrijk van Groot-Brittannië en Ierland en de Franse Republiek 4 verdragen om zo tot de bekende Entente Cordiale te komen. Naast regelingen en verklaringen betreffende de wederzijdse claims en acties op en naar Egypte, Marokko, Newfoundland, Centraal Afrika en het aanstellen van consuls te Saint Pierre (in het Franse Saint Pierre et Miquelon) en Newfoundland (in St-Johns) werden ook afspraken gemaakt met betrekking tot de invloed van de twee staten in enerzijds Siam, het huidige Thailand en anderzijds een kleine archipel in het zuiden van de Stille Oceaan; de Nieuwe Hebriden.

Met betrekking tot Siam overeenkwamen dat geen van beide staten delen van Siam daadwerkelijk in bezit zou nemen. De territoriale integriteit van het land werd als het ware bewaard als buffer tussen het door Frankrijk gecontroleerde Indochina en het Brits-Indische keizerrijk, dat via zijn Birmaanse provincies aan Thailand grensde. Ten overstaan van de Nieuwe Hebriden kwam men echter niet tot een dergelijke deal. De Nieuwe Hebriden waren ook geen land in de Westfaalse betekenis van het woord. Er was geen inheemse staat voor handen zoals die in Siam er wel was. Logischerwijs was het voor beide staten makkelijker deze archipel te bezetten en onder controle te brengen. Toen bleek dat geen van beide partijen, onder invloed van lokale belangengroepen zoals Australische en Franse (vanuit Nieuw Caledonië) handelaars, de eilanden aan de andere wilde laten, werkte men een regeling uit die in 1904 leidde tot het zogenaamde Condominium van de Nieuwe Hebriden.  

De Entente, wat zoveel betekende als het komen tot een verstandhouding en dus niet tot een formele alliantie, die voornamelijk ingegeven was door politieke gebeurtenissen in Europa, leidde in deze uithoek van de Stille Oceaan tot het ontstaan van een haast tot de verbeelding sprekende administratie. Zowel Frankrijk als Groot-Brittannië oefende formeel de soevereiniteit uit over het gebied en richten allebei een complete koloniale administratie in het gebied op. Fransen werden bestuurd door de Franse administratie, Britten door de Britse. Europeanen met een andere nationaliteit en de Ni-Vanuatu, die de eilanden al eeuwen bewoonden, hadden de keuze. Of ze vielen onder Brits bestuur of onder het Franse. Al kan men natuurlijk vragen stellen bij deze keuze. De Ni-Vanuatu hadden niet om het Condominium gevraagd.

Meer dan 70 jaar, van 8 april 1904 tot 30 juli 1980 toen de archipel onder de naam Vanuatu onafhankelijk werd, functioneerden twee volledige administraties naast elkaar als een gevolg van vroeg 20ste eeuwse politieke belangen en afspraken. Met de onafhankelijkheid van Vanuatu in 1980 kwam hieraan een einde. Anno 2007 resten er nog maar weinig overblijfselen van regeling. Tenzij de vele prachtige postzegels die door de autoriteiten onder het regime van het condominium uitgegeven werden. De bovenstaande is een van de eerste die in het gebied uitgegeven werd, in 1908. Tot  1911 gaf iedere administratie verschillende zegels uit. Vanaf 1911 echter werden door beide diensten dezelfde zegels gebruikt. Of toch niet? De bekende kroningsuitgifte naar aanleiding van de kroning van Elisabeth II in 1953 werd echter enkel in het Engels uitgebracht. De uitzondering bevestigd nu eenmaal de regel...

------------------

For a better understanding; the Entente Cordiale in the South Pacific... 

On April 8th 1904 the famous Entente Cordiale was formed by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the French Republic by signing four treaties with regard of their mutual claims and ambitions in Egypt, Morocco, Newfoundland and Central Africa. Besides agreements on the appointment of consuls at Saint Pierre (in the French controlled Saint Pierre and Miquelon) and Newfoundland (at St-Johns) the two countries also made arrangements regarding their spheres of influence in Siam, currently Thailand and a small archipelago in the South Pacific: the New Hebrides.  

In the Siamese question both parties agreed not to take any part of the country in possession. The territorial integrity of Siam thus was saves to serve as a sort of buffer state between the French controlled Indochina and the British Indian empire which, by its Burmese provinces, also bordered with Siam. With regard to the New Hebrides however no such a deal could be closed. On one side, the New Hebrides weren’t a state as Siam so it would be relatively easy for a European power to take them into possession. Both powers at home however were under heavy pressure of interest groups to not to cede the islands to the other. Australian and French traders (based in New Caledonia) set pressure on their respectively governments not to give up their claims on the islands. In an effort to come to an agreement, Britain and France came up with and agreement which led to the creation of the so called Condominium of the New Hebrides.  

The Entente, which means an understanding and not a formal alliance, which was the result of mainly European political events in this far corner of the world gave birth to a more then breathtaking administration. As both France and Great Britain exercised full sovereignty they both separately organised a complete colonial administration in the archipelago. French settlers were governed by the French administration, British ones by the British. Europeans, other then French of British, and the local Ni-Vanuatu could choose which administration they wanted to be governed by. Although, one could question this privilege to choose. The Ni Vanuatu never asked for the Condominium in the first place.

For more then 70 years, for April 8^th 1904 up to July 30^th 1980, when the archipelago gained independence as Vanuatu, two complete separate administrations functioned next to each other, each governing the same territory as a result of early 20^th century political interests and agreements. Vanuatu’s independence in 1980 ended all of this and in 2008 not much is left of the this special administrative organisation. Except of the many beautiful stamps that were issued by the Condominium authorities. The above example was one of the very first to be issued for the territory, in 1908. Until 1911 both administrations issued separate stamps. From 1911 on however, both administrations issued the same stamps, only differing the usage of language. Or didn’t they. On occasion of Queen Elisabeth II’s coronation a rare exception was made. The famous coronation issue, which was issued by British hold possessions all over the world, was issued in the Condominium in an English version only.

(For an English version: scroll down) 

Dertig jaar geleden, in mei 1967, scheidde de regio Biafra in de Golf van Bonny zich af van de republiek Nigeria. Gedurende 3 lange jaren werd vervolgens een bloedige oorlog uitgevochten tussen Biafranen en Nigerianen, beide gesteund door een breed palet aan staten die vanuit hun eigen belangen meenden deze of gene partij te moeten steunen. Enkelen staten gingen zelfs tot erkenning van de Republiek Biafra over.  Alleen betrof het enkel secundaire, om niet te zeggen tertaire staten, die onvoldoende politiek gewicht in de internationale weegschaal konden werpen om Biafra internationaal erkend te krijgen. Het politieke gewicht van Haïti en Coté d'Ivoire is nu eenmaal een stuk minder dan dat van de VSA of toen nog de Sovjet Unie.

Terwijl de regio zelf volledig verwoest werd en de Nigeriaanse blokkade van de regio leidde tot een hongersnood die honderdduizenden burgers het leven kostte, brokkelde eind jaren '60 de interesse in het conflict van steeds meer partijen af en eindigde de Biafraanse afscheiding met de heropname van het gebied in Nigeria. De oorlog zelf stopte na 1970 maar het conflict tussen de Igbo in de regio Biafra en de Hausa en Fulani, die in Nigeria de sterkste entische groepen zijn, duurt tot op de dag van vandaag verder. Biafra is anno 2007 dan ook één van de vele vergeten Afrikaanse conflictgebieden waarvan enkel nog de weinige postzegels, die de regio uitgegeven heeft gedurende zijn korte bestaan, een getuige van zijn.

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Remember Biafra: Stamps that tell a story... 

This year exactly thirty years ago, in May 1967, the region of Biafra, situated in the Bight of Bonny, broke away from the Nigerian federal republic. For three long years Biafrans and Nigerians, each supported by several other nations with own their individual interests, fought out a bloody civil war. Some states even recognised Biafra as a sovereign state but in the end these secondary states, not to say tertiary, hadn’t enough influence to get Biafra recognized by the whole world. In the end, Haitian and Ivorian political influence isn’t that big as the US's.

Whilst both parties continued the bloodshed and the Nigerian blokkade of the region caused a hundreds of thousends dying from starvation, foreign involvment and interest in the conflict started crumbling away. In the end, the Biafran secession ended in the reincorporation of the region in the federal republic of Nigeria. The war stopped but ever since 1970 tensions between the Biafran Igbo and Hausa and Fulani, Nigeria’s biggest etnic groups, keep on surfacing and threathening peace in the region. Today, Biafra is one of those forgotten conflicts of which only the few stamps the breakaway region issued during it’s brief existence, remind us of the bloody conflict that was fought out over it.

Vandaag zat er opnieuw een interessante brief in m’n bus. Met dank aan Andes1 van Postcrossing opnieuw een stukje vergane Sovjet glorie. Ditmaal uit Tasjkent, in de toenmalige Socialitische Sovjetrepubliek Uzbekistan. Enerzijds het obligate standbeeld van Lenin, let op de pioniers, de socialistische jeugdbeweging, die het standbeeld bezoeken, en anderzijds een standbeeld ter ere van 14 commissarissen van de Turkmeense Communistische Partij.   

Today I found yet another interesting letter in my mailbox. Thanks to Andes1 from Postcrossing, I received another genuine piece of Soviet glory. Two cards about Tashkent, during soviet days the capital of the Socialist Soviet republic of Uzbekistan. There’s of course the obligatory statue of Lenin, mind the pioneers, the socialist youth movement, which were visiting the statue and on the other hand a statue in remembrance of 14 Turkmen commissars of the Communist Party.

(For an English version: scroll down)

Nadat Grieks-Cypriotische extremisten in 1974 een staatsgreep gepleegd hadden, viel Turkije het land binnen en bezette na twee militaire operaties ongeveer 35 % van de totale oppervlakte. Bemiddelingspogingen onder leiding van de VN faalden en nadat de Turks-Cypriotische leider Rauf Denktash op 13 februari 1975 een Turks-Cypriotische federale staat uitgeroepen had, riep het Turks-Cypriotische parlement op 15 november 1983 de Turkse Republiek van Noord Cyprus uit.  

De Cypriotische kwestie, waarin ook Griekenland, als traditionele bondgenoot van de Grieks-Cyprioten en Turkije, betrokken zijn, woedt tot op de dag van vandaag verder. Hoewel het conflict de afgelopen jaren misschien wel wat aanwezigheid ingeboet heeft, waren en zijn alle middelen goed om het eigen grote gelijk te bewijzen. Zo geven Turks- en Grieks Cyprus via hun postzegels maar wat graag elk hun eigen visie op het probleem. Bovenstaande souvenirvelletjes zijn hier een prachtig voorbeeld van.  

Voor de Grieks-Cyprioten, die sinds 1974 jaarlijks een uitgifte doen ter ondersteuning van het fonds voor Grieks-Cypriotische vluchtelingen uit het noorden, enkele van deze zegels zijn op het velletje afgebeeld, is er geen sprake van een Turks-Cypriotische staat maar gaat het om een illegale Turkse bezetting van Noord-Cyprus. Het klopt dat Turks Cyprus zich staand weet te houden dankzij de aanwezigheid van het Turkse leger en zware Turkse economische steun. Maar het is toch ook meer dan louter een bezettingszone van het Turkse leger.   

Aan de andere kant van de demarcatielijn, of staatsgrens, het hangt af van welke visie men hanteert, worden de Turkse militaire operaties van 1975 dan weer voorgesteld als een vredesoperatie die tot doel had de Turks-Cypriotische minderheid op het eiland te beschermen tegen het repressieve Grieks-Cypriotische bewind. Althans, dat is de boodschap dat het Turks-Cypriotische velletje aan de wereld wil overbrengen….

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In 1974 Turkish armed forces invaded Cyprus and occupied about 35% of the country. The Turkish invasion directly resulted from a coup performed by Greek-Cypriot extremists. UN attempts to mediate a solution for the Greek-Turkish Cypriot problem failed and after Rauf Denktash’s proclamation of a Turk-Cypriot federal state on February 13^th 1975, the Turk-Cypriot assembly proclaimed an independent Turk-Cypriote republic on November 15^th 1983. 

The Cypriote question, in which also Greece, traditionally supporting the Greek-Cypriotes and Turkey, are involved, still exists today. Although tensions may have slowed down a bit through these last years, every possibility is used to prove one’s right. Through their respective stamps issues, Turk- and Greek-Cypriote authorities give their own version on the Cypriote question. The souvenir sheets featured here give a good example of this.   

For Greek-Cypriote authorities, who annually issue a stamp in support of the Greek-Cypriote refugee fund, some of these stamps are featured on the souvenir sheet, there’s no such a thing as an independent Turk-Cypriote state. Turk-Cyprus is, according to them, nothing more than the illegal occupation of northern Cyprus by the Turkish army. It’s true that Turk-Cyprus is backed by the Turkish military and receives an substantial amount of economic aid from Turkey but to say it’s only that is untrue.  

On the other side of the state border, or demarcation line, it depends on the version you believe, Turk-Cypriote authorities tend to call the Turkish military operations of 1974 a peace operation. A necessary operation which only goal was the protection of the Turk-Cypriote minority from Greek-Cypriote repression. Well, that’s the message the Turk-Cypriote souvenir is giving us….

Gisteren ontvangen uit Rusland van fiyah op Postcrossing. Een kaartje uit de oude doos: Het standbeeld van V.I. Lenin aan het Finland-station in Sint Petersburg in 1965. Vergane Sovjet glorie als het ware.

Vladimir I. Lenin at the Finland-station in Saint-Petersburg in the Soviet Union of 1965. I received this one yesterdag from fiyah on Postcrossing. A beautifull piece of lost Soviet glory.

Here you can read the text of an interview I did with Jürg Lehni in February, when I invited him in Milan for a lecture at the SPD Talks! series of the Scuola Politecnica di Design.

10/09/2007

         'The Little Envelope'

  By Takis Michas  Athens

As Greece is going to the polls this Sunday, the recent wildfires understandably preoccupy the public. Sixty-six people were killed and over 200,000 hectares of land destroyed in the worst forest fires in nearly a century. But the debate over whether conservative Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis mishandled the crisis has also further sidelined Greece’s number one problem from this election campaign: the public sector’s inability to deliver basic services like health care and education. The long-term economic damage of these shortcomings by far surpasses the destruction caused by the fires. Take secondary education, for example, which in principle is free. Yet in practice, teachers lack the motivation and professionalism to provide students with an adequate education. As a result, most parents are forced to pay for private tutoring—in many cases provided by the very same teachers that teach their kids in the state schools. Others send their children to expensive private evening schools.“No kid can expect to enter a university or to learn a foreign language if he relies on what he learns in the state school,” says Georgia Mastoraki, a math teacher at an Athens high school. The failure of the state to provide basic services is compounded by wide-spread corruption. According to a 2006 report by Transparency International, a Berlin-based think tank, Greece is one of the most corrupt countries in the European Union. That sad reality is known in Greece as “fakelaki” which means “the little envelope” and refers to the bundles of cash Greeks need to navigate the corrupt halls of their public administration.

When a Greek has to undergo surgery in a public hospital, for instance, he knows that he’ll have to grease the surgeon’s hands with some “fakelaki” underneath the operating table. Such payments—depending on the type of surgery they can range anywhere from Œ1,000 to Œ20,000—are of course illegal since the services in public hospitals are supposed to be free. By making this payment the patient hopes not only that the doctor will do his best but will also ensure that during his stay at the hospital he will be treated with at least a minimum of dignity.Theodoros Pelagidis and Michael Mitsopoulos, two Greek academics, speak of the “predatory expropriation” of the public sector by the very same employees and organizations that are supposed to provide those services. “The Greek State is huge yet hollow,” the two authors wrote in a recent book on Greek reforms. “It intervenes in all aspects of economic and social activity, yet at the same time it has been taken over from the inside by organized groups that prey on the national welfare in the same way the Vikings were preying on other European societies a few centuries ago.”

As a result, services that are in principle free require considerable expenditures on the part of the population. In the case of health and education the Greek citizens must in effect pay twice. Once through taxes to fund the system and then again through direct payments, such as to the doctor or to the private tutor. And while the recipients of these payments do not pay taxes, the person providing the funds cannot deduce the “fakelaki” from his taxable income. This is especially hard on the lower income groups, who are supposed to be the primary beneficiaries of such “free” public services.This system encourages the growth of a civil service culture where the job is not seen as an end in itself but as a means to make additional tax-free money.“Getting a civil service job in Greece is widely perceived as being granted a sinecure and not as entering into a contractual obligation to work,” says Nikos Dimou, one of Greece’s best-known authors and intellectuals.

During the previous elections in 2004, Mr. Karamanlis successfully campaigned on a platform to erase corruption from the public sector. But after three years in power, his New Democratic party was unable to make any progress on this front. What’s more, it ended up being itself tainted by sleaze. Managers of state-controlled pension funds and government officials are suspected of having colluded with brokerage firms and bankers to sell over-priced government bonds to pension funds, swindling them out of an estimated Œ100 million.Pervasive corruption of course breeds cynicism and resignation among the public. There are few other places in the Western world where the average man so readily expects the worst of the men and women leading them as in Greece. Greeks habitually refer to their politicians as “liars” or “crooks.”“Politicians are only interested in promoting their own well being,” says George Sidiropoulos, who owns a souvlaki joint in downtown Athens.

At the same time, many citizens also know that their future may depend crucially on carrying favours  with the people in power. In Greece’s patronage system, knowing the right politician or carrying the right party book is crucial if you want to get that coveted job in the civil sector or that EU subsidy for your small business. This mutual dependency helps keeping down public outrage over corruption. Given the clientelistic nature of Greek politics, who wins Sunday’s elections won’t matter much for public governance. “Fakelaki”, I’m afraid, is here to stay. Mr. Michas is a journalist for the Greek daily Eleftherotypia.  

As a result, when one defines someone or something as «interesting», the listener is entitled to some diffidence. Even if one simply meant: «interesting».

Interesting is also the title of a very short story by Lydia Davis, from her collection Samuel Johnson is Indignant (McSweeney’s Books, 2001). A few lines:

Here is a very handsome English traffic engineer. The fact that he is so handsome, and so animated, and has such a fine English accent makes it appear, each time he begins to speak, that he’s about to say something interesting, but he is never interesting, and he is saying something, yet again, about traffic patterns.

The full text is here (scroll down), together with another good short piece on the same theme, Boring Friends.

06/11/2006 

      Cyprus Decides ,Greece Follows

By Takis Michas

Greece faces a serious foreign policy dilemma. On the one hand, Athens supports Turkey’s bid to join the European Union. On the other hand, it also supports, officially at least, the policies of the Greek Cypriot leadership. Thus Greece may  inadvertently end up helping  derail Turkey’s EU accession.

At present, Brussels and Ankara seem to be heading for collision. Foreign ministers from Turkey, Greece, both sides of the divided island and  current EU president Finland were supposed to gather this weekend to discuss a transport dispute between Cyprus and Turkey. But the meeting fell through.

The EU wants Turkey to open its ports and airports to vessels and planes from EU member Cyprus this year under a customs union protocol it signed in 2005. Turkey refuses. It argues that Brussels has failed to honour a pledge to lift the economic and political blockade of the Turkish Cypriots in return for their support for a U.N.-backed reunification plan. Brussels insists that these two issues are not formally linked. EU diplomats acknowledge in private, though, that ethically such a linkage does exist.

The Finish EU Presidency had hoped to break the deadlock during negotiations in Helsinki. Their compromise proposal would have obliged Turkey  to extend “at some point” the customs agreement to the Republic of Cyprus. In return, northern Cyprus’ Farmagusta port would have been opened for Turkish Cypriots to trade under U.N. supervision. The meeting’s last-minute cancellation further darkens Ankara’s prospects for joining the EU. Recent press leaks say the European Commission's next report card on Turkey, due this week, will already be very critical. Apart from the Cyprus dispute, Brussels is expected to slam Turkey’s alleged lack of progress on human and civil rights issues.

How will a Turkish-EU crisis affect Greek-Turkish relations and consequently the stability of the region? When I recently interviewed Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bacoyannis, she insisted that this is purely a problem of Turkey complying with EU requirements. As such, it should not affect the relations between the two countries. “Besides”, she added “ Cyprus is only one of  many issues plaguing Turkey’s EU membership negotiations”

Some analysts disagree. “If negotiations with Turkey get derailed over Cyprus,” says Professor Alexis Iraklidis of Panteion University of Athens, “Turkey will hold Greece  directly responsible because of its unwillingness to confront the hard-line policies of the Greek Cypriot leadership.”

Such a development would be especially hard for Ms. Bacoyannis. Since she assumed  office last spring she has made Turkey’s EU accession a cornerstone of her foreign policy. At the same time, though,  she has not introduced any policy changes in her country’s foreign policy on this issue.  That policy can be summed up as “Cyprus decides, Greece follows.”

Unlike Ankara, which is actively engaged in shaping the policy of the Turkish Cypriots, Athens seems increasingly content to accept whatever Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos  offers. In April 2004, Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan played a very constructive role in convincing Turkish Cypriots to support a U.N. plan to reunify the island. Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis, however, simply let things run their course. In the end, the Turkish Cypriots voted overwhelmingly in favour of the U.N. plan. But the Greek Cypriots, following their president’s plea, rejected it.

The only significant difference between Athens and Nicosia, according to diplomatic sources, concerns their attitudes toward U.S. efforts to mediate. Greece welcomes such efforts while the Greek Cypriots believe that any such attempt is just a ploy to promote Turkish interests at their cost.

To this day the Greek Cypriot leadership opposes lifting the economic and political restrictions on their Turkish neighbors. They argue that this would be the first step  to the international recognition of a sovereign Turkish Cypriot State. As a consequence, Turkish Cypriots cannot engage in direct trade with the international community. And they have no voice in EU institutions

Most diplomats are gloomy about the possibilities of ever striking a deal. But there are exceptions.   “If you force me to make a guess, I see lots of reason for hope,” U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Mathew Bryza told me last month . “Nobody wants this train wreck to occur. Neither the Greek government nor the government of the Republic of Cyprus want to derail Turkey’s accession. They all agree that at the end of the day the Eastern Mediterranean is a more stable and prosperous region as long as Turkey is reforming and modernizing and fulfilling the criteria of EU membership.”

This may be so. But in matters of so-called “national importance,” Greek politicians are just like their American or Turkish counterparts. Unfortunately, they tend to follow the dictates of public opinion polls rather than those of reason.