Yet the war revolves silently around these poles, so far as the American public knows.   The media seldom covers these things.  Nor are these things often mentioned in the vast numbers of web sites on which experts and faux-experts swap guesses about every trivial aspect of the war (usually ignoring these two centers of the war).

What little we know has been collected and reported by a few people, most notably Tom Englehardt -- whose work will, I suspect, figure more prominently in the War's histories than most of the journalists and commentators today amous in the media and on the Internet.  Here is Engelhardt's latest, as usual a must-read for anyone interested in our wars.

The Greatest Story Never Told, Tom Engelhardt, TomDispatch (15 June 2008) -- "Finally, the U.S. Mega-Bases in Iraq Make the News."  Excerpt:

Think of this as the greatest American story of these years never told -- or more accurately, since there have been a few reports on a couple of these mega-bases -- never shown. After all, what an epic of construction this has been, as the Pentagon built a series of fortified American towns, each some 15 to 20 miles around, with many of the amenities of home, including big name fast-food franchises, PXes, and the like, in a hostile land in the midst of war and occupation. In terms of troops, the President may only have put his "surge" strategy into play in January 2007, but his Pentagon has been "surging" on base construction since April 2003.

... It has been, for instance, a commonplace of these years to see a TV correspondent reporting on the situation in Iraq, or what the American military had to say about Iraq, from Baghdad's enormous Camp Victory. And yet, if you think about it, that camera, photographing ABC's fine reporter Martha Raddatz or other reporters on similar stop-overs, never pans across the base itself. You don't even get a glimpse, unless you have access to homemade G.I. videos or Pentagon-produced propaganda.

... Imagine if just about no one knew that the pyramids had been built. Ditto the Great Wall of China. The Hanging Gardens of Babylon. The Coliseum. The Eiffel Tower. The Statue of Liberty. Or any other architectural wonder of the world you'd care to mention.

Tom Engelhardt is the author of The End of Victory Culture — Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation.  Here are excerpts and reviews.

For more information about the Iraq War, see the "reference library" on the top of the right-hand menu bar.  The two following sections are from the Iraq & Afghanistan Wars - other valuable reports page.

I.  The Air War in Iraq

Our use of airpower is the great undercovered story of the Iraq War.  Tom Engelhardt has been one of the few covering this key aspect of the war.  A journalist — no military expert — he has told a story ignored by most warbloggers and military experts.  For example, look at the low volume of coverage of the air war at StrategyPage, the Small Wars Council, and by Stratfor.  Here are his major articles on the air war, essential reading for anyone seeking to understand our activities in Iraq.

1. Incident on Haifa Street, TomDispatch (September 19, 2004)
2. Dahr Jamail on Life under the Bombs in Iraq, TomDisatpch (February 2, 2005)
3. Icarus (Armed with Vipers) Over Iraq, TomDispatch (December 5, 2005)
4. Michael Schwartz on Iraq as a Killing Ground, TomDispatch (January 10, 2006)
5. Air War, Barbarity, and the Middle East, TomDispatch (July 28, 2006)
6. Nick Turse on America’s Secret Air War in Iraq, TomDispatch (February 7, 2007)
7. Nick Turse: The Air War in Iraq Uncovered, Tom Dispatch (May 24, 2007)
8. Bombs Away Over Iraq, TomDispatch (29 January 2008)
9. “The Role of Airpower in the Iraq and Afghan Wars“, Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic adn International Studies (19 March 2008)
10. “Oops, Our Bad“, TomDispatch (10 April 2008)
11. "In Iraq, a Surge in U.S. Airstrikes", Washington Post (23 may 2008) -- "Military Says Attacks Save Troops' Lives, but Civilian Casualties Elicit Criticism"

II.  Where to go for information about our bases in Iraq

1. If the U.S. is ultimately leaving Iraq, why is the military building ‘permanent’ bases?, Friends Committee on National Legislation
2. Iraq Facilities, Global Security.org
3. A Permanent Basis for Withdrawal?, Tom Engelhardt  (14 February 2006)
4. How Permanent Are Those Bases?, Tom Engelhardt  (7 June 2007)
5. Baseless Considerations, Tom Engelhardt  (4 November 2007)
6. A Basis for Enduring Relationships in Iraq, Tom Engelhardt (2 December 2007) 
7. Stratfor’s analysis of US reasons for invading and occupying Iraq, FM site,  (4 March 2008)
8. The Greatest Story Never Told, Tom Engelhardt, TomDispatch (15 June 2008) -- "Finally, the U.S. Mega-Bases in Iraq Make the News"

FYI -- Tom's Sources for his latest report, and further reading

1. Patrick Cockburn has shown what a good journalist can still do for the rest of us.
2. Juan Cole's invaluable Informed Comment blog (which I visit daily without fail),
3. Those splendid hunter-gatherers of the news at Antiwar.comand Cursor.org's daily Media Patrol,
4. Dan Froomkin's superb White House Watch blog in the Washington Post, and
5. Sharp-eyed Paul Woodward at his War in Context blog.
6. For those of you who want to get a little more sense of the endless base-building activities of the Bush administration, check out the chatty newsletter(PDF file) of the Redhorse Association, "a group of past and present members of the U.S. Air Force Prime Beef and Red Horse combat engineer units."

Please share your comments by posting below (brief and relevant, please), or email me at fabmaximus at hotmail dot com (note the spam-protected spelling).

This widespread blindness of Americans about the goals of this long and expensive war is one of its many anomalies.  Needless to say, none of this has surfaced in the Presidential campaign -- despite its record length and unprecedented media coverage.  Best not to confuse and upset the proles.

Here are excerpts from Stratfor's reports on Iraq, from before the invasion.  Note the increasing focus on bases.

"Smoke and Mirrors:  The United States, Iraq and Deception"   (21 January 2003)

However, attacking and occupying Iraq achieves three things:

1. It takes out of the picture a potential ally for al Qaeda, one with sufficient resources to multiply the militant group's threat. Whether Iraq has been an ally in the past is immaterial - it is the future that counts. 
2. It places U.S. forces in the strategic heart of the Middle East, capable of striking al Qaeda forces whenever U.S. intelligence identifies them. 

The Bush administration ... has excellent strategic reasons for wanting to conquer Iraq.  The government has chosen not to enunciate those motives for a simple reason: If it did, many of the United States' allies would oppose the war.  Washington's goal - the occupation of Iraq - would strengthen the United States enormously, and this is something that many inside Washington's coalition don't want to see happen.  Therefore, rather than crisply stating the strategic goal, the government has tried to ensnare its allies in a web of pseudo-legalism.

"Iraq: Is Peace an Option?"   (25 February 2003) 

The strategic challenge is tremendous.  After Sept. 11, the United States did not have a war-fighting strategy.  The strategy that was first adopted - a combination of defending the homeland and attacking al Qaeda directly - has proven difficult if not ineffective.  Al Qaeda is a sparse, global network operating in a target-rich environment.  A defense of the homeland is simply impractical ...

Washington's decision to redefine the conflict was driven by the ineffectiveness of this response.  The goal has been to compel nations to crack down on citizens who are enabling al Qaeda ... Invading Iraq was a piece of this strategy.  Iraq, the most strategic country in the region, would provide a base of operations from which to pressure countries like Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. 

Iraq was a piece of the solution, but far from the solution as a whole.  Nevertheless, the conquest and occupation of Iraq would be at once a critical stepping-stone, a campaign in a much longer war and a proof of concept for dealing with al Qaeda. 

"Iraq War Plans"  (11 March 2003)

In early September 2002, Stratfor published a war plan series in which we laid out four possible U.S. strategies for invading Iraq. The war aims listed at that time consisted of 

1. Replacing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's regime with one compatible with U.S. interests.
2. Maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq so that it remains a counterweight to Iran, and so that nationalist ambitions by ethnic Kurds in northern Iraq do not disrupt U.S.-Turkish relations.
3. Eliminating the threat of weapons of mass destruction by having total direct access to all of Iraq.
4. Changing the perception of American effectiveness in the Islamic world.
5. Destroying collaboration between Iraq and al Qaeda.
6. Minimizing U.S. casualties.

We since have added a seventh war goal, which is to create bases within Iraq for future power projection in the region. 

"After Iraq: The Ongoing Crisis"   (23 April 2003)  -- This the formula for our goals that they have used since this date.

Stratfor has argued that the United States had two fundamental reasons for invading Iraq:

1. To transform the psychology of the Islamic world, which had perceived the United States as in essence weak and unwilling to take risks to achieve its ends.
2. To use Iraq as a strategic base of operations from which to confront Islamic regimes that are either incapable of or unwilling to deny al Qaeda and other Islamist groups access to enabling resources.

This does not mean that Stratfor's people are magicians.  Our intentions have been clear from the beginning, which is why I say we are blind not to see it.  From “Pentagon Expects Long-Term Access to Four Key Bases in Iraq“, New York Times (20 April 2003):

The United States is planning a long-term military relationship with the emerging government of Iraq, one that would grant the Pentagon access to military bases and project American influence into the heart of the unsettled region, senior Bush administration officials say.

American military officials, in interviews this week, spoke of maintaining perhaps four bases in Iraq that could be used in the future: one at the international airport just outside Baghdad; another at Tallil, near Nasiriya in the south; the third at an isolated airstrip called H-1 in the western desert, along the old oil pipeline that runs to Jordan; and the last at the Bashur air field in the Kurdish north. 

Closing notes

Stratfor's reporting is often penetrating, but sometimes oblique about sensitive matters.  Such as in this quote from "Ahmadinejad Among the Iraqis" (3 March 2008)

It is interesting to note that the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, showed up unannounced in Iraq on March 1.  There is not the slightest evidence that Mullen met with any Iranians, but his dropping in reminded everyone that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs comes and goes in Iraq without anyone's permission.  The message: The Iraqi government is formally sovereign, with emphasis on the word "formally."

In the plain language, Iraq is not sovereign.  But why does anyone in America believe otherwise (I doubt anyone in Iraq has delusions about their independence).

For more on this, browse the Archive of my articles about the Iraq War.

Please share your comments by posting below (brief and relevant, please), or email me at fabmaximus at hotmail dot com (note the spam-protected spelling).

Update:  Stratfor again tweaks its view of the reasons for the war

"Stratfor's War:  Five Years Later" (18 March 2008) 

The motivation for the war, as we wrote, had to do with forcing Saudi Arabia to become more cooperative in the fight against al Qaeda by demonstrating that the United States actually was prepared to go to extreme measures. The United States invaded to change the psychology of the region, which had a low regard for American power. It also invaded to occupy the most strategic country in the Middle East, one that bordered seven other key countries.

... The United States is now providing an alternative scenario designed to be utterly frightening to the Iranians. They are arming and training the Iranians' mortal enemies: the Sunnis who led the war against Iran from 1980 to 1988. That rearming is getting very serious indeed. Sunni units outside the aegis of the Iraqi military are now some of the most heavily armed Iraqis in Anbar, thanks to the Sunni relationship with U.S. forces there. It should be remembered that the Sunnis ruled Iraq because the Iraqi Shia were fragmented, fighting among themselves and therefore weak. That underlying reality remains true. A cohesive Sunni community armed and backed by the Americans will be a formidable force.

... The irony is that the war is now focused on empowering the very people the war was fought against: the Iraqi Sunnis. In a sense, it is at least a partial return to the status quo ante bellum.

The last two paragraphs display a stunning inability to recognize that Iraq has fragmented.   Unless the situation changes -- as it did following the US invasion -- neither the Kurds nor the Shia Arabs will again be dominated by the Sunni Arabs -- nor will the the Sunni Arabs in "Iraq" have the ability to threaten Iran. 

Obama will immediately begin to remove our troops from Iraq. He will remove one to two combat brigades each month, and have all of our combat brigades out of Iraq within 16 months. Obama will make it clear that we will not build any permanent bases in Iraq. He will keep some troops in Iraq to protect our embassy and diplomats; if al Qaeda attempts to build a base within Iraq, he will keep troops in Iraq or elsewhere in the region to carry out targeted strikes on al Qaeda.

This looks like an attorney being clever. 

 Even after the surge is wound down (whenever that is) we will have over 60 thousand support troops in Iraq.  How many of them will leave?  We should need only a few thousand troops -- bot "combat" and "support" - to protect our "embassy and diplomats."

The reference to "building bases" is suspiciously vague.  We have already spent tens of billions to build bases in Iraq, bases that look as permanent as those we have anywhere else (see tomorrow's post for more on this).  Will he close most of them, or some, or any of them?  Each base will need combat troops to protect it, in addition to those protecting "our embassy and diplomats." 

The role of US bases has been, along with the air war (see this), one of the great under-covered aspects of the war.  Many experts, such as Stratfor, said from the beginning that obtaining these bases - with a local government too weak to limit our use of them - was a key reason for invading Iraq.  Events since 2003 have made these comments look prescient.  From "Pentagon Expects Long-Term Access to Four Key Bases in Iraq", New York Times (20 April 2003):

The United States is planning a long-term military relationship with the emerging government of Iraq, one that would grant the Pentagon access to military bases and project American influence into the heart of the unsettled region, senior Bush administration officials say.

American military officials, in interviews this week, spoke of maintaining perhaps four bases in Iraq that could be used in the future: one at the international airport just outside Baghdad; another at Tallil, near Nasiriya in the south; the third at an isolated airstrip called H-1 in the western desert, along the old oil pipeline that runs to Jordan; and the last at the Bashur air field in the Kurdish north.

If more Americans wanted us out of Iraq, and felt strongly about it, we would have a candidate advocating withdrawal.  As it is, the Pew polls show that a “Majority now believe U.S. effort in Iraq will succeed, 53-39“.  This is a result of and tribute to the skill and intensity of the propaganda campaign waged in America during the past year. Our government might not do foreign occupations well, but they have mastered one aspect of 4GW:  infowar.  Unfortunately they are wielding it against us.  Not that it matters.  In a democratic republic we are responsible for the actions of our government.  Neither future historians nor our descendants will care for our excuses.

Please share your comments by posting below (brief and relevant, please), or email me at fabmaximus at hotmail dot com (note the spam-protected spelling).

Update:  "The World Beyond Iraq", speech by Senator Barack Obama at Fayetteville, NC (19 March 2008)

Here is an excerpt from a comment by Marc Lynch, posted at his blog Abu Aardvark:

Everyone is justifiably still talking about Barack Obama's incredible speech on race yesterday, which only the fringe right failed to admit was rather extraordinary. But I was equally impressed by his outstanding speech today on Iraq and national security. I'm certainly not going to make a habit of reprinting every speech made, or focus on domestic politics more than occasionally, but this speech does a better job of framing the issues I care about than almost any other speech I've yet seen from any candidate. I was especially impressed with his ability to articulate the tension between tactics and strategy in Iraq, and the wider opportunity costs of the current strategy:

"...while we have a General who has used improved tactics to reduce violence, we still have the wrong strategy. As General Petraeus has himself acknowledged, the Iraqis are not achieving the political progress needed to end their civil war.... When you have no overarching strategy, there is no clear definition of success. Success comes to be defined as the ability to maintain a flawed policy indefinitely. Here is the truth: fighting a war without end will not force the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own future. And fighting in a war without end will not make the American people safer."

He argues that the troop withdrawal and changed political strategy:

"...will finally put pressure on Iraq's leaders to take responsibility for their future. Because we've learned that when we tell Iraq's leaders that we'll stay as long as it takes, they take as long as they want. We need to send a different message. We will help Iraq reach a meaningful accord on national reconciliation. We will engage with every country in the region - and the UN - to support the stability and territorial integrity of Iraq. And we will launch a major humanitarian initiative to support Iraq's refugees and people. But Iraqis must take responsibility for their country. It is precisely this kind of approach - an approach that puts the onus on the Iraqis, and that relies on more than just military power - that is needed to stabilize Iraq."

There's a lot more in the speech, which places Iraq in a wider regional and global framework and talks seriously about the wider strategic perspective.

See the full text here; please read it.  This election is important, perhaps of historic importance to America.  Let's get it right.

Where to go for information about our bases in Iraq

• If the U.S. is ultimately leaving Iraq, why is the military building 'permanent' bases?, Friends Committee on National Legislation
• Iraq Facilities, Global Security.org
• A Permanent Basis for Withdrawal?, Tom Engelhardt  (14 February 2006)
• How Permanent Are Those Bases?, Tom Engelhardt  (7 June 2007)
• Baseless Considerations, Tom Engelhardt  (4 November 2007)
• A Basis for Enduring Relationships in Iraq, Tom Engelhardt (2 December 2007)