(1911-1979) Politólogo y sociólogo de gran prestigio en Hungría, entre 1946 y 1950 había impartido clases en la Universidad de Szeged. Fue miembro del Partido Nacionalcampesino; como Ministro del último Gobierno de Nagy fue condenado en 1958 a cadena perpetua y quedó en libertad cinco años más tarde. A partir de ese momento se dedicó a su labor universitaria y publicó numerosas obras de Ciencia Política, Sociología e Historia.

Après une semaine de campagne électorale, à quoi a-t-on eu droit, de la part des principaux candidats?

Des vidéos “pas gentilles”, à l’ADQ, des “tapes sur la gueule”, entre péquistes, un chef libéral qui ne veut pas “s’asseoir à une table”, mais surtout, du “tapage sur la tête” entre adversaires.  Le pire, dans toute cette affaire, c’est que les trois principaux protagonistes ont la même façon d’administrer, la même façon de gouverner, à savoir la pensée keynésienne.

Certains doivent se demander “qu’est-ce que ça mange en hiver, ça”, la pensée keynésienne.  Je vais tenter de décortiquer.

La pensée keynésienne vient de John Maynard Keynes, économiste britannique qui vécut de 1883 à 1946.  Sa pensée est complexe, selon ce qu’en dit l’encyclopédie en ligne Wikipédia, mais le plus clair se résume à une intervention marquée de l’état dans l’économie, afin de tenter d’atteindre le plein emploi.  Plusieurs pays ont tenté la pensée keynésienne, et la très grande majorité d’entre-eux ont abandonné cette philosophie.  L’application de la pensée keynésienne débouche, dans la plupart des cas, à la même constatation; si les résultats, à court terme, sont intéressants, ceux à moyen, et à long terme, deviennent catastrophiques.

En voici un exemple frappant.

Suite aux événements du 11 septembre 2001, la population des USA est prise de panique.  Le président, George W. Bush, déclare alors que dans le but de démontrer aux terroristes que les USA n’ont pas peur, le peuple doit faire comme si de rien n’était, qu’il doit dépenser, qu’il doit faire rouler l’économie.  Or, l’économie américaine, pour se remettre en marche, verra le gouvernement faire une première intervention, soit la création de la Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), communément appelée Fannie Mae, qui fait des prêts, et des garanties de prêts hypothécaires, ainsi que de la Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), surnommée Freddie Mac, qui achète des hypothèques et les revend sur les marchés internationaux.  Ces deux sociétés, créées par le gouvernement, permettent à des banques d’accorder des prêts hypothécaires à des emprunteurs insolvables, qui auraient normalement été refusés par les banques.

Devant le succès de ces initiatives, le gouvernement fait une autre intervention; il permet aux banques d’avoir un taux d’argent “en mains” plus bas, leur permettant d’accorder davantage de crédit.  Ce taux détermine la quantité d’argent que la banque doit détenir, soit par des dépôts dans des comptes courants, des placements, etc., avant d’accorder du crédit.  Normalement, ce taux se situe entre 50 et 60 pour cent, c’est à dire que pour chaque dollar de crédit accordé, la banque doit avoir de 50 à 60 cents “en mains”.  Le gouvernement américain permet un taux de seulement 8%.  Autrement dit, pour chaque dollar prêté, la banque n’a qu’à détenir 8 cents, ce qui est très dangereux.

Afin d’amener des emprunteurs potentiels à signer, les banques y vont d’un brillant subterfuge; dans les marchés où les municipalités ont adopté des “smart growth policies”, ou des réglements de développement durable, les maisons, de moins en moins disponibles, à cause des possibilités très limitées de développement, prennent environ 10% de valeur par année.  On dit aux emprunteurs, d’une part, que ce mouvement de prise de valeur ne s’arrêtera pas, puisque l’économie va bien, et d’autre part, que si leur hypothèque leur pèse trop, ils pourront revendre la maison avec profit, grâce à la prise de valeur annuelle, et recommencer avec une maison plus modeste.

En 2006, l’économie commence à donner des signes d’essoufflement, et les prises de valeurs cessent.  Certains emprunteurs, qui demeurent insolvables, cessent de verser leur hypothèque, et se font saisir leur maison.  Celles-ci sont aussitôt remises en vente, ce qui propulse l’offre (soit le nombre de maisons disponibles) au-dessus de la demande (soit le nombre d’acheteurs).  Résultat; la valeur des maisons plonge, et entraîne beaucoup d’emprunteurs dans une panique, puisque ceux-ci se retrouvent avec une hypothèque plus élevée que la valeur de leur maison.  Les Fannie Mae et Freddie Mac en ont donc plein les bras, et en viennent à demander l’aide du gouvernement.  Les banques, qui ont embarqué dans ce marché hypothécaire risqué, se retrouvent en situation précaire, et demandent aussi de l’aide.

Que fait le gouvernement de George W. Bush?  Une autre intervention!  Cette fois sous la forme de divers plans d’aide, dont la somme dépassera un billion de dollars.  Un million de millions!  De quoi mettre l’économie des USA sur la touche pendant de nombreuses années.

Ceci n’est qu’un exemple d’interventionnisme de l’État.

Or, les trois partis principaux, qui se font la lutte, au Québec, et qui nous demande de voter pour eux, le 8 décembre prochain, ne jurent, tous les trois, que par la pensée keynésienne.  Sous des images très différentes, les libéraux, les adéquistes et les péquistes ont, finalement, le même plan, la même pensée économique.  Donc, on nous donne le choix entre “une piastre”, “quatre trente-sous”, ou “deux rouleaux de cennes noires”.  Bref, du pareil au même.

Quand aura-t-on, au Québec, au point de vue de l’économie, un véritable choix politique?

Il semble que ce ne soit pas pour cette élection-ci.

(1889-1961) Se convirtió en Presidente del Gobierno tras el triunfo del Partido de los Pequeños Propietarios en las elecciones del 4 de noviembre de 1945. Pocos meses después -1 de febrero de 1946- abandonó ese puesto para ocupar el cargo de Presidente de la República. En la primera mitad de los años cincuenta se le obligó a retirarse de la vida pública y sufrió arresto domiciliario. Durante la insurrección de octubre y noviembre de 1956, en el segundo Gobierno de Imre Nagy, fue nombrado Ministro de Estado en representación del Partido de los Pequeños Propietarios. En 1958, en el mismo proceso judicial urdido contra Nagy, Tildy fue condenado a seis años de prisión. Liberado en 1959, murió dos años después.

Thomas Bros Popular Atlas of Los Angeles County 1946

VINTAGE THOMAS BROS. POPULAR ATLAS OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY 1946

This vintage Thomas Bros. Atlas was printed when the population in all of Los Angeles County was only 3,435,000 and few if any of the Freeways as we know them today were in existence. You will also NOT find many of the streets that we Angelinos travel today as the communities of that day had not yet expanded to handle the growth that has occurred since then.

The Atlas consisting of 156 pages contains, in addition to the usual maps and indexes, lists of Buildings, Universities and Colleges, Hospitals, Motion Picture Studios and other points of interest plus the population of cities/towns in the county. Also you will find the Los Angeles transit lines and the L A Motor Coach lines and their routes. Finally on page 154 you will find a listing of the Constabulary- Personnel for the county’s townships.

The atlas is in very good condition given its age. All pages are present and completey attached to the ring binder with the exception of the 1st page which has separated from the 1st 4 rings at the top and 2 rings at the bottom. Also the 1st page appears to have been laminated on the front only which has created some wrinkles and caused the top and bottom corners to curl up as shown in photos. There are no tears or other damage to the pages.

Seller: thebookvendor1934 / Buyer: chume65

Two people got lucky.  First, the seller was able to procure a 40s L.A. County that is in remarkably good condition, and then sell it for more than I absolutely expected.

Then the buyer is able to fight off another bidder and get this fabulous treasure.

I have seen 1950s Los Angeles atlases stall at $10.00, but this earlier edition must be an absolute rarity for the price that it fetched.

I’m still not sure if Thomas produced a San Diego atlas in book form this early, but if it did, the price could easily be double.

More pictures from the sale:

Taken from “From Recognition to Repudiation: Bulgarian Attitudes on the Macedonian Question” by Vanǵa Čašule, Kultura, 1972.

The Macedonians of Greece

Although ethnic Macedonians in northern Greece make up a large minority with their own language and culture, their internationally-recognized human rights and even their existence are vigorously denied by the Greek government. Free expression is restricted; several Macedonians have been prosecuted and convicted for the peaceful expression of their views. Moreover, ethnic Macedonians are discriminated against by the government’s failure to permit the teaching of the Macedonian language. And ethnic Macedonians, particularly rights activists, are harassed by the government — followed and threatened by security forces — and subjected to economic and social pressures resulting from this harassment. All of these actions have led to a marked climate of fear in which a large number of ethnic Macedonians are reluctant to assert their Macedonian identity or to express their views openly. Ethnic Macedonian political refugees who fled northern Greece after the Greek Civil War of 1946-49, as well as their descendants who identify themselves as Macedonians, are denied permission to regain their citizenship, to resettle in, or even to visit northern Greece. By contrast, all of these are possible for political refugees who define themselves as Greeks. Greek courts have denied permission to establish a “Center for Macedonian Culture.” Ultimately, the government is pursuing every avenue to deny the Macedonians of Greece their ethnic identity.

Please click the below link to read the book.

Denying Ethnic Identity: The Macedonians of Greece

The book was published by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki in 1994.

Artículo publicado por la web Club Lorem Ipsum el 13 de abril de 2007.

El final de la II Guerra Mundial trajo consigo la división del mundo entre las dos grandes cosmovisiones. En contra de lo que esperaban los occidentales más optimistas, Stalin y su régimen no habían cambiado -salvo en el incremento de su poderío- a raíz de su estrecha relación con británicos y norteamericanos durante el conflicto. La URSS mantenía su antigua aspiración de llevar a cabo la revolución comunista a escala mundial. De esta manera, a lo largo de los años 1945 y 1946, las diferencias entre los miembros de la triunfadora Gran Alianza –anglosajones y eslavos- fueron ampliándose. En 1947, como demuestran los documentos oficiales de estas potencias y las declaraciones de sus dirigentes, la brecha resultaba ya insalvable: había dado comienzo la Guerra Fría.

El “Telón de Acero”, descrito magistralmente por Winston Churchill en Fulton (Missouri), había caído sobre Europa. Sin embargo, cabe preguntarse cómo llegaron todos los países del Este a formar parte del sistema planetario que giraba en torno al gran sol del Kremlin. Es cierto que así lo habían acordado los vencedores de la II Guerra Mundial en las conferencias de Yalta y Potsdam. También es verdad que el Ejército Rojo ocupaba, con la presión que ello suponía, esos territorios. No obstante, lo más interesante de todo el proceso de sovietización de la Europa del Este no son estas cuestiones fundamentales para el triunfo comunista. Lo curioso, el aspecto en el que se va a centrar este artículo, es cómo se las ingeniaron los soviéticos para dar un ropaje de aparente legalidad a la revolución política que llevaron a cabo en esos países; cómo trataron de hacer creer al mundo –aunque en el fondo todos sabían la verdad- que eran esos pueblos los que habían escogido la senda del marxismo-leninismo.

Mientras el ejército de los soviets iba liberando la parte oriental del continente del yugo nacionalsocialista –es curioso ese fenómeno de cambiar la esclavitud parda por la roja-, desde Moscú se preparaban para transformar estos territorios en estados-satélite. Cientos de políticos y propagandista comunistas de nacionalidad húngara, polaca, checoslovaca, búlgara y rumana caminaban detrás de las divisiones rusas con la misión de organizar el partidos comunista de sus respectivos países. Sándor Márai, al hablar de ellos en ¡Tierra! ¡Tierra!, dice que llegaron demacrados y sin nada que llevarse a la boca. Sin embargo, con la ayuda de las autoridades soviéticas, lograron ocupar los principales puestos de la administración del Estado en pocas semanas. Dejaron de ser unos miserables y pasaron a disfrutar de las comodidades y lujos reservados a marqueses, empresarios y mariscales. Así, más o menos, describe el literato húngaro la llegada de estos personajes. Ahí estarían comunistas míticos como Bierut, Rákosi, Gottwald, Rajk, Pauker… políticos que en pocos meses, bajo la supervisión y auxilio de Moscú, tomaron el control de media Europa.

No obstante, resultaba evidente que, de cara a los primeros comicios de posguerra, estos misioneros del internacionalismo no iban a lograr el respaldo electoral necesario para gobernar. Por esa razón, Stalin decidió resucitar la figura del frentepopulismo para formar grandes coaliciones de izquierdas. Los Frentes Populares habían funcionado ya en el periodo anterior a la II Guerra Mundial -en especial en Francia y España-, y su finalidad principal era contener la expansión del fascismo por Europa. El Kremlin favoreció en los años treinta la consecución de esos pactos porque veía en ellos, no sólo un arma eficaz para evitar el surgimiento de nuevos hitleres, sino también porque aspiraba a instaurar el comunismo a través de ellos. En los gobiernos frentepopulistas los comunistas estaban destinados a ocupar los principales resortes del control estatal: la seguridad y la propaganda. Podían no ser numerosos, tampoco hacía falta que ocuparan muchos ministerios; tan sólo hacía era necesario que se situasen en los puestos claves. Desde esa posición de influencia los comunistas miembros del ejecutivo tendrían que ir eliminando legal o moralmente a sus rivales. Seguían la llamada “táctica del salchichón”: iban minando poco a poco a los enemigos, después a los aliados, y, finalmente, era en el propio partido donde se llevaban a cabo las purgas. Este manera de extender la revolución bolchevique se ensayó al final del periodo de Entreguerras, pero su gran éxito como modelo de actuación política llegó con el final de la II Guerra Mundial.

Entre 1945 y 1947 fueron desfilando por las cárceles y juzgados de la Europa del Este miles de personas acusadas de apoyar al fascismo. Las primeras víctimas de estos procesos fueron los políticos de la derecha, pero más tarde les llegó el turno a la izquierda moderada. A todos se les tachó de fascistas, tan sólo se salvaron los miembros de los partidos comunistas. Quedaba un pequeño paso para establecer regímenes totalitarios de partido único: su proclamación. A la altura de 1948 todos los países ocupados por el Ejército Rojo, con la excepción de Austria y Alemania, habían cumplido ese requisito. En apenas tres años el frentepopulismo había abierto a los soviéticos las puertas de la “revolución legal”. Habían eliminado toda oposición, incluso la de los antiguos aliados de la izquierda. A partir de ahí comenzaba un camino aún más tortuoso: el de las purgas internas. Entre 1948 y 1953 el pecado ya no era ser fascista, sino revisionista.

Así fue como, bajo el amparo del Ejército Rojo, se operó el cambio político al otro lado del “Telón de Acero”. Fueron necesarias la presencia militar de la URSS y la, hasta 1947, aquiescencia del mundo occidental. Sin embargo, la operación nunca hubiera llegado a ser tan perfecta sin el frentepopulismo y la “táctica del salchichón”. Gracias a estos dos elementos el comunismo construyó en estos países un edificio político que logró mantenerse durante cuarenta años en pleno corazón de Europa.

Bibliografía:

[1] Historia Universal Contemporánea II; Javier Paredes (Coord.) - Barcelona - Ariel - 2004.

[2] La guerra del mundo: los conflictos del siglo XX y el declive de occidente (1904-1953); Niall Ferguson - Barcelona - Debate - 2007.

[3] Postguerra. Una historia de Europa desde 1945; Tony Judt – Madrid – Taurus -2006.

[4] La Batalla de Budapest. Historia de la insurrección húngara de 1956; Ricardo M. Martín de la Guardia, Guillermo A. Pérez Sánchez, István Szilágyi - Madrid - Actas - 2006.

[5] ¡Tierra! ¡Tierra!; Sándor Márai - Barcelona - Salamandra - 2006.

N. Novikov
Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador to the US to the Soviet Leadership
09/27/1946

Reflecting the imperialistic tendency of American monopoly capital, US foreign policy has been characterized in the postwar period by a desire for world domination*. This is the real meaning of repeated statements by President Truman and other representatives of American ruling circles that the US has a right to world leadership [rukovodstvo]. All the forces of American diplomacy, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, industry, and science have been placed at the service of this policy. With this objective in mind broad plans for expansion have been developed, to be realized both diplomatically and through the creation of a system of naval and air bases far from the US, an arms race, and the creation of newer and newer weapons.

N. Novikov
Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador to the US to the Soviet Leadership
09/27/1946

Reflecting the imperialistic tendency of American monopoly capital, US foreign policy has been characterized in the postwar period by a desire for world domination*. This is the real meaning of repeated statements by President Truman and other representatives of American ruling circles that the US has a right to world leadership [rukovodstvo]. All the forces of American diplomacy, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, industry, and science have been placed at the service of this policy. With this objective in mind broad plans for expansion have been developed, to be realized both diplomatically and through the creation of a system of naval and air bases far from the US, an arms race, and the creation of newer and newer weapons.

* Emphasis here and from this point on indicates where V. M. Molotov underlined the original document.

1. a) US foreign policy is being pursued right now in a situation quite different from that which existed in the prewar period.

This situation does not completely match the expectations of those reactionary circles who hoped during the Second World War that they would be able to remain apart from the main battles in Europe and Asia for a long time. Their expectation was that the United States of America, if it was not able to completely avoid participation in the war, would enter it only at the last moment when it might be able to influence its outcome without great effort, completely securing its own interests. It was intended thereby that the main rivals of the US would be crushed in this war or to weakened to a great degree and that due to this circumstance the US would be the most powerful factor in deciding the main issues of the postwar world. These expectations also were based on the assumption quite widespread in the US during the first period of the war that the Soviet Union, which had been attacked by German fascism in June 1941, would be weakened as a result of the war or even completely destroyed.

Reality has not borne out all the expectations of the American imperialists.

b) The two main aggressor powers, fascist Germany and militarist Japan, at the same time the main rivals of the US both in the economic and in foreign policy fields, were defeated as a result of the war. A third great power, Great Britain, having been dealt strong blows from the war, is now faced with enormous economic and political difficulties. The political foundations of the British Empire have been noticeably undermined, in some cases having taken on the nature of a crisis, for example in India, Palestine, and Egypt.

Europe came out of the war with a thoroughly shattered economy, and the economic devastation which resulted during the war cannot soon be repaired. All the countries of Europe and Asia are feeling an enormous need for consumer goods, industrial and transportation equipment, etc. Such a situation opens up a vista for American monopoly capital of enormous deliveries of goods and the importation of capital to these countries, which would allow it [American monopoly capital] to be introduced into their economies.

The realization of this opportunity would mean a serious strengthening of the economic position of the US throughout the entire world and would be one of the stages in the path toward establishing American world supremacy.

c) On the other hand, the expectations of those American circles have not been justified which were based on the Soviet Union being destroyed during the war or coming out of it so weakened that it was forced to bow to the US for economic aid. In this event it could have dictated such conditions which would provide the US with an opportunity to carry out its expansion in Europe and Asia without hindrance from the USSR.

In reality, in spite of all the economic difficulties of the postwar period associated with the enormous damage caused by the war and the German fascist occupation the Soviet Union continues to remain economically independent from the outside world and is restoring its economy by its own means.

In addition, at the present time the USSR has a considerably stronger international position than in the prewar period. Thanks to the historic victories of Soviet arms the Soviet armed forces are on the territory of Germany and other former enemy countries, a guarantee that these countries will not be used again to attack the USSR. As a result of their reorganization on democratic principles, in such former enemy countries as Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Romania regimes have been created which have set themselves the task of strengthening and maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union. In the Slavic countries - Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia - liberated by the Red Army or with its help, democratic regimes have also been created and are consolidating which maintain relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of friendship and mutual aid agreements.

The enormous relative importance of the USSR in international affairs in general and in European affairs in particular, the independence of its foreign policy, and the economic and political aid which it gives neighboring countries, both allies and former enemies, is leading to a growth in the influence of the Soviet Union in these countries and a continuing strengthening in them of democratic trends.

Such a situation in eastern and southeastern Europe cannot fail to be viewed by the American imperialists as an obstacle in the path of an expansionist American foreign policy.

2. a) Right now US foreign policy is not being determined by those circles of the Democratic Party which (as when Roosevelt was alive) try to strengthen cooperation between the three great powers which composed the basis of the anti-Hitler coalition during the war. When President Truman, a politically unstable person with certain conservative tendencies, came to power followed by the appointment of Byrnes as Secretary of State it meant the strengthening of the influence of the most reactionary circles of the Democratic Party on foreign policy. The constantly increasing reactionary nature of US foreign policy, which as a consequence of this approached the policy advocated by the Republican Party, has created a foundation for close cooperation in this area between the extreme right wing of the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. This cooperation of the two parties, formalized in both houses of Congress in the form of an unofficial bloc of reactionary Southern Democrats and the old guard of the Republicans headed by Vandenberg and Taft, is especially clearly demonstrated in the fact that in their statements about foreign policy issues the leaders of both parties are essentially advocating the same policy. In Congress and at international conferences where as a rule prominent Republicans are represented in American delegations the latter actively support the foreign policy of the government, and often due to this the above [policy], moreover even in official statements of ‘bipartisan’ foreign policy.

b) At the same time the influence on foreign policy of the followers of the Roosevelt policy of cooperation with peaceloving powers has been sharply reduced. The corresponding circles in the government, in Congress, and in the leadership of the Democratic Party are more and more being pushed to the background. The differences in the area of foreign policy which exist between Wallace and Pepper supporters on the one hand and the partisans of the reactionary ‘bilateral’ policy on the other were recently displayed with great bitterness in Wallace’s speech which led to his resignation as Secretary of Commerce. Wallace’s resignation signifies the victory of the reactionary forces of the Democratic Party and the foreign policy which Byrnes is pursuing in cooperation with Vandenberg and Taft.

3. The increase in peacetime military potential and the organization of a large number of naval and air bases both in the US and beyond its borders are clear indicators of the US desire to establish world domination.

For the first time in the country’s history in the summer of 1946 Congress adopted a law to form a peacetime army not of volunteers but on the basis of universal military conscription. The size of the Army, which is to reach 1 million men as of 1 July 1947, has been considerably increased. At the end of the war the size of the US Navy was reduced quite insignificantly compared to wartime. At the present time the US Navy occupies first place in the world, leaving the British Royal Navy far behind, not to mention other powers.

The colossal growth of expenditures for the Army and Navy, comprising $13 billion in the 1946-1947 budget (about 40% of the entire budget of $36 billion) and is more than 10 times the corresponding expenditures in the 1938 budget, when it did not even reach $1 billion.

These enormous budget sums are being spent along with the maintenance of a large Army, Navy, and Air Force and also the creation of a vast system of naval and air bases in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. According to available official plans, in the coming years 228 bases, support bases, and radio stations are to be built in the Atlantic Ocean and 258 in the Pacific Ocean. The majority of these bases and support bases are located outside the United States. The following bases exist or are to be built on islands in the Atlantic Ocean: Newfoundland, Iceland, Cuba, Trinidad, Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Azores, and many others; in the Pacific: former Japanese mandated possessions - the Marianas, and the Caroline and Marshall Islands, Bonin, Ryukyu, the Philippines, the Galapagos Islands (which belong to Ecuador).

The situating of American bases on islands often 10-12,000 kilometers from US territory and located on the other side of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans clearly shows the aggressive nature of the strategic designs of the US Army and Navy. The fact that the US Navy is studying the naval approaches to European shores in a concentrated manner is also confirmation of this. During 1946 US Navy ships visited Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Turkey, and Greece with this purpose in mind. In addition the US Navy constantly cruises the Mediterranean Sea.

All these facts clearly show that their armed forces are designed to play a decisive role in the realization of plans to establish American world domination.

4. a) One of the stages in the establishment of American world domination is their agreement with Britain about a partial division of the world on the basis of mutual concessions. The main lines of the clandestine agreement between the US and Britain about the division of the world, as the facts indicate, are that they have agreed that the United States include Japan and China in the sphere of its influence in the Far East whereas for its part the US has agreed not to hinder Britain in solving the Indian problem or the strengthening of [British] influence in Thailand and Indonesia.

b) in connection with this division at the present time the US is dominant in China and Japan without any interference from Britain.

American policy in China strives for its complete economic and political subordination to control by American monopoly capital. In the pursuit of this policy the American government does not even stop at interference in the internal affairs of China. At the present time there are more than 50,000 American soldiers in China. In a number of cases US Marines have directly participated in combat operations against the people’s liberation forces. The so-called ‘mediation’ mission of General Marshall is only a cover for actual interference in the internal affairs of China.

How far the policy of the American government has gone with respect to China is witnessed by the fact that it is now trying to exercise control over its army. Recently the US government introduced a bill for congressional discussion concerning military aid to China which provides for the complete reorganization of the Chinese army, its training with the aid of American military instructors, and supply with American weapons and equipment. An American consulting mission of Army and Navy officers will be sent to China in order to implement this program.

China is gradually being turned into a base of the American armed forces. American air bases are situated throughout its entire territory. Their main ones are located in Beijing, Qingdao, Tianjin, Nanking, Shanghai, Chengdu, Chongqing, and Kunming. The main American Navy base in China is located in Qingdao. The headquarters of the 7th Fleet is also located there. In addition, more than 30,000 American Marines are concentrated in Qingdao and its outskirts. The measures taken by the American Army in northern China show that it is calculating on remaining there for a long time.

In Japan, control is in the hands of the Americans in spite of the presence of the small contingent of American troops there. Although British capital has substantial interests in the Japanese economy British foreign policy with respect to Japan is being pursued so as not to interfere with the Americans’ penetration of the Japanese economy and the subordination to its influence. In the Far East Commission in Washington and in the Allied Council in Tokyo the British representatives as a rule are in solidarity with American representatives who pursue this policy.

The measures of the American occupation authorities in the area of domestic policy and directed at supporting reactionary classes and groups which the US is counting on using in the struggle against the Soviet Union also encounter a sympathetic attitude from Britain.

c) A similar policy is also being pursued in the United States with respect to the British sphere of influence in the Far East. The US recently halted its attempts which it had been making during the recent war to influence the solution of Indian problems. Now there are often cases when the mainstream American press, which more or less reliably reflects official American government policy, speaks favorably of the British policy in India. American foreign policy is also not hindering British troops from suppressing the national liberation movement in Indonesia together with the Dutch Army. In addition, even instances are known of assistance from the United States to this British imperialist policy by sending American weapons and supplies to the British and Dutch troops in Indonesia, the sending of Dutch Navy sailors from the US, etc.

5. a) If the division of the world in the Far East between the US and Britain can be considered a fait accompli then it cannot be said that a similar situation exists in the Mediterranean and the countries adjacent to it. The facts rather say that such an agreement in the Middle East and Mediterranean region has not yet been reached. The difficulty of an agreement between Britain and the US in this region is that British concessions to the United States in the Mediterranean would be fraught with serious consequences for the entire British Empire, for which it has exceptional strategic and economic importance. Britain would not be averse to using the American armed forces and influence in this region, directing them to the north against the Soviet Union. However, the United States is not interested in helping and supporting the British Empire in this point where it is vulnerable but in penetrating the Mediterranean and Middle East more thoroughly itself, which attracts them with its natural resources, primarily oil.

b) In recent years American capital has been being introduced into the economies of Middle Eastern countries quite intensively, particularly in the oil industry. At the present time there are American oil concessions in all the Middle East countries which have sources of oil (Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia). American capital, which first appeared in the Middle East oil industry only in 1927, now controls about 42% of the total proven reserves of the Middle East (less Iran). Of the total proven reserves of 26.8 billion barrels of oil 11 billion belong to US concessions. In striving to guarantee the further development of its concessions in individual countries, which are often the largest (as is the case in Saudi Arabia, for example), American oil companies are planning to build a trans-Arabian pipeline which is to pump oil from the American concession in Saudi Arabia and in other countries to the southeastern coast of the Mediterranean, ports in Palestine and Egypt.

In pursuing expansion in the Middle East American capital has British capital as its competition, which is stubbornly resisting this expansion. The fierce nature of the competition between them is the main factor which prevents Britain and the United States from achieving an agreement about the division of spheres of influence in the Middle East, which might only take place at the expense of direct British interests in this region.

Palestine, where the US has recently displayed great interest, creating many difficulties for Britain, can be cited as an example of the quite sharp differences in US and British policy in the Middle East as is occurring in the case of the demand of the US government to allow 100,000 European Jews into Palestine. American interest in Palestine, outwardly expressed in sympathy for the Zionist cause, actually only means that American capital is expecting to become rooted in the economy of Palestine by interfering in Palestinian affairs. The choice of a Palestinian port as one of the terminal points of the American oil pipeline explains a lot about American foreign policy on the issue of Palestine.

c) The lack of agreement between Britain and the US on the Middle East is also often displayed in the great activity of the US Navy in the eastern Mediterranean, which cannot fail to run counter to the main interests of the British Empire. This activity of the US Navy is undoubtedly also in connection with American oil and other economic interests in the Middle East.

However, it ought to be borne in mind that such facts as the visit of the American battleship Missouri to the Black Sea Straits, the visit of an American fleet to Greece, and the great interest which American diplomacy shows in the problem of the Straits have a dual meaning. On the one hand, it means that the US has decided to consolidate its position in the Mediterranean to support its interests in the countries of the Middle East and that it has chosen the Navy as the tool of this policy. On the other hand, these facts are a military and political demonstration against the Soviet Union. The strengthening of the US position in the Middle East and the creation of the conditions to base the US Navy at one or several places in the Mediterranean (Trieste, Palestine, Greece, Turkey) will therefore mean the appearance of a new threat to the security of the southern regions of the Soviet Union.

6. a) The US attitude toward Britain is determined by two circumstances. On the one hand, the US views Britain as its greatest potential competitor and, on the other, Britain seems to view the United States as a possible ally. The division of several regions of the world into American and British spheres of influence has created the possibility, if not to avoid competition between them, which is impossible, then at least of reducing it somewhat. At the same time such a division makes it easier for them to achieve economic and political cooperation.

b) Britain needs American credits to reorganize its economy which was ruined by the war and it has been forced to make significant concessions to get them. This is the importance of the loan which the US recently gave Britain. With the help of the loan Britain will be able to strengthen its economy. At the same time this loan opens the door for the penetration of American capital into the British Empire. The narrow scope within which trade in the countries of the so-called sterling bloc has been found in recent years has been expanded at the present time and gives the Americans an opportunity to trade with British dominions, India, and the other countries of the sterling bloc (Egypt, Iraq, and Palestine).

c) The political support which the United States gives Britain is quite often manifested in the international events of the postwar period. At recent international conferences the US and Britain have closely coordinated their policies, especially in those instances when it was necessary to oppose the policy of the Soviet Union. The US gives Britain moral and political aid in its reactionary policy in Greece, India, and Indonesia. Complete coordination of American and British policy can be observed with respect to the Slavic and other countries bordering the Soviet Union. The most important American and British demarches in these countries after the war have had a quite similar and parallel nature. American and British policy in the United Nations Security Council has the same features of coordination (especially in questions about Iran, Spain, Greece, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Syria and Lebanon, etc.).

d) US ruling circles evidently have a sympathetic attitude toward the idea of a military alliance with Britain, but at the present time the matter has still not reached the point of concluding an official alliance. Churchill’s speech in Fulton [Missouri] calling for the conclusion of an Anglo-American military alliance in order to establish joint world domination was consequently not officially supported by Truman or Byrnes, although Truman indirectly sanctioned Churchill’s call by his presence.

But if the US is not now seeking to conclude a military alliance with Britain then all the same in practice it supports the closest contact with it on military issues. The Joint Anglo-American staff in Washington still continues to exist in spite of the fact that it has been over a year since the war ended. Frequent personal contact between British and American military leaders also continues. The recent trip of Field Marshal Montgomery to America is one indication of this contact. It is characteristic that as a result of his meetings with American military leaders Montgomery said that the British Army would be patterned after the American model. Cooperation is also being conducted between the navies of these two countries. It is sufficient to mention in this connection the participation of the Royal Navy in the recent maneuvers of the American fleet in the Mediterranean and the participation of the US fleet in the North Sea this autumn.

e) In spite of the temporary achievement of agreements about very important issues, current relations between Britain and the United States are quite conflictive and cannot be long-term.

In many respects American economic aid holds a danger for Britain. Not to mention that by virtue of receiving the loan Britain will fall into a certain economic dependence on the US from which it will not be easy to free itself, it ought to be kept in mind that the conditions created by the loan for the penetration of American capital into the British Empire might entail serious political consequences. The countries in the British Empire or those dependent on it might reorient themselves to the United States under economic influence from powerful American capital, following the example of Canada in this respect, which is more and more escaping British influence and in the process orienting itself to the US. The strengthening of the American position in the Far East might stimulate a similar process in Australia and New Zealand. In the Arab countries of the Middle East which are trying to emancipate themselves from the British Empire there are also groups among the ruling classes which have no objection to trading with the United States. It is entirely possible that it is the Middle East that will become the focal point of Anglo-American conflicts where the agreements currently reached between the US and Britain will be destroyed.

7. a) The ‘hard-line’ policy with respect to the USSR proclaimed by Byrnes after the rapprochement between reactionary Democrats and the Republicans is right now the main impediment in the way to cooperation between the great powers. It is mainly that in the postwar period the US has no longer been pursuing a policy of strengthening the cooperation of the Big Three (or Four) and, on the contrary, is trying to undermine the unity of these powers. The goal which is being set in the process is to impose the will of other countries on the Soviet Union. The attempt being made by several powers to undermine or completely eliminate the veto principle in the United Nations Security Council with the blessing of the United States is a move in this direction. This would give the United States an opportunity to create narrow groups and blocs among the great powers directed primarily against the Soviet Union and thereby split the united front of the United Nations. The renunciation of the veto by the great powers would turn the United Nations into an Anglo-American private domain in which the United States would have the leading role.

b) The current policy of the American government with respect to the USSR is also directed at limiting or displacing Soviet influence from neighboring countries. While implementing it the US is trying to take steps at various international conferences or directly in these very same countries which, on the one hand, manifest themselves in the support of reactionary forces in former enemy or allied countries bordering the USSR with the object of creating obstacles to the processes of democratizing these countries but, on the other, in providing positions for the penetration of American capital into their economies. Such a policy relies on weakening and disbanding [razlozhit'] the democratic governments in power there which are friendly to the USSR and then replacing them with new governments which would obediently carry out a policy dictated from the US. In this policy the US receives full support from British diplomacy.

c) One of the most important links of overall US policy directed at limiting the international role of the USSR in the postwar world is policy with regard to Germany. The US is taking steps in Germany with special persistence to strengthen reactionary forces in order to counteract democratic restructuring, accompanied by completely insufficient steps regarding demilitarization.

American occupation policy is not setting as its goal the elimination of the remnants of German fascism and the reorganization of German political life on democratic principles in order that Germany ceases to be an aggressive force. The US is not taking steps to eliminate the monopolistic associations of German industrialists on which German fascism relied in preparing aggression and waging war. An agrarian policy with the elimination of large landholders who were formerly a reliable bulwark of fascism is also not being pursued. Moreover, the US is providing for the possibility of ending the Allied occupation of German territory even before the main tasks of the occupation, consisting of the demilitarization and democratization of Germany, are finished. The preconditions would thereby be created for a revival of an imperialist Germany which the US is counting on using on its side in a future war. One cannot fail to see that such a policy has a clearly defined anti-Soviet focus and represents a serious danger to the cause of peace.

d) The numerous statements by American government, political, and military leaders about the Soviet Union and its foreign policy in an exceptionally hostile spirit are quite typical of the current attitude of American ruling circles toward the USSR. These statements are echoed in an ever more unbridled tone by the overwhelming majority of the American press. Discussions about a ‘third war’, meaning a war against the Soviet Union, even a direct call for this war with a threat to use the atomic bomb, this is the substance of statements about relations with the Soviet Union by reactionaries at public meetings and in the press. At the present time the advocacy of a war against the Soviet Union is not just the monopoly of the extreme right and the yellow American press which is represented by the Hearst and McCormick newspaper syndicates. This anti-Soviet campaign also includes such more ’serious’ and ‘respectable’ publications of the conservative press like the New York Times and New York Herald Tribune. The numerous articles by Walter Lippmann in which he almost undisguisedly calls on the US to launch a strike on the Soviet Union in the most vulnerable places of the south and southeast of the USSR are characteristic of such publications of the conservative press.

The primary goal of this anti-Soviet campaign of American ‘public opinion’ consists of exerting political pressure on the Soviet Union and forcing it to make concessions. Another, no less important goal of the campaign is a desire to create an atmosphere of a fear of war among the broad masses who are tired of war, which would make it easier for the government to take steps to maintain the great military potential in the US. It is in such an atmosphere that the law was passed in Congress about introducing peacetime military conscription, an enormous military budget was adopted, and plans are being developed to build a far-flung system of naval and air bases.

e) All these steps to preserve the great military potential are not an end in itself, of course. They are intended only to prepare conditions to win world domination in a new war being planned by the most warlike circles of American imperialism, the timeframe for which, needless to say, no one can determine right now.

It ought to be fully realized that American preparations for a future war are being conducted with the idea of war against the Soviet Union, which in the eyes of American imperialists is the chief obstacle in the American path to world domination. Such facts as the tactical training of the US Army for war with the USSR as a future enemy, the situating of American strategic bases in regions from which strikes can be launched on Soviet territory, the intensified training and reinforcement of Arctic regions as tactical approaches to the USSR, and attempts to pave the way in Germany and Japan to use them in a war against the USSR testify to this.



27.09.46 NOVIKOV

Long Telegram
861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram
The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
SECRET
Moscow, February 22, 1946–9 p.m. [Received February 22--3: 52 p.m.]

511. Answer to Dept’s 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows…
Long Telegram
861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram
The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
SECRET
Moscow, February 22, 1946–9 p.m. [Received February 22--3: 52 p.m.]

511. Answer to Dept’s 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:
(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.
(2) Background of this outlook
(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level.
(4) Its projection on unofficial level.
(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.
I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once. There follows:

[edit]
Part 1: Basic Features of Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine
Are as Follows:
(a) USSR still lives in antagonistic ‘capitalist encirclement’ with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers:
‘In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world.’
(b) Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.
(c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states, and wars of intervention against socialist world. Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter.
(d) Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.
(e) Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership.
(f) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes (1) certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in acceptable communistic parties and (2) certain other elements (now described for tactical reasons as progressive or democratic) whose reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be ‘objectively’ favorable to interests of USSR These last must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes.
(g) Among negative elements of bourgeois-capitalist society, most dangerous of all are those whom Lenin called false friends of the people, namely moderate-socialist or social-democratic leaders (in other words, non-Communist left-wing). These are more dangerous than out-and-out reactionaries, for latter at least march under their true colors, whereas moderate left-wing leaders confuse people by employing devices of socialism to seine interests of reactionary capital.
So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead from standpoint of Soviet policy? To following:
(a) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity must be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.
(b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia’s friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an ‘imperialist’ war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.
(c) ‘Democratic-progressive’ elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.
(d) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and social-democratic leaders abroad.

[edit]
Part 2: Background of Outlook
Before examining ramifications of this party line in practice there are certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.
First, it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power–party, secret police and Government–and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.
Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion ‘capitalist’ world of today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to improve conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been given chance to show what they could do.
Falseness of those premises, every one of which predates recent war, was amply demonstrated by that conflict itself Anglo-American differences did not turn out to be major differences of Western World. Capitalist countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of aim.
Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and disproven, are being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate? It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation beyond Russia’s borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today.
At bottom of Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.
It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin’s interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes most always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven [by?] necessities of their own past and present position to put forward which [apparent omission] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final Coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.
It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it forward. Many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question [apparent omission] self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this Government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth–indeed, their disbelief in its existence–leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policy makers–extent to which they are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisors whom they never see and cannot influence–this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which Western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.

[edit]
Part 3: Projection of Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy on Official Level
We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?
Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is conducted on two planes: (1) official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (2) subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.
Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated to serve basic policies (a) to (d) outlined in part 1. Actions taken on different planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in purpose, timing and effect.
On official plane we must look for following:
(a) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.
(b) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a ‘friendly Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under Communist control, question of Soviet base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.
(c) Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this purpose, Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to conclusion that it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they see better prospects for pursuit of these aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon UNO. This would imply, however, that they felt themselves strong enough to split unity of other nations by their withdrawal to render UNO ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, replace it with an international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which those nations defend in UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.
(d) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations, on theory that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor Communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of Western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of Soviet power. Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements. Thus we may expect to find Soviets asking for admission everywhere to trusteeship or similar arrangements and using levers thus acquired to weaken Western influence among such peoples.
(e) Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense Strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power. This applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries, etc.
(f) In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in 1930’s to desirability of building up international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviet’s own security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.
(g) With respect to cultural collaboration, lip service will likewise be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contacts between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with superabundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.
(h) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be called ‘correct’ course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol as distinct from good manners.

[edit]
Part 4: Following May Be Said as to What We May Expect by Way of Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies on Unofficial, or Subterranean Plane, i.e. on Plane for Which Soviet Government Accepts no Responsibility
Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on this plane are following:
1. Inner central core of Communist Parties in other countries. While many of persons who compose this category may also appear and act in unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a concealed Comintern tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow. It is important to remember that this inner core is actually working on underground lines, despite legality of parties with which it is associated.
2. Rank and file of Communist Parties. Note distinction is drawn between those and persons defined in paragraph 1. This distinction has become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign Communist Parties represented a curious (and from Moscow’s standpoint often inconvenient) mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and ordered underground, while rank and file–no longer even taken into confidence about realities of movement–are thrust forward as bona fide internal partisans of certain political tendencies within their respective countries, genuinely innocent of conspiratorial connection with foreign states. Only in certain countries where communists are numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as a body. As a rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as case may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools of Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes through [apparent omission] organizations, rather than by direct action as a separate political party.
3. A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor unions, youth leagues, women’s organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc.
4. International organizations which can be similarly penetrated through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and women’s organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital importance is attached in this connection to international labor movement. In this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking western governments in world affairs and building up international lobby capable of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR
5. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.
6. Pan-Slav movement and other movements (Azerbaijan, Armenian, Turcoman, etc.) based on racial groups within Soviet Union.
7. Governments or governing groups willing to lend themselves to Soviet purposes in one degree or another, such as present Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists, etc. Not only propaganda machines but actual policies of these regimes can be placed extensively at disposal of USSR
It may be expected that component parts of this far-flung apparatus will be utilized in accordance with their individual suitability, as follows:
(a) To undermine general political and strategic potential of major western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to spelt redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc.
(b) On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and influence of Western Powers of [on] colonial backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred. Mistakes and weaknesses of western colonial administration will be mercilessly exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in Western countries will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies. Resentment among dependent peoples will be stimulated. And while latter are being encouraged to seek independence of Western Powers, Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when independence is achieved.
(c) Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran), where they seal their territories off against Communist penetration (Switzerland, Portugal), or where they compete too strongly, like Labor Government in England, for moral domination among elements which it is important for Communists to dominate. (Sometimes, two of these elements are present in a single case. Then Communist opposition becomes particularly shrill and savage. [)]
(d) In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought into complete dependence on higher power. Thus, persons who are financially independent–such as individual businessmen, estate owners, successful farmers, artisans and all those who exercise local leadership or have local prestige, such as popular local clergymen or political figures, are anathema. It is not by chance that even in USSR local officials are kept constantly on move from one job to another, to prevent their taking root.
(e) Everything possible will be done to set major Western Powers against each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of unity or cohesion among other [apparent omission] from which Russia might be excluded. Thus, all forms of international organization not amenable to Communist penetration and control, whether it be the Catholic [apparent omission] international economic concerns, or the international fraternity of royalty and aristocracy, must expect to find themselves under fire from many, and often [apparent omission].
(f) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is doming But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command of key positions in administration and especially in police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par excellence, reared in the dim half world of Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of in ganging Soviet motives.

[edit]
Part 5: Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy
In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world’s greatest peoples and resources of world’s richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendentiously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve–and that without recourse to any general military conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:
(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventunstic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw–and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.
(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.
(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin’s death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin’s death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and–for the moment–highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.
(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.
For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:
(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.
(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.
(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit–Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.
(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.
(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.
KENNAN
800.00B International Red Day/2 - 2546: Airgram

“

(Via .)

     “The Stranger” is considered an odd duck in Welles directorial hierarchy. The film was seen as a test to see if Welles could work within the system, meaning could he stay within budget.  Many film scholars have dismissed it as contract job, unlike his first two films and his later work, which all had Welles personal stamp all over them. The film even slipped into the public domain resulting in a lot of cheap poor reproduced DVD’s which has not helped enhance its reputation. Only recently did MGM release a high quality version for home video.  While the movie does not have the flare or the visual stunningness of “Citizen Kane” or “The Magnificent Ambersons”, “The Stranger” has enough Wellesian, touches to distinguish it as a Welles film and even more important it is an entertaining film to watch.

    Today, there is nothing original about the story we’ve seen it before, the man on the run who changes his identity living in a small town (Shadow of a Doubt). The former Nazi war criminal who fled, and is now living in another country (The Boys of Brazil, Apt Pupil), yet Welles style is evident. We see it in the long takes, the expressionistic lighting and unusual camera angles. While the story today is common, in 1946 it was not. “The Stranger” is also notable for its use, only a year after the end of World War 2, of actual concentration camp footage used to reveal the truth about Franz Kindler (Orson Welles) to his father in-law and wife.

    Welles himself pretty much disowned “The Stranger”, seeing it only as a ‘gun for hire’ job. It is the only film he directed where someone else wrote the script (Victor Trivas), and where he did not have control over editing. He also had problems with producer Sam Spiegel. Originally, Welles wanted Agnes Moorhead in the role of Inspector Wilson however, Spiegel wanted a name with more star power and Edward G. Robinson was signed for the role. Welles and Robinson did not get along, during the filming.  Spiegel would go on to produce epics like “The Bridge on the Rive Kwai” and “Lawrence of Arabia.”

    The plot involves a convicted war criminal, Konrad Meinike (Konstantin Shayne), who is released from prison in hope that he will lead officials to the more notorious Nazi, Franz Kindler. An investigator from the War Crimes Commission, Inspector Wilson (Edward G. Robinson) is assigned to follow Meinike. As planned, Meinike leads Wilson to the small New England town of Harper, Connecticut where we find Kindler leading a new life as Charles Rankin, a professor at a nearby college. Rankin is about to marry Mary Longstreet (Loretta Young), the daughter of the prominent citizen Judge Longstreet. From this point on, it becomes a cat and mouse game between Wilson and Kindler/Rankin. As Wilson gathers more and more evidence, he comes closer and closer to forcing Kindler to reveal to all his real identity. 

    Orson Welles, whose acting was more in demand than he directing, is always on edge as his character becomes more and more trapped in a vice like grip until the final exciting climax. The always good Edward G. Robinson seems to be doing a variation of his Barton Keyes character from Billy Wilder’s “Double Indemnity.” Loretta Young is good as the naive wife who wants to believe her husband is innocent and not whom Wilson says he is. Also notable are a young Richard Long as Mary’s brother and Billy House who plays Mr. Potter, the checker playing General Store owner.

    Ironically, “The Stranger” is one of Welles few films to do well at the box office and the film was also nominated for Best Original Screenplay.  Due to its success, Welles was able to go on and make “The Lady from Shanghai” next. Admittedly, “The Stranger” is not in the class “Citizen Kane”, The Magnificent Ambersons” or “Touch of Evil”, it is a more standard thriller with some Wellesian touches thrown in however; it does not deserve to be more than just a footnote from Welles filmography and is certainly well worth seeing.  

New Delhi: The Nobel Foundation ignored not only Mahatma Gandhi but also India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, one of 20th century’s leading statesmen, for the peace prize, not once but on 11 occasions.

Though the details of past nominations are kept confidential, the foundation has opened the database for 1901-56. A search through it shows that the name of Nehru was under consideration during the early 1950s when he was building the foundations of a modern India.

In 1950, there were two nominations considered by the Nobel Committee. L R Sivasubramanian, a Delhi University professor of law, and M Venkatarangaiya, a Bombay University professor of political science, sent in the nominations.

Jens Arup Seip, a professor of the university of Oslo, did the evaluation of the nomination.

Coincidentally, the committee also considered nominations of Maharshi Aurobindo, a radical freedom fighter turned spiritual leader, and S. Radhakrishan, another freedom fighter and statesman who was to later become India’s president (1962-67).

In 1950, the most coveted prize in the world went to Ralph Bunche, an American political scientist and diplomat, for his late 1940s mediation in Palestine.

In 1951, Panditji, as he was popularly known, was nominated thrice. The nominations were sent in by Emily Greene Balch of the US, Nobel Peace Prize laureate of 1946, Lewis Hoskins on behalf of the American Friends Service Committee and Shrinavala Sarma on behalf of the “Professors at the University of Madras.”

All three nominations were evaluated by Seip.

Léon Jouhaux, a French trade union leader, won the peace prize in 1951.

Three more nominations in favour of Nehru were sent to Sweden two years later - all from Brussels. “Several Members of the Belgian National Assembly,” “Several Members of the Belgian Senate” and “Several Professors of the university of Bruxelles” were the nominators. K Getz Wold was the evaluator and August Schou also wrote an additional evaluation, according to the database.

The 1953 Peace laureate was George C Marshall, who led the US Army during World War II.

The year 1954 saw two nominations for Nehru, both along with British Prime Minister Clement Attlee “for their work for the peaceful settlement between Great Britain and India in 1947″. Seip himself was one of the nominators.

The honour that year went to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Edmond Privat, a professor of the Neuchatel university in Switzerland, again nominated Nehru in 1955. That year, no winner was announced and the prize money was “allocated to the Special Fund of this prize section.”

From movie “No Leave No Love” 1946, Caledonia
Frank “Sugarchile” Robinson

Sugar Chile Robinson was a child prodigy out of Detroit. He played boogie woogie piano about as ferociously as anyone ever did. He was only seven in the above video.

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TIMES NEWS NETWORK
Kolkata: Research scholar Purabi Roy on Wednesday claimed that thousands of men belonging to the Indian National Army (INA) were massacred at a camp in 1946.
She made this revelation while addressing a discussion on the implications of the Justice Manoj Mukherjee commission report.

“When Nehru visited Malaya to meet the INA men captured by the British forces, three ships had already left for Chittagong, Madras and Calcutta carrying the soldiers. About 29,000 INA men were taken to a camp in Nilgunge and massacred when negotiations for the INA property were on,” Roy said.

“INA’s property was worth $72,000 and that was divided among India, Pakistan and Britain,” she pointed out. Roy also claimed that the INA owned gold mines, diamond mines and rubber plantations. Commenting on the Centre’s rejection of the Justice Mukherjee commission report, Roy said successive Congress governments have not allowed the facts regarding Subhas Chandra Bose to come out.

“Whenever they are in power, inquiries into Netaji’s life and death are aborted. For 12 years, I have been struggling with this subject. Hopefully, one day we will be able to answer the questions raised by Justice Mukherjee about what happened to Netaji if he did not die in the air crash,” she added.

Former Union human resources development minister Murli Manohar Joshi said the Centre had not extended full cooperation to the Justice Mukherjee commission. “Unless the Centre takes up the matter with the Russian government, the archives there will not open their doors,” he claimed.

“In 1954, Prime Minister Nehru as foreign minister had received the ashes and remains. If this is true then whose ashes are kept in Renkoji? When the Shahnawaz committee was set up, the Indian government was aware that the death certificates issued in Taiwan were not related to Netaji but this fact was suppressed,” he added.

Joshi said Netaji’s early life has also been ignored. “It is not just that his death is shrouded in mystery. Even his earlier life is not presented properly. The history books eulogise only a few leaders. He was the first person to set up an Indian government in-exile. He was the first to declare India free.”

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Founded:1946 Number of teams in NBA:30

NBA annual turnover:$4 billion

Estimated value of new domestic TV deal:$7.5 billion

Highest-paid player:Kevin Garnett of the Boston Celtics who has an annual salary of $23.8m

Highest average attendance 2007-8:Detroit with 22,076

Lowest average attendance 2007-8:Indiana with 12,221

Number of regular season games played per team:82

Team with most title wins:Boston Celtics

A existat, incontestabil, o manipulare sovietică în România anilor 1946 şi 1968, vezi un studiu de caz  aici: http://www.ziua.ro/display.php?data=2008-09-27&id=243279 . Vasile Paraschiv a avut roluri de jucat, în folosul sovieticilor, şi în  1946 şi în 1968. Numai că jigodia care poartă pe nedrept titlul de “dizident anticomunist” este acum floare dalbă. Se uită responsabilitatea  muncitorului Vasile Paraschiv la instaurarea reprimării comuniste în România. Titlul unei cărţi publicate de Vasile Paraschiv la Editura Polirom era : “Lupta mea pentru sindicate libere în România. Terorismul politic organizat de statul comunist”. Cartea a fost bine primită de public. Iată un comentariu scris de domnul Adrian Neculau, în periodicul X din februarie 2006: “Am auzit mai demult de muncitorul Vasile Paraschiv şi de obsesia lui de a milita pe căi legale, în statul totalitarist comunist, pentru o organizaţie sindicală autentică, care să apere drepturile muncitorilor, să nu fie o curea de transmisie pentru partid.” Cum se poate explica obsesia tovarăşului Vasile Paraschiv de a milita pe căi legale în statul totalitarist comunist ? Citim o explicaţie în ziarul Y : “Vasile Paraschiv s-a înscris în PCR în 1946 din convingere.” Articolul respectiv nu elaborează intensitatea ori moralitatea convingerii, nici nu insistă pe timing-ul înscrierii lui Vasile Paraschiv în partidul comuniştilor din România la anul 1946. Să explicăm noi. Folosim informaţii publicate pe situl Memorialul Victimelor Comunismului şi al Rezistenţei. Aici intâlnim şi citatul: “Atunci când justiţia nu reuşeşte să fie o formă de memorie, memoria singură poate să fie o formă de justiţie. (Ana Blandiana)”  . Foarte frumos zis. Anul 1946 a înregistrat legitimarea de jure prin alegeri libere a victoriei comuniştilor internaţionalişti asupra României, sprijiniţi de cozile de topor din România, o victorie deja obţinută de facto la 6 martie 1945 de către comuniştii internaţionalişti veniţi în România pe tancuri sovietice. “Alegerile din 19 noiembrie 1946 au avut loc într-o atmosferă de tensiune maximă”, scrie pe situl mai sus amintit. Ceea ce este perfect adevărat. Dar, mai departe, vocea memoriei, în care doamna Ana Blandiana ne spune să avem încredere, păcătuieşte printr-o minciună prin omisiune. Să redăm mai întâi pasajul: “Un aparat administrativ agresiv, dublat de Armata Roşie, a fost mobilizat pentru a promova candidaţii Blocului şi, în special, pentru a împiedica opoziţia să-şi organizeze o campanie eficientă.” Lipseşte aici ceva extrem de important. Să deschidem, ca pe o cutie de conserve, şi fraza următoare: “Poliţia şi alte oficialităţi au împiedicat distribuirea ziarelor de opoziţie şi a materialelor de propagandă  ale acesteia”. Nu am redat până aici decât prima parte a frazei. Nici măcar până acum, situl patronat de doamna Ana Blandiana nu spune nimic despre chestia principală, care nu avea legătura cu administraţia, cu Armata Roşie, ori cu poliţia: mardeiaşii electorali comunişti, echipele de tineri muncitori care cooperau activ, chiar pro-activ, cu Armata Roşie. Este drept, mai departe fraza pune o enigmă într-un văl atunci când spune: “echipe speciale au spart adunarile national-taranistilor si liberalilor”. Ei bine, acele echipe speciale nu erau formate din terorişti arabi desantaţi din elicoptere, ci erau tineri muncitori îmbarcaţi în camioane care circulau cu mare viteză prin localităţile şi pe drumurile României. Cine plătea benzina? Ruşii? Nu cred. Oficialităţile româneşti? Probabil.  Însă care a fost forul cel mai înalt care încuviinţa hotărârile ce vor stabili soarta Europei de Est şi a României pentru o jumătate de veac ? Americanii, care plătiseră  complet până şi instruirea, echiparea şi hrănirea diviziilor Tudor Vladimirescu şi Horia, Cloşca şi Crişan. Este păcat că Memorialul Victimelor Comunismului şi al Rezistenţei trece sub tăcere aceste aspecte esenţiale în instaurarea regimului comunist în România. Din acele “echipe speciale”, –ador eufemismele!–, făcea parte şi Vasile Paraschiv care intrase în partid la vîrsta de doar 18 ani, în 1946. Tovarăşul Vasile Paraschiv avea suficiente amintiri personale să scrie o carte cel puţin la fel de veridică precum aceea prezentată mai sus, dar purtând de astă dată titlul: “Terorismul politic organizat de statul comunist pentru care am luptat si eu”. În autoritatea sa de mardeiaş electoral comunist, Vasile Paraschiv a contribuit cu muşchii lui de om tînăr la mânuirea bâtei de cealaltă parte. Mult mai târziu –din păcate–, Vasile Paraschiv a primit şi el nişte bâte. Efect de boomerang, s-ar putea chema aceasta. Ori răsplata, ce bine ar fi fost! pentru ceea ce făcuse pe vremuri. Şi nu i-a plăcut. Există un lanţ cauzal uşor detectabil. Vasile Paraschiv nu a fost bătut de cărturarii protocronişti români, aşa cum minte Raportul Tismăneanu. Vasile Paraschiv a suferit numai rigorile unei reglări de conturi de la inşi din gaşca al cărei membru fondator a fost. Tocmai acţiunea unora ca Vasile Paraschiv în 1946 a ajutat punerea pe roate a instituţiei de represiune Securitatea.

Titus Filipas

I am glad to come to Westminster College this afternoon and am complimented that you should give me a degree. The name Westminster is somehow familiar to me. I seem to have heard of it before. Indeed it was at Westminster that I received a very large part of my education in politics, dialectic, rhetoric and one or two other things.
It is also an honor, perhaps almost unique, for a private visitor to be introduced to an academic audience by the President of the United States. Amid his heavy burdens, duties and responsibilities—unsought but not recoiled from—the President has traveled a thousand miles to dignify and magnify our meeting here today and give me an opportunity of addressing this kindred nation, as well as my own countrymen across the ocean and perhaps some other countries, too. The President has told you that it is his wish, as I am sure it is yours, that I should have full liberty to give my true and faithful counsel in these anxious and baffling times. I shall certainly avail myself of this freedom and feel the more right to do so because any private ambitions I may have cherished in my younger days have been satisfied beyond my wildest dreams. Let me, however, make it clear that I have no official mission or status of any kind and that I speak only for myself. I can, therefore, allow my mind, with the experience of a lifetime, to play over the problems which beset us on the morrow of our absolute victory in arms, and try to make sure that what has been gained with so much sacrifice and suffering shall be preserved for the future glory and safety of mankind.

U.S. at Pinnacle of Power
The United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world power. It is a solemn moment for the American democracy. With primacy in power is also joined an awe-inspiring accountability to the future. As you look around you, you must feel not only the sense of duty done but also feel anxiety lest you fall below the level of achievement. Opportunity is here now, clear and shining, for both our countries. To reject it or ignore it or fritter it away will bring upon us all the long reproaches of the aftertime. It is necessary that constancy of mind, persistency of purpose and the grand simplicity of decision shall guide and rule the conduct of the English-speaking peoples in peace as they did in war. We must and I believe we shall prove ourselves equal to this severe requirement.
When American military men approach some serious situation they are wont to write at the head of their directive the words, ”over-all strategic concept.” There is wisdom in this as it leads to clarity of thought. What, then, is the over-all strategic concept which we should inscribe today? It is nothing less than the safety and welfare, the freedom and progress of all the homes and families of all the men and women in all the lands. And here I speak particularly of the myriad cottage or apartment homes, where the wage earner strives amid the accidents and difficulties of life, to guard his wife and children from privation and bring the family up in the fear of the Lord or upon ethical conceptions which often play their potent part.

Shield Homes From War
To give security to these countless homes they must be shielded from the two gaunt marauders—war and tyranny. We all know the frightful disturbance in which the ordinary family is plunged when the curse of war swoops down upon the bread winner and those for whom he works and contrives. The awful ruin of Europe, with all its vanished glories, and of large parts of Asia, glares in our eyes. When the designs of wicked men or the aggressive urge of mighty states dissolve, over large areas, the frame of civilized society, humble folk are confronted with difficulties with which they cannot cope. For them all is distorted, broken or even ground to pulp.
When I stand here this quiet afternoon I shudder to visualize what is actually happening to millions now and what is going to happen in this period when famine stalks the earth. None can compute what has been called ”the unestimated sum of human pain.” Our supreme task and duty is to guard the homes of the common people from the horrors and miseries of another war. We are all agreed on that.
Our American military colleagues, after having proclaimed the ”over-all strategic concept” and computed all available resources, always proceed to the next stop, namely the method. Here again there is widespread agreement. A world organization has already been erected for the prime purpose of preventing war. United Nations Organization, the successor of the League of Nations, with the decisive addition of the United States and all that that means, is already at work. We must make sure that its work is fruitful, that it is a reality and not a sham, that it is a force for action and not merely a frothing of words, that it is a true temple of peace in which the shields of many nations can some day be hung and not merely a cockpit in a tower of Babel. Before we cast away the solid assurances of national armaments for self-preservation, we must be certain that our temple is built not upon shifting sands or quagmires, but upon the rock. Any one with his eyes open can see that our path will be difficult and also long, but if we persevere together as we did in the two world wars—though not, alas, in the interval between them—I cannot doubt that we shall achieve our common purpose in the end.

United Air Units
I have, however, a definite and practical proposal to make for action. Courts and magistrates cannot function without sheriffs and constables. The United Nations Organization must immediately begin to be equipped with an international armed force. In such a matter we can only go step by step; but we must begin now. I propose that each of the powers and states should be invited to dedicate a certain number of air squadrons to the service of the world organization. These squadrons would be trained and prepared in their own countries but would move around in rotation from one country to another. They would wear the uniform of their own countries with different badges. They would not be required to act against their own nation but in other respects they would be directed by the world organization. This might be started on a modest scale and grow as confidence grew. I wished to see this done after the first world war and trust it may be done forthwith.
It would nevertheless be wrong and imprudent to intrust the secret knowledge or experience of the atomic bomb, which the United States, Great Britain and Canada now share, to the world organization, while it is still in its infancy. It would be criminal madness to cast it adrift in this still agitated and ununited world. No one in any country has slept less well in their beds because this knowledge and the method and the raw materials to apply it are at present largely retained in American hands. I do not believe we should all have slept so soundly had the positions been reversed and some Communist or neo-Fascist state monopolized, for the time being, these dread agencies. The fear of them alone might easily have been used to enforce totalitarian systems upon the free democratic world, with consequences appalling to the human imagination. God has willed that this shall not be, and we have at least a breathing space before this peril has to be encountered, and even then, if no effort is spared, we should still possess so formidable superiority as to impose effective deterrents upon its employment or threat of employment by others. Ultimately, when the essential brotherhood of man is truly embodied and expressed in a world organization, these powers may be confided to it.

Tyranny Is Second Danger
I now come to the second danger which threatens the cottage home and ordinary people, namely tyranny. We cannot be blind to the fact that the liberties enjoyed by individual citizens throughout the British Empire are not valid in a considerable number of countries, some of which are very powerful. In these states, control is enforced upon the common people by various kinds of all-embracing police governments, to a degree which is overwhelming and contrary to every principle of democracy. The power of the state is exercised without restraint, either by dictators or by compact oligarchies operating through a privileged party and a political police. It is not our duty at this time, when difficulties are so numerous, to interfere forcibly in the internal affairs of countries whom we have not conquered in war, but we must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom and the rights of man, which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world and which, through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the habeas corpus, trial by jury and the English common law, find their most famous expression in the Declaration of Independence.
All this means that the people of any country have the right and should have the power by constitutional action, by free, unfettered elections, with secret ballot, to choose or change the character or form of government under which they dwell, that freedom of speech and thought should reign, that courts of justice independent of the executive, unbiased by any party, should administer laws which have received the broad assent of large majorities or are consecrated by time and custom. Here are the title deeds of freedom, which should lie in every cottage home. Here is the message of the British and American peoples to mankind. Let us preach what we practice and practice what we preach.
I have now stated the two great dangers which menace the homes of the people. I have not yet spoken of poverty and privation which are in many cases the prevailing anxiety. But if the dangers of war and tyranny are removed, there is no doubt that science and co-operation can bring in the next few years—certainly in the next few decades—to the world, newly taught in the hard school of war, an expansion of material well being beyond anything that has yet occurred in human experience. Now, at this sad, breathless moment, we are plunged in the hunger and distress which are the aftermath of our stupendous struggle; but this will pass and may pass quickly, and there is no reason except human folly or subhuman crime which should deny to all the nations the inauguration and enjoyment of an age of plenty. I have often used words which I learned fifty years ago from a great Irish-American orator, Mr. Bourke Cockran, ”There is enough for all. The earth is a generous mother; she will provide in plentiful abundance food for all her children if they will but cultivate her soil in justice and in peace.” So far we are evidently in full agreement.

Fraternal Association
Now, while still pursuing the method of realizing our over-all strategic concept, I come to the crux of what I have traveled here to say. Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States. This is no time for generalities. I will venture to be precise. Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendsh